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FEBRUARY AND AFTER.
THE COM~UNISTPARTY'S ASSUMPTION OF
UNDIVIDED POWER AND THE SUBSEQUENT
CHANGES IN PARTY POLICIES.
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• The most dramatic event of immediate post-war Czechoslovak~
history was the Communist victory in february 1948. This was in
a sense the climax of developments over the immediately preceding
years and also of the whole of KSC history. In another sense it
was an anti-climax because it eliminated, or led to the elimination
of, a number of possible roads for Czechoslovakia's development.
Above all, the road of development based on broad national unity
and a genuine plurality of parties was effectively ruled out.
Part VI therefore tries to set the february events within the
wider context of the post-war development of Czechoslovakia and of
the Czechoslovak road to socialism. This means looking at the
immediate causes of the crisis, at the course of the crisis itself
and finally at the wider consequences of the kSC victory.
The Communists' activities in february can be conceptually
separated into two aspects. The first was the public political
defeat and hence paralysis of the National Socialists following the
mobilisation of an enormous body cf ...opinion. The second aspect was
the intensification and exploitation of this paralysis by the KSC
so as to effectively eliminate the National Socialists, and their
right-wing allies, from a share in power. This restructuring of
power was carried through with the minimum of public involvement
and meant that the KSC leadership acquired a quite enormous con-
centration of power.
It was a very important factor in post-february development
that many workers and many ordinary party members saw themselves as
the victors, but the realities of power meant that they had no more
direct influence over decision making than in the ,pre-february
- 3 -
• system.
The events during the rest of 1948 revealed the deep conflicts
and problems within post-February Czechoslovakia. There were im-
portant elements of continuity in the lasting social and economic
problems, but a striking discontinuity in the implications for
policy formation of the accession of the KSC to undivided power
and hence their implicit assumption of responsibility for the
whole development and activity of society. It seemed, in fact,
that the Communists were simply not up to the enormOus task they
had taken on. Their past had not led to the development of general
or theoretical concepts from which they could formulate ideas for
a model of socialism suitable to Czechoslovakia at that time.
Instead, confronted with the new problems, they sought solutions
from an old and familiar, but quite unsuitable, theoretical basis.
The comparison with pre-February society is revealing. Although
the National Socialists had many faults and weaknesses which con-
tributed to their defeat, and although they were themselves incapable
of positively leading Czechoslovak society, they had deeply in-
fluenced KS~ policy. They had ensured that policy measures had to
be argued for and publicly Justified.;!n pragmatic terms. After
February that was no longer necessary.
I
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CHAPTER 36: THE IMMEDIATE PRELUDE TO THE rEBRUARY CRISIS.
VI.36.1. The National Socialists become more confident as dis-
agreements within the government are intensified.
Although 1948 did not begin with a complete deadlock in the
government, there certainly were deepening differences. Particularly
serious was the apparent standstill over the principal task set
for parliament, the formulation and passing of a new constitution.
Broadly speaking, there were two sides with the National Socialists
advocating only a few modifications to the 1920 constitution, while
the KSC wanted to codify and incorporate many of the post-war
1changes without restricting the scope for further socialist change •
h concrete terms, agreement seemed impossible over the questions of
Czech-Slovak relations, National Committees and the nationalised
industries. In this last case the National Socialists wanted a
constitutional guarantee that no more could be nationalised while
the KSC wanted to leave that open and preferred to insist that
nothing could be denationalised2•
If a new constitution could not be approved, then the govern-
ment could not complete its programme. The National Socialists
3 4were prepared to accept this and joined with the People's Party
in advocating early elections. The date they pressed for, at the
1Bou~ek, Klime§: Dramatick~, p.44.
28ou~ek: Praha, p.112-113.
3SS 7/2/48, p.1.
4ror their Executive Committee's statement, advocating elections as
soon as possible, see LO 27/1/48, p.1 •
.It:
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National Front meeting on 5/2/48, was 18/4/48 while the Slovak
Democrats picked on 25/4/48. The Communists and Social Democrats,
however, wanted to delay as long as possible and chose 23/5/485•
The timing of the elections could be very important in deciding
their outcome as the Communists needed time to build up their
campaign while the right-wing parties wanted to prevent this: the
completion of the programme itself could also help raise the
Communists' prestige as it was essentially their programme •. The
Social Democrats, as is argued below, found themselves pulled both
ways but they definitely wanted the programme completed. Moreover,
as lau~man sensibly pointed out, there was no reason to suppose that
agreement could be reached more easily after the elections6•
Despite some nervousness the National Socialists seem to have
been generally confident of markedly reducing the KSC vote. This billsf
7was shared by Bene! and J. Masaryk and was said to be based on
the results of a public opinion poll that had been suppressed by
8Kopecky but nevertheless leaked out. The claim in numerous
western sources is that the KSC vote was expected to drop from 38%
to 29%9. SimiAar' claims can be found in National Socialist pub-
10lications long before any reference was made to an opinion poll •
,
10livot strany, 31/5/47, p.1.
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In fact, it seems that, although there was an opinion poll, its
11results were never even calculated • Anyway, it would have been
of very limited value in so fluid a political situation with so
much scope for vigorous campaigning or even events abroad to affect
the final outcome. There is certainly no sign of the Communists
regarding the outcome as easily predictable like they had in 1946.
They apparently conducted their own survey, as they had in 1946,
which suggested that they could win 55% of the votes in the Czech
lands. This, however, was not a firm prediction, but an estimate
dependent on the condition that their campaigning would prove
effective12•
Changes in the membership of parties do not give a definite
indication for the elections either. All the parties were growing
"as political conflicts became sharper. The National Socialists
made some losses in re-registration of members over the new year
so that their total was 602,056 on 31/1/48 compared with 593,982
13in September 1946 • The KSC, with no re-registration to disrupt
the impression of uninterupted growth, drew near to the target of
one and a half million: they were claiming more memRbers than all
the other parties put together. They may, however, have been
recru~ing mostly their former supporters: they still lacked a firm
membership base among peasants, office workers and the urban petty
11 et al: Na rozhranl, p. 206-207.BeIda,
12 et al: Na rozhrani', p.204-205.BeIda,
13pavlleek: Politick~, p.101-102.
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14bourgeoisie •
Within this fluid situation the NationalSocialists seem to
have become more confident. Gottwald's speech to the November
xsC Central Committee meeting was interpreted as "a defensive
15speech" and as expressing fear at the course of events • The
electoral defeat of the KSC was confidently predicted after which
it was assumed that genuine cooperation within the gove~nment
16could be renewed , presumably on terms laid down by the National
Socialists. Their confidence was such that Ripka could foresee a
KSC victory only if the Soviet Union actively intervened: he
convinced himself, owing to their cautious attitude on the situation
in Greece, that the Soviet leadership were scared ~o go too far in
offending the West and would therefore hesitate to send troops
into Czechoslovakia1?
Confidence was raised particularly when it seemed that the
leaders of other parties were also nervous about the Communists'
possible intentions. Scope was therefore created for an anti-KSC
bloc which, as it could unite a majority of MPs, could have the
strength to block the development of the Communists' campaign
and force an early election. Towards this end, discussions were
held between Drtina and lettrich in January 1948 on a possible
common approach between their two parties. The KSC were able to
14 'Ka§par: "Clensk~", p.11.
15 .Svobodn¥ z!tfek, 4/12/47, p.1, editorial.
16e•g• J. Bene§, Svobodny z!tfek, 8/1/48, p.3.
1?Ripka: Czechoslovakia, p.137 and p.141.
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18expose this to the public and the National Socialists, having
previously expressed total opposition to any "blocs", were acutely
embarrassed. The discussions were, it was claimed in defence, no
19more than na natural affair between decent people" • Nevertheless,
they did indicate the two parties' desire to coordinate actions.
Even more encouraging for the National Socialists was lau~man's
fear of KSe victory in the elections which he thought would be
"a jump into the dark". This led him to welcome secret contacts
with Zenkl which, unfortunately for them, were publicised by the
20KSC albeit with exaggerated claims about the extent of agreement •
The Social Democrats had particular cause for concern as,
following the Communist Party's November Central Committee meeting,
an organised left wing was taking shape within their own party.
It has been claimed that this was entirely directed by the KSC,
as part of the policy evolved at the November 1947 Central Committee
21meeting ,and it was soon openly challenging the leadership and
hence the unity of the party with its own journal and a firm base
in Hradec Kr~lov~. It was, however, not afraid to criticise the
KSC and to argue for a strong Social Democracy as the backbone and
unifier of the National front. It did not support the demands for
18RP 28/1/48, p.1.
19ss 30/1/48, p.1.
20RP 17/2/48, p.1, and Soueek, Klime~: Dramatick~, p.91-92. The
SOcial Democrats, of course, denied that any agreement had been
reached and described the newspaper stories as a fabrication in
the tradition of Svobodn~ slovo; £1 18/2/48, p.1.
21J• Svec: Onor, p.317-321.
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further nationalisations and gave great prominence to allegiance to
22the heritage of T.G. Masaryk • Nevertheless, its existence could
certainly justify lau~man becoming more nervous of anything outside
23the scope of the National tront as it had previously been understood •
The National Socialists evidently hoped to exploit this nervous-'
ness to create a bloc against the KSe. They seem to have consciously
decided to minimise criticisms of the Social Democrats: instead, for
example, they defended Majer against KSC criticisms24•
VI.36.2. The National Socialists succeed in forming a bloc
against the K5C in the government, but the Communists
respond by preparing to mobilise working class support
for a major confrontation.
The National Socialists finally succeeded in ensuring another
defeat for the KSC in the government on 10/2/48. The issue was
the ORO proposal on civil servants' pay which the KSe supported.
Two other proposals were then presented. Drtina advocated a linear
25% rise in wages and also an increase in pensions. Majer advocated
a smaller overall rise but with more for the highest paid and an
increase in pensions too. During the meeting Drtina withdrew his
suggestion so as to support Majer's thereby ensuring it a majority
25in the government • This could be a cause for pleasure and even
22~, 26/1/48, p.1, and 5/2/48, p.13.
23An important part of lau~man's discussions with Zenkl had been the
insistence that only the existing parties, with the same titles,
could take part in the ,elections; BE. 17/2/48, p.1.
245ee the National Socialists' Presidium statement, ~ 5/12/47, p.1.
25~ 22/1/48, p.1.
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surprise for the Social Democrats, as they had asserted, md won with
their own independent line. The National Socialists too could be
happy at having defeated both the KSC and ORO. The traB unions,
26however, continued to reject Majer's proposal •
They claimed that it'had been extremely difficult to present
a united position on civil servants' pay. All the civil servants'
unions had wanted an increase in pensions, but had accepted the
Presidium's objections that there could be no case for the pre-
27ferential treatment of one group of employees • The ORO proposal
was not held up as an ideal solution but rather as a difficult
compromise that left plenty of other unions in the embarrassing
position of holding back their dWn members because of the serious
economic· situation. Zapotocky therefore argued that to accept the
civil servants' wishes would open the way for a free for all
28with disastrous consequences for the economy •
So the government's vote could be presented as an attack on the
power, competence and unity of the trade union movement and an
insult after the responsible way the unions had restrained their
members. This was not changed when leading Social Democrats,
including many on the left of the party, insisted that the ad-
ditional expense over the ~RO proposal was so small as not to
29damage the economy • The issue was presented rather as a point
of principle.
26.ru:22/1/48, p.1.
27 .Pr~c8, 25/1/48, p.1.
28prace, 23/1/48, p.1.
29£1 17/2/48, p.1.
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This refusal, by the KS~ and URO, to accept a compromise was
undoubtedly a consequence of the preceding KSC Central Committee
meeting. It was believed there that a sharp struggle prior to
the elections would take place: a rebuff to the trade unions was
reckoned, at the KSC Presidium meeting of 9/2/48, to give maximum
scope for a broadly based offensive against the other parties
30around the general demand for further nationalisations • Prior
to that Zapotocky had hinted at the need to find a means to finance
wage rises without increasing production. References began appearing
to "a road of struggle" and to a possible congress of factory
Councils31•
A second government rejection of the ORO proposal therefore
did not lead to a retreat, but instead to a statement from Zapotocky
that !ll the questions worrying the trade unions about the govern-
ment.would be put to an all-state congress of trade union groups
d r t C i t 1 d obI 32an ac ory ounc Is 0 be ca le as soon as poss~ e • To be
fully representative there would have to be 30,000 delegates but
no building in Prague could hold so many so the numbers had to be
33restricted~ •
newThe mainAissue to be included was the question of nationalisa-
tions which was posed in such a way that it could be certain of
widespread support and particularly solid backing from the workers
30 p.253.R~fieka: BQtl,
31 23/1/48, p.1.Prace,
32 11/2/48, p.1 and p.2.Pr~ce,
33 12/2/48, p.1.Prace,
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in big nationalised factories. Disagreements had smouldered through
1947 but they were suddenly thrust into the forefront of attention
in early 1948, The iss~e was the Orion chocolate factory which
had been nationalised on 9/1/46 because it was judged to be part
of a big concern. Its US shareholders appealed against this to
the Supreme Court and their case was upheld. Naturally, the wor~ers
awere bitterly opposed to the decision. It could be~dangerous pre-
cedent too as there were 140 similier appeals awaiting consideration.
The government therefore discussed the case on 3/2/48. Zenkl
argued for accepting the court's decision but Mejer, who was backed
by the KSC, argued for installing a national administrator until
34the case could be settled • This, together with delays in in-
corporating confiscates into nationalised industries, the failure
of the private sector in the plan and accusations against black,
marketeers, could provide the Communists with a good basis for
developing their offensive around a demand for further nationalisations.
The build up to the congress was coordinated between the trade
union and KSC leaderships. It was also reinforced by the Communist,
press which prominently publicised the extent of capitalists'
profits and devoted great attention to the proposals for a com-
prehensive social insurance scheme that were raised by KSC ministers
in the 13/2/48 government meeting.
It is still unclear exactly what results the KSC expected from
34soueek, Klime§: Dramaticke, p.39-40. The KSC had previously
called for definitive nationalisation and had argued against
excessive pedantry in interpreting nationalisation decrees;
RP 3/2/48. Evidently, they too could line up behind Social
Q;mocrats' proposals against their real enemies.
- 13 -
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the congress of ractory Councils, but Gottwald later implied that
the aim was to repeat the experience of the campaign over the
millionaires' tax when, by carefully choosing and presenting the
issue, many people who had previously wavered were apparently
convinced that the National Socialist leaders really were
35"reactionaries" • This fits with the articles appearing arguing
that the leaders of some parties were defending enormous profits
which were going to only a handful of capitalists36• It still
leaves open whether the congress was to be part of a longer
campaign37, or whether it was to coincide with an immediate attempt
to create a "new" National rront or to change the composition of
the government.
Irrespective of these ambiguities even the Social Democrats,
who were likely to support demands for further nationalisstions,
were nervous enough to oppose the calling of the Congress of
ractory Councils. They claimed that, owing to the restriction
imposed on the number of delegates, it would under-represent office
38workers who tended to be employed in smaller enterprises • They
were particularly concerned at the apparent creation of a situation
35Gottwald, speaking to the Central Committee meeting of 9/4/48,
Splsy, XIV, p.358.
36 .e.g. RP 15/2/48, p.1 contains an estimate of the sile of these
profits.
37Gottwald implied that ,this may have been the,case when he
reminded the KSC Central Committee on 9/6/48 that they had only
expected to implement the further nationalisations after the
elections; Gottwald: Spisy, XIV, p.426.
3BpL 15/2/48, p.1. Apparently office workers were well represented;
RO!ieka: ROH, p.310. ror the full figures on representation ot
different-unions, see L. Leh~r: SJezd velk~ho rozhodov~nr, Praha,
196B, p.12B-129.
of"dual power" with trade unions arrogating for themselves the
39right to watch over and Judge the government •
They viewed with similar apprehension the apparent determination
of the KSe to force a confrontation over agricultural policy. The
Agricultural Committee of parliament refused to accept in full the
Hradec programme at its meeting on 11/2/48 and the KSC Presidium then
40decided to call a peasant congress • This was done by the "Kladno
Regional Action Committee of Peasant CommissionsV. It called for
an all-state Congress of Peasant Commissions to discuss the fate
of the Hradec programme and the question of the prices of agricultural
products which was in turn related to the issue of profits in the
41distribution system • The response from villages was extraordinarily
rapid with 22% sending in resolutions of support by 22/2/4842•
The Social Democrats, however, ·joined the National Socialists in
43condemning the congress as illegal • Their argument, backed by
the majority of the JSCZ leadership, was that the JSCZ was the only
legitimate representative body for peasants. Nevertheless, the
congress was held at the end of february.
39Ci1, 20/2/48, p.81.
40 Kaplan: "dloha", p.
41Jech: Probuzen~, p.426-427.
42 'Kaplan: "Ulohan,
43£h 18/1/48, p.1, and ~ 18/2/48, p.1.
VI.36.3. The National Socialists, nervous about the developing
Communist offensive, believe that they can win an
important tactical victory by creating an alliance
against increasing Communist domination of the
police force.
As preparations were being made for the Congress of factory
Co~ls, there seemed to be grounds for both nervousness and
optimism on both sides. The KSC could be satisfied that their
demands seemed to be immediately welcomed by the mass of workers.
Meetings showed great enthusiasm for calls for passing the new
constitution and laws directly benefiting the working class, for
further nationalisations - to include part of the distribution
system and all enterprises with over fifty employees - and for
supporting the ORO position on civil servant's pay. Resolutions
were soon flooding in at a faster pace than during the dispute over
the millionaires' tax44• There were some agns of opposition to the
45Congress from some office workers ,but it appeared to be only
a small minority.
The National Socialists could feel reassured that precisely
this situation was making even the Social Democrats nervous. They
believed that they had the strength to deflate the impact of the
Congress of ractory Coucils, achieve the isolation of the KSt in
46the government and thereby force early elections • The key to this
was to be the issue of Communist domination of the police force
which had reached such a stage as to lead even Social Democrats to
47suggest that the KSC might have been preparing an "armed putch".
44~ 19/2/48, p.1, and following days.
45e.g. 1£ 20/2/48, p.1-2.
49Ripka:Czechoslovakia, esp. p.20e,
47£1 30/1/48, p.1.
The National.Socialists had often appeared to be making
48exaggerated and sens~alised accusations against the police ,
and these were stepped up in the autumn of 1947 with warnings of
an imminent police state49• They, in fact, did not believe that
the KSe had the strength to stage a coup against the existing
government on the basis of its position within the police force.
BeneS even thought that half the police and effectively the whole
army would follow him rather than the KSe50• There certainly was
a significant anti-Communist presence within the union represenb~ng
51the police ,and the union's journal was full of concern about the
conditions of work and the need for higher pay for policemen who
were classified as civil servants52• Nevertheless, the police union
did definitely follow the line of the ROH leadership in late 194753•
The army, with 140,000 men compared with 40,000 in all the
different sections of the police force, was potentially far more
powerful. 54Although there was a definite KS~ presence , Bene~
48 See above Sections 111.13.2 and IV.29.2.
49e.g. Hora, ~ 18/12/47, p.1-2.
50J• Korbel: The Communist Subversion of Czechoslovakia 193a-
1948; the Failure of Coexistence, London, 1959, p.199.
51, ,V. Kroupa: "Unor 1948 a Sbor n~rodn! bezpefnosti", Unor a
ceskoslovensk~, p.8S-a6. See also BeIda, et all Na rozhranf,
p.220.,
52 ..tMrodnf bezpe~nost, ·10/12/46, and later· issues.
53e•9• M. BartoS, Narodn! bezpeenost, 15/11/47, p.173.
54 ~Apparently there was a small but powerful group of KS~ officers
partly balanced ~y "outright reactionaries". The typical army
officer vacillated around the middle of the Czechoslovak political
spectrum; J. Liptak, Spie~k: "dnor", p.148-149.
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could have based his optimism on an unmistakable tendency for even
Svoboda to dissociate himself from the Communists' campaigning
methods. Disagreements even became open when, evidently in the
expectation of a major power struggle, the KSC began calling for
a purge of army officers on the grounds that many had been in-
disputably pro-German during the war55• Svoboda sharply rejected
h t· 56suc sugges lons •
Even if this made a "police coup" an improbable eventuality,
there were three new factors which made the National Socialists'
case more serious. These were the personnel policy of the Ministry
of the Interior, the course of investigations into the assassin-
ation attempt on three government ministers and the behaviour of
the security forces in early 1948.
Nosek naturally continued to maintain in public that appoint~
ments were not made on party terms and he backed this with the
insistence that changes he instituted were not opposed by non-
C i t ·th· h' i' t 57ommun s S Wl ln 18 m n~s ry • Nevertheless, the true situation
was revealed in a speech to KSC policemen in Prague on 19/1/48. He
revealed there that half of Prague's policemen had joined the KS~,
but this did hot mean compete domination. He left no doubt about
his aim when he pronounced: "You certainly know that, in connection
with the implementation of the law on the police, we have carried
55B£ 30/11/47, p.2.
56pL 21/1/48, p.1.
57See his speech to tha 8U~et Committee of parliament on 26/11/47,
Cesta k lidove, asp. p.131-132.
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out an exchange of personnel and also a reorganisation in the
Ministry. Wa want to continua in this way so as to have the
58leading posts and the commanding positions in our hands" • This
was apparently justified because only Communists were "the best
and most reliable patriots",while others were judged to be un-
reliable in their support for People's Democracy.
So, although Nosek was definitely trying to ensure Communist
domination of the police, it was still not clear what role this
would play in party-political struggles.
It seemed, however, that the National Socialists could demon-
strate direct police partisanship in the investigations of the
attempted assassinations. The police believed that the boxes
containing the bombs had been made in Prague and seemed unwilling ~o
consider any other possibility59. They had, however, also invest-
igated the possibility that they had been made in the Moravian
village of Kr~m6n by a carpenter who boasted while drunk that he
had been involved in the assassination attempt and apparently never
60altered his story afterwards • The National Socialists used their~
in the Ministry of ~ustice to continue investigations and give them
full publicity. Drtina even presented the findings to parliament and
Svobodne slovo did not hesitate to sensationalise, for party-political
ends, claiming that five people held in Krem6~, all KSC members,
58Cesta k lidov~, p.147.
59B£ 22/1/48, p.1.
60~ 21/11/47, p.1-2 and 25/11/47, p.1, and ~ 22/11/47, p.1.
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had actually committed the crime61• Drtina tried further to implicate
the whole KS~ by linking up the assassination attempt with a dis-
covery of arms apparently stored by the KSC MP Jura-Sosnar.
Although the MP denied responsidlity he resigned from all positions
to allow investigations to procede without becoming a focus for
party-political disputes62• He also complained that Drtina had made
charges against him in a parliamentary speech before he had even
63been questioned on the case •
Gottwald seems to have believed that the National Socialists
were revealing more aggresS!ive intentions with their "provocation"
64over the assasination attempts • The evidence presented by
Drtins was, however, powerful: under normal conditions it would
have to have been taken seriously. It has been suggested that the
Communist leaders were unaware of what was happening within the
police force and security organs and found themselves defending
actions that they could not control and preventing investigations
65of what was really happening • Presumably the problems were being
caused by party members, particularly within the organs of power,
who doubted tha party's ability to win in the elections and therefore
61S5 22/1/48, p.1, and 28/1/48, p.1. Some emigr~ writers have
8Iaborated even on this claiming, for example, that there was
conclusive proof that the KSC Presidium had known all about the
assasnnation attempts; e.g. J. Josten: Oh My Country, London,
1949, p.78.
62Ei 22/1/48, p.1 and p.2, and Ei 24/1/48, p.2.
63LD 24/1/48, p.1.
64KSS dok, p.616.
65 ,..;J. Svec: ~, p.404.
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66wanted to use other means to change things •
This could have applied more clearly to the behaviour of
security organs over the so-called Most spy affair. Drtina claimed
that agents provocateurs had been used to show links between a spy
group, allegedly working for the West, and leading National Socialists67•
Obviously, this could have had an enormous impact on the elections,
but it could also give the National Socialists an opportunity to
raise still more forcefully the issue of Communist domination of
the police and security forces.
In fact, they chose to stage a confrontation over personnel
changes~ the Prague police. During the government meeting of
13/2/48 a report reached the National Socialist ministers of further
changes which, they beliEved, transferred ei~ht senior police officers
out of Prague into provincial posts. It proved possible, even though
Nosek was absent, to create a bloc against the KS~ and demand the
reversal of these most recent changes. The National Socialists then
refused to attend arofrer government meeting until this resolution
was carried out. When the decisive meeting was to take place, on
20/2/48, Svobodn~ slovo published a lengthy article under the title
"We will not allow a police regime". The content was less sensation-
alist than usual: the essential message was that BO% of decisive
6Bpositions in the police were held by the KS~ • Irrespective of
66 ~ ,J. ~vec: ~, p.40S.
67see the Ministry of Justice statement, ~ 22/2/48, p.3.
68~ 20/2/48, p.1-2.
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the truth of the article's claims, it can hardly be expected that
a windy and controversial account ' in a highly partisan paper could
have transformed the political situation so completely as to push in-
to the background questions of completing the government programme,
of ration shortages and of the international situation.' Ripka,
however, later even suggested that KSC proposals for a social
insurance scheme were intended purely to divert attention from the
i f th 1· 69 d h . 1· d th tit f thssue 0 e po ~ce ,an e even ~mp ~e a a v r ue 0 e
Svobodn~ slovo article was that it was the first time the public
70had been informed of the situation in the Ministry of the Interior •
Under these circumstances, the KSC was more than willing to
invite a confrontation. Nosek was even preparing a reply which
would prove that the National Socialists had received so inaccurate
an account of the changes in the police force as to make the govern-
ment's resolution meaningless71•
Before attending the government meeting, the National Socialist
ministers asked whether the preceding meeting's resolution had been
implemented. On hearing only that Nosek was preparing a statement,
they felt their own inside information to have been confirmed. They
therefore handed in their resignations to the President and to the
Prime Minister. The People's and Democratic Parties followed.
69Ripka: Czechoslovakia, p.193-194.
70Ripka: Czechoslovakia, p.223.
71soueek, Klime~: Dramatick~, p.120. See also Gottwald's speech
to the Central Committee meeting of 9/4/48, Spisy, XIV, p.361.
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After that they sat back and waited. It is not clear exactly
what they expected to gain: although the action had been discussed
beforehand there were strong doubts about it within the leaderships
• of the three parties and there had been no attempt to gain the
72prior approval of the Social Democrats or of the non-party Ministers •
There had previously been some suggestions of repeating the french
or Italian experiences and expelling the KSC from the government.
There could then have been a new government headed by Zenkl or
73Masaryk or a government of officials • This would have been the
ideal outcome for the National Socialist~ but more likely the hope
was that the KSC would give way rather than face a government crisis:
74apparently 8ene~ generally encouraged this belief • They could then
have hoped for the reversal of the most recent changes in the police
75and early elections .which would have taken place before completion
of the government programme and without agreement on the new consti-
tution, and also without any political involvement from the security
forces.
VI.36.4. Summary and discussion.
1948 began in an atmosphere of increasing tension between parties.
Deadlock was imminent on a number of important issues, so that the
72for summaries of the confused situation, see BeIda, et al: Na
rozhrani, p.230. and J. Svec: Unor, p.440.
73Selda, et al: Na rozhrani, p.220.
74Ripka: Czechoslovakia, p.217 and p.219.
75selda,et al: Na rozhrani, p.232, and Ripka: Czechoslovakia, p.203.
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forthcoming elections looked increasingly like the decisive struggle
for power. Nobody could confidently predict the result and this only
accentuated nervousness as all sides could foresee possibilities of
both triumph and oisaster.
The National Socialists were pleased that the Communists'
aggressiveness seemed to be increasing the chances of an anti-KSC
bloc. They were even able to isolate the KSC in the government when
the URO proposal for adjustments in civil servants' pay was rejected
by a majority vote.
Instead of meekly accepting defeat, the KSC decided to step up
their offensive. Almost immediately, mobilisation of the working
class was started as ORO called a Congress of Factory Councils to
discuss!!! their grievances with government policy.
This was potentially very aangerous for the National Socialists
who had built a shaky unity around little more than fears of the
Communists' intentions. That was not enough to achieve their
immediate aim of defeating the KSC and forcing early elections on
favourable terms. For this they had to take the initiative away
from the demands of the Factbry Councils.
They chose the issue of increasing KSC domination of the police.
They were genuinely concerned, but believed that they could exploit
the issue to their own advantage because even the Social Democrats
seemed to share their fears. Urgency was added to the issue by,
first, personnel changes, amounting to an establishment of firm
KS~ dominance in Prague;secondly by evidence that police investigations
of the earlier assassination attempts were ignoring evidence un-
comfortable for the KS~; and thirdly by evidence that an attempt
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madehad been~in the security forces to implicate government ministers
in spying for the West.
IWarning of the imminence of a "police regime", the National
Socialists forced a confrontation in the government demanding the
reversal of some personnel changes. They were supported by a
majority of ministers, but Nosek refused to carry out their demands.
In an attempt to force the KSC to yield, the National Socialist,
People's and Democratic Parties' ministers resigned from the
government.
This was probably intended as a tactical manuevre in the hope
that the KS~ would back away from a confrontation. If the Communists
had still had no alternative to cooperation within the existing
National Front, it could well have been successful. As the next
two chapters show, it was based on an erroneous estimation of KSC
strength, of KSC intentions and willingness to face a final con-
frontation and of how the mass of the population would respond to
a major political crisis.
- 2S -
CHAPTER 37: THE CRISIS Of fEBRUARY 1948 AND THE COMMUNIST
PARTY'S MOBILISATION.
VI.37.1. The Communists quickly mobilise massive support for
the formation of a new government to be headed by
Gottwald.
far from yielding at once, so as to avert a major crisis, the
Kst saw the resignations as a phenomenal blunder. The vigorous
and decisive action they took was unlike their ealier campaigns.
The aim, it very quickly became clear, was not simply to "expose"
their political opponents. Instead, they saw and seized upon the
opportunity that had suddenly been created to stage the decisive
power struggle before the elections.
They could see a possibility for the National Socialists'
plan to succeed. Should the Social Democrats join the others in
resigning the government could fall: Gottwald would be entrusted
by 8ene~ to form another government but would be unable to persuade
the other parties to Join it. The only possibility then would be
a government of officials. Alternatively, if the KSC tried to
maintain the government, then Bene§ could refuse to accept the
resignations and the resigning ministers would return with
Presidential approval so that the government majority could block
1the activities of KS~ Ministers one after another.
Nevertheless, the resignations were a blunder because they left
the KS~ holding positions of power while seeming to confirm precisely
what the Communists had wanted to prove, i.e. that the three re-
1Gottwald: Spisy, XIV, p.362.
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signing parties were opposed to the completion of the government
programme and were scared of the Congresses of factory Councils and
Peasant Commissions. The police, the KSC believed, was for most
ordinary people not a central issue so that the KS~W3re left with
2"more or less all the trumps" in their hand. They therefore took
an absolutely firm stand from the start portraying the resignations
in the most dramatic terms possible as an abandonment of the
National front and transition to the opposition. A call was issued
for the mobilisation "of all the strength of the working people for
the support of K. Gottwald's government", amd for the creation of a
"firm National front which would create a safe support for K. Gottwald's
3government" •
This meant maintaining that the resignations need not lead to
immediate dissolution of the ~overnment. This was a constitutionally
acceptable position as the chairman and a majority of the ministers
were still in office. Moreover, the President had no constitu-
tional right to demand its resignation unless parliament passed a
vote of no confidence. Gottwald presented this view to the President
adding that he could not accept back those who had resigned. This
was the crucial point as it meant that he was seizing the opportunity
to demand a complete change in the character of the government.
8ene§, however, refused to accept the ministers' resignations4•
2Gottwald, speaking at the KSC Central Committee meeting of 9/4/48,
Gottwald: Spisy, XIV, p.363.
3Resolution of the KS~ Presidium meeting of 20/2/48, B£ 21/2/48, p.1.
4soueek, Klime§: Dramaticke, p.130-131.
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Gottwald's firm stand won immediate widespread popular support:
this was a pleasant surprise for Communist activists5 who had only
just before been reporting signs of difficulties6• The day after
the resignations, at a huge rally called in Prague's Old Town
Square, Gottwald made the KSe position even clearer. He argued
that Nosek was doing everything legally and constitutionally and
ridiculed the accusations of a "police regime", "terror" and
"gestapism". He claimed that the real issue was much wider and that
it involved the creation of a bloc preventing the government from
proceding with the normal conduct of its business. Although he
accepted that the immediate aim behind the resignations was not
7to expel the KSe from the government , he still claimed that it
was part of an attempt, stemming from "reaction", to destroy the
National front, to break the alliance with the USSR and "to
gradually annul everything that has been brought to the people by
Bthe national revolution and liberation". finally, he argued that
a solution to the crisis had to be found "constitutionally, demo-
cratically and parliamentarily - on the basis of a broad National
9front". A new government should be formed with the support of
"progressive and democratic forces in all political parties and
all-national organisations": its task would be simply to complete
10the existing government programme •
5e.g. Bou~ek: Praha, p.140-141.
6Bou~ek: Praha; p~123-124.
7Gottwald: Splsy; XIV, p.266-267.
BGottwald: Spisy, XIV, p.251.
9Gottwald: Splsy, XIV, p.252.
10Gottwald: Spisy, XIV, p.253.
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So, essentially, Gottwald tried to portray the crisis as a
threat to all the revolutionary gains while presenting KSe policy
as no more than continuity with the existing immediate programme.
There was no difficulty in mobilising support for this position
and huge demonstrations were held in all major towns on 21/2/48.
Meetings were held in factories showing the strength of feeling in
the working class. In CKD-Libe~, for example, according to the
most hostile account an early morning meeting of all employees was
warned by the chairman that anyone voting against "excludes himself
from the factory" and that " workers will not work with him". Only
voted against and he was . 11one escorted out •
Sometimes such meetings might support the position taken by the
Social Oemocrats12• In the eKO central office in KarlIn, for
example, a resolution was passed for maintaining the unity of the
National Front on the basis of democratic cooperation. The National
front was to discuss all disputed questions like the constitution
and proposed laws and there were to be further nationalisations
achieved "by the calm and democratic agreement of the parties or
the National Front ••• "13. There was, however, no sign of
mobilisation among the supporters of the other parties. Rather
there were signs of disagreement of doubt from their members about
11~ 22/2/48, p.3.
12See below Section VI.38.6.
13£h 21/2/48, p.2.
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the correctness of the resignations14• The causes of their para-
lysis are discussed in moredetail in the next chapter, but were
revealed to some extent at the Congress of factory Councils on
22/2/48.
VI.37.2. Opposition to the Communists' position evaporates
at the Congress of factory Councils.
This congress, although attended by only 8,030 delegates, was
referred to at the time as a great parliament of the working
people. It was addressed by Gottwald, Zapotocky and E. Erban and
there then followed a fairly wide-ranging discussion around a
draft resolution prepared by the trade union leadership apparently
on the basis of resolutions received from basic organisations over
the preceding days. The government crisis was naturally at the
centre of attention, and there were several vay··militant expressions
of the Communists' view of its origins. Nevertheless, it was
remarkable how many contributors evaded directly taking sides in
the crisis, and concentrated on the social issues more typically
associated with trade unions.
It was also remarkable that the expected opposition, which
could conceivably have been supported by one third of the delegates,
proved quite incapable of presenting a coherent position. ,.
A. Vandrovec's speech was largely ambiguous: he claimed to un-
conditionally support the proposed social insurance scheme and
further nationalisations, but then referred to reservations on
14Boueek, Klime~: Dramatick~, p.169-170.
some further unspecified points. He therefore wanted to be able to
vote on the final resolution in parts rather than taking it as a
1Swhole • 16~plrchalova was even more vague • This contrasted
pathetically with Ripka's attempt only a few days before, on
19/2/48, to argue to the National Socialist delegates to the
congress that all the ORO suggestions were either bad or somehbw
unreasobable. He had particularly opposed the idea of further
nationalisations17• Presumably it would have been politically
suicidal to say that in public.
In the end the resolution was taken as a whole and Zapotocky
ridiculed those who wanted to split up the conrete demands from
proposals for action. 18That, he said would be "cheap demagoguery" •
The resolution itself included a preamble analysing the general
political situation ,and claiming that reaction was trying to reverse
the development of People's Democracy. This was put in a fairly
general way and did not contain direct references to the government
crisis. The core of the resolution was a set of five demands: the
passing of the social insurance law without delay, passing the new
constitution, accepting the ORO proposal on civil servants' pay,
further nationalisations and rejection of any attempts to denationalise
nationalised firms. There was also a general expression of support
for peasants' demands €oncerning land reform and finally a definite
15lehar: Sjezd, p.72-73, and ~ 24/2/48, p.3.
16leh~r: Sjezd, p.81-83.
17Bou~ek: Praha, p.139-140.
18Lehar: Sjezd, p.103.
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proposal for a one-hour stoppage of work on 24/2/48 in all factories
and offices so that all employees could be informed of the results
19of the Congress • According to the official account only ten votes
were cast against the resorution.
Attention then turned to the one-hour general strike which
proved to be extraordinarily successful. In Prague 200,300 took
part there were only 98 strike breakers: 96% then voted for the
20Congress resolution • Similar figures were produced for other
parts of the country although it is difficult to calculate with
accuracy as it is not always clear what resolutions were passed.
One estimate suggests that 4% voted against while 5% voted for
resolutions not containing all the demands21; It is at least clear
that, alongide the effective unanimity of the working class, many
offices joined in too. Even the Ministry of foreign Affairs and
Masaryk himself took part: only 32 out of 24,000 factories and
offices refused to strike22•
The general strike appeared to confirm the disappearance of
any organised force opposing the KSC. Behind this apparent un-
animity, however, was considerable differentiation: office workers
were by no means as definite as manual workers and could be expected
to view some of the Congress' demands with suspicion, particularly
on the question of civil servants' pay. They often reached their
19lehar: Sjezd, p.104-106.
20 Prace, 25/2/48, p.1.
21Bou~ek: Praha, p.231.
22RO!ieka: BQtl, p.278.
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decisions in the presence of delegations of workers from big
factories who seem to have been pretty blunt in expressing their
views on the situation23• The response from many' office workers,
therefore probably stemmed from fear, confusion and disorientation
rather than firm commitment.
Nevertheless, the KSC felt themselves strong enough to demand
that, if Bene! did not accept the proposals for a new government which
Gottwald had by then prepared, therewould be a full general strike24•
They firmly opposed a subtle compromise solution whereby different
representatives of the ~me parties would be accepted into the
25government and, claiming that the old National front had been
abandoned by the resigning minist~ they set about preparing a
new National front which was to be a solid support for the Gottmald
government and its programme.
Action Committees, presented as the organs of this new
National front, began appearing on 23/2/48. That evening a Central
Action Committee was established following an initiative from
26ORO .and the KSC. It is not clear who was invited, but a number
of mass organisations and the left within the People's Party were
present. The Social Democrats sent observers, but no National
Socialists were present. Perhaps most important of all, the
23Soueek, Klime~: Dramatick~, p.270.
24Even this was seen by the KSC leaders as a further demonstration
of public opinion rather than a final show-down as it was in-
tended to last for only one day; Soueek, Klime~: Dramaticke,
p.287-288.
25Gottwald: Spisy, XIV, p.270-271.
26 'This had been proposed and voted on at the Congress of factory
Councils; Soueek, Klime§: Dramaticke, p.191.
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27commanders of the army attended •
After this it appeared that the KSC had enough support from
groups within the National Socialist and People's Parties, and als~
from ~robar's rreedom Party, to guarantee a parliamentary majority.
There was therefore no opposition to delaying the meeting of
par Ltament scheduled for 24/2/4828•
VI.37.3. The Communist Paj¥ increasingly exploits positions
of power to suppress opposition activities and to
restrict the expression of alternative views.
While the mobilisation of mass support for Gottwald's demands
was the main task of party organisations and the main means of
preventing the development of any coherent opposition, the KSt
also had no compunctions about using the organs it dominated to
ensure a fundamental change in political power. This was in no
sense an alternative to the mobilisation of public opinion.
Particularly after the Congress of ractory Councils had confirmed
paralysis of potential opposition, the involvement of the police
became more direct thereby ensuring that the National Socialists,
rather then suffering a single major setback, were completely
defeated.
The KSe seem to have been even less restrained in exploiting
control of the radio. This was an extremely useful instrument
for encouraging mass mobilisation as events such as the Congress
of ractory Councils, Gottwald's pronouncements, workers' demonstra-
27Soueek, KlimeS: Drandick~, p.241-250.
28Bou~ekt Klime!: Dramatick~t p.238-239.
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tions and the allegations about preparations for a coup from within
29the National Socialist Party ,could all be given maximum publicity.
La~tovi~ka also had no hesitation in preventing anyone likely to
~ 30oppose the KS~ view of events from broadcasting • M~jer apparently
tried unsuccessfully to challenge this while a whole number of
employees of the radio simply received dismissal notices through
31the post •
The press was more difficult to control, but the KSC Presidium
on 21/2/48 discussed ways for the union of print workers to limit
the amount of paper for some newspapers. In fact, the initiative
had already been taken by workers in paper mills stoppng the paper
supplies so that National Socialist and People's Party publications
32would have been stopped within a week •
A pretext for more direct measures was the discovery of what
organs of the Ministries of Defence and of the Interior presented as
a plot by National Socialists to seize po~. Their evidence
suggested that National Socialists in the army and police were
33preparing to distribute arms to reliable party members • There
was no proof of direct contacts with the party's top leadership -
34
although Hora was soon accused of keeping contacts with the plotters
29see below.
30Soueek, Klime§: Dramaticke, p.143.
31 .Eh 22/2/48, p.2.
32Boueak, Klima§: Dramatick~, p.165.
33~ 24/2/48, p.1.
34RP 25/2/48, p.1•.....
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_ and it could all have been little more than an amateurish
escapade.
Nevertheless, the police took it as a reason for searching
offices of both the National Socialist and People's Parties on
23/2/48. 35They took away some written material , but made no
36arrests • The National Socialists, previously full of rhetoric,
responded very meekly: the police were accused of illegal actions
in searching premises and confiscating documents, but the charge
that some sort of plot had existed was not denied. Instead, the
party's Presidium expressed their inability to comment and gave
an essurance that "they would defend noone who could be proven by
a proper court to have committed an offence". Simultaneously, they
rejected any attempt to link the party as a whole or the leader-
37ship with any anti-state activities •
legal procedings were later started against the National
Socialist MPs Krajina, Hora and ~!~ek. Accusations included the
establishment of an intelligence network in the police and army
38and a plan to make arms available to members of their party •
These accusations are in no sense ridulous: there obviously was some
sort of intelligence network providing inside information on the
police force, and Ripka seems to have been fully aware of plans
35Svobodn~ noviny, 24/2/48, p.2.
36Soueek, Klime~: Oramatick~, p.230.
~3721 24/2/48, p.1.
3B~ 19/3/4B,p.2.
to organise serious defensive actions should the KSC attempt to
39stage a coup •
At the time, though, the KSC willingly exaggerated the
significance of the police discoveries so as to accuse the
National Socialists of preparing a putch. While assessing
"reaction's" chances "very realistically"40, the KSC took full
advantage of the atmosphere created by these allegations.
National Socialist organisations were, for example, forbidden
41in power stations on grounds of state security • The Ministry
of the Interior acted on 24/2/48 to ban public meetings of all
the parties whose ministers had resigned because, it was claimed,
42such meetings were being used to attack the government • On the
same day the Ministry of the Interior ordered, "in the interests of
law and order", that measures should be taken "to stop the further
systematic spreading of lies and false reports" by the National
Socialist's publishing house: this involved removing the senior
editorial staff43•
VI.37.4. The Communists are prepared for the eventuality of
an armed conflict, but nobody even attempts to use
armed force against them.
Although the Communists were able to achieve their aims with-
39Ripka: Czechoslovakia, p.262.
40J• Pavel: "Hlavn! ~t~b lidovych milic! v Unoru", Pra~ske milice
v ~noru, Praha, 1964, p.20.
41B£ 26/2/48, p.3.
42soueek, Klime§: Oramatick~, p.213.
43RP 25/2/48, p.1, and RP 26/2/48, p.3.- -
out any armed clashes, their position within the police force was
certainly a great help. They were in a position to direct partic-
ularly reliable units into Prague where the decisive struggle _
was taking place. Already before the crisis had broken a special
unit that had been formed out of frontier guards to fight the
Banderovci was brought from Eastern Slovakia to locations near
44Prague • On 20/2/48 they were brought into Prague itself and
on 23/2/48 they took up positions guarding communications, public
4Splaces and members of the government • This must have further
demoralised any potential ppposition.
At the same time, the unquestioning loyalty of the ordinary
police, who were armed with rifles and small machine guns, was
assured by the way crisis developed. They were simply asked to
stand by the country's legal government which seemed to be quite
capable of maintaining the loyalty of the population. Moreover,
,
many policemen could interpret the National Socialist accusations
as an attack on all of them while workers' resolutions often
expressed "solidarity with the police".
The possibility was always present that the army could
intervene against the KS~ and there seems to have been some hope
that Bene~. as its supreme commander, might order some sort of
. 46action • Had a situation arisen in which the KS~ had been
448ou~ek, Klime§: Dramatick~, p.133, and Kroupa: HOnor", p.96.
45Bou~ek, Klime§: Dramatick~, p.212 and p.213.
46Ripka: Czechoslovakia, P!280.
politically isolated and then attempted a putch, the great majority
of the army could well have been mobilised against them. This,
however, was not how the political situation developed and it is
very difficult to see how the army could have been used ag~st
the legal government.
The KSC did fear the possibility of part of the army answering
47a call to move against them ,but believed that they too could
48rely on some army units • Among these was a tank brigade located
49close to Prague • In this situation any direct intervention against
the KSC by a part of the army, even if ordered by Bene!, could only
have led to a bloody clash with no certainty of success and no
guarantee of a stable political future afterwards. This would have
been a type of action very distant from Bene~'s conception of
politics and with extremely dangerous international implications.
It is therefore not surprising that he made no actual approaches
50to the army but instead insisted on a peaceful solution to the
crisis.
So, instead of intervening decisively on either side, the army
commanders ~ave, on 23/2/48, an emphatic order that the army should
keep out of internal political disputes and remain loyal to its
supreme commander - BeneS - and to the alliance with the USSR51•
47Pavel: "Hlavn!", p.24-25.
48Pavel: "Hlavn!", p.21-22.
49J• lipt~k, ~pi~~k: "Cnor", p.161-162.
50J• lipt~k, Spi~Ak: "anor", p.167.
51£1. 25/2/48, p.1.
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This did not prevent the same commanders from attending the
founding meeting of the Central Action Committee52 and there is
also evidence of army officers being involved at lower .levels in
the creation of Action Committees53• This did not decisively alter
the situation: rather it confirmed the inability of the army to
playa role independent of the general political tide.
Alongside the police and a~my the KS~ created a further armed
force on which they could rely completely. This was the People's
Milita which appeared as a small force of reliable KSC members with
the task of policing and ensuring control in fact6ries. Militia
54groups seem to have been very hastily organised and generally
made their first public appearances on 23/2/48. Their first task
then was to ensure unanimity in the general strike and the mere
sight or~even a few armed men in f~ctories was enough to ensure
the disappearance of any opposition55• They were also concerned in
Prague with ensuring physical dominance in the centre of town and
56preventing "larger rgatherings of reaction" •
They must have stFengthened the tendency towards demoralisation
aand resignation among anti-KSC forces, but asAreal military force
they were insignificant. Over the whole country there were probably
52The exact reasons for this decision have never been explained as
Svoboda soon buried his differences with the KSC. Perhaps his
reasoning was similar to that of the left-wing Social Democrats.
53J. Lipt~k, Spie~k: "dnor", p.159-160.
54See Pavel: "Hlavn!".
55Brada~: lidove, p.92.
56Bou~ek, Klime§: Dramaticke, p.216.
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5715,000 - 18,000 with 6,550 in Prague • They often had difficulty
in acquiring arms and, in Ostrava for example, started with a
motley collection from the old factory Militia, from weapons kept
58in people's homes and from the police • In some places they were
59assured that the army would provide arms if it proved necessary ,
but in Prague 10,000 rifles and 2,000 machine guns were brought
f b· k 60under police escort rom Z rOJov a-Srno •
On the night of 24-25/2/48 the KSC leadership decided on this
full arming of the new militia force and simultaneously presented
Bene~ with a full proposal for the composition of a new govern-
ment61• The militia really became established in the factories as
62victory was announced •
VI.37.5. Summary and discussion.
The course of the february crisis was dominated by the
Communists' determined response to the resignations. Instead of
yielding, they demanded of Bene~ that he accept the resignations
betoAfilled by ministers of Gottwald'sand allow the vacant posts
choosing. They thereby converted the government crisis into the
57BeIda, et al: Na rozhranl, p.251.
58Brad~O: Lidov8, p.83-84.
59H• KoneOn~, Cesta k v{t~zstv!, p.25.
61. f. Sova: "Lidov8 milice v~rn~ straz revolu~n!ch vymo!enost!
pracuj!ciho lidu", Unor a ~eskoslovenske, p.30.
60SouOek, Klime!: Dramaticke, p.217.
62SouOek, Klime~: Dranaticke, p,307.
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decisive struggle for power. They used all their strength,
including positions in the media and police force, to ensure a
favourable outeome, but their first consideration was a massive
mobilisation of their supporters.
This led, as could have been predicted from the experience
,
over the millionaries' tax, to the fragmentation and paralysis of
the other parties. Their weaknesses were clearly exposed at the
Congress of ractory Councils which almost unanimously backed the
KSC demands for continuing with the existing government programme
plus the further nationalisations. Although several speakers had
doubts and ~eservations, nobody could express outright opposition.
Neither did anybody try to raise further issues such as the
Communist domination of the police force.
This congress marked the implicit public political defeat of
the National Socialists' position. This was confirmed by the success
of a one-hour general strike. It meant that, if there had ever
been any doubts, the KSC could then move to the next stage of
solving the crisis on their own terms. With the argument that the
old National rront had failed, steps were taken to establish a
new one under a Central fAction Committee which was supported by
the army commanders and which incorporated elements from other
parties who could help fill the vacant posts in the government.
To ensure a speedy favourable outcome to the crisis, increasing-
ly repressive measures were used against the right-wing parties.
A pretext was found for this in allegations, based on a great
exaggeration of evidence, that National Socialists had conspired
to seize power by force. It meant that, only a few days after the
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resignations, the National Socialists were being effectively
silenced.
With victory looking imminent, the KSC even created a further
armed force, the People's Militia, which was completely under their
own control.
In assessing Communist tactics during the february crisis,
the question invariably arises of whether their behaviour remained
within the constitution. This issue was given prominence particularly
by emigr~ writers who wanted to portray the KSC as a brutal usurper
of power riding roughshod over all legal norms. They could hardly
claim that the overall solution to the crisis was counter to the
constitution, but they could point with more justification to
aspects of KSC tactics which went beyond the mobilisation of
opinion. Examples were the activities of Action Committees and the
creation of the People's Militia which were only legalised retro-
spectively.
Nevertheless, the controversies around the constituOonality
of february can lead to evasion of the central issues on both
sides. They provide an apparent explanation for the defeat of
the resigning ministers thereby diverting attention from their
political weaknesses which are discussed in the next chapter.
Alternatively, the general constitutionality of the solution to
the crisis can be presented as a cover or even justification for
the real essence of the change which was the complete transformation
of the political power structure.
/
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CHAPTER 38: THE PARALYSIS AND CAPITULATION OF POTENTIALLY
ANTI-COMMUNIST FORCES DURING THE FEBRUARY CRISIS.
VI.38.1. The need to explain the easy Communist victory.
On 25/2/48 Bene§, presented with a list of names for Gottwald's
new government and faced with yet another huge demonstration of
public support for KSC policy, finally yielded. The crisis
ended with the formation of an effectively new government in which
the parties that had resigned lost posts to the KSe, URO and the
freedom Party. The Social Democrats and Slovak Communists retained
exactly the same positions as before, but the Government Presidium
was fundamentally altered. The precise situation is shown below.
This meant that the resignations, far from forcing the KSC
to make concessions, had given the Communists the opportunity to
completely transform the situation within the government. With
remarkable speed, a minimum of violence and without over-ruling
the existing constitutional framework, the KS~ had excluded from
power their main opponents.
This easy victory was partly a consequence of their own
tactics and of their ability to mobilise massive support. It
must also be seen as a consequence of the failure of any potential
opposition to raise significant support and then of the conscious
decisions by~my commanders, Social Democrats, elements of the
Nation&-Socialist and People's Parties and ultimately 8ene~ him-
self to accept the Communists' demands. The reasons for this, it
is argued below, must be sought in the restrictions imposed on
the various potentially anti-Communist forces by the international
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Table 29:. Czechoslovak Government from 25/2L4S1.
Prime Minister K. Gottwald
Deputy Prime Ministers v. ~iroky
A. Zapotocky
B. lau~man
foreign Affairs J. Masaryk
National Defence l. Svoboda
foreign Trade A. Gregor
Interior v. Nosek
finance J. Dolansky
Education z. Nejedly
Justice A. tepic!ka
Information V. Kopecky
Industry Z. fierlinger
Agriculture J. OurU
Internal Trade f. Kraj~!r
Transport A. Petr
Posts A. Neuman
Social Security E. Erban
Health J. Plojhar
food Supply l. Jal'i<o\,Cova
Technology E. Slechta
Unification
of laws v. ~rob~r
State Secretary for
foreign Affairs V. Clementis
state Secretary for
National Defence J. Sev~!k
(see below
1Soucek, Klime~: Oramatick~, p.365.
(KSC)
(KSS)
(URO)
(SO)
(non-party)
(non-party)
(KSC)
(KS~)
(KSC)
(KSC)
(KSC)
(KSC)
(SO)
(KSS)
(KSC)
(LS)
(NS)
(URO)
(lS)
(SO)
(NS)
(freedom
Party)
(KS5)
(Party of
Slovak
Revival)
Section VI.3ciCl)
situation, by the weaknesses in their own political philosophies
and by the KSC tactics which served to highlight all their
inadequacies.
VI.38.2. The international situation is a major factor preventing
the National Socialists from vigorously posing an
alternative to the Communists' policies.
During the autumn of 1947 the National Socialists had possibly
been seeking to win friends in the USA with their anti-Communist
rhetoric. During the rebruary crisis this was no longer an adequate
basis for foreign policy. To mobilise any mass support, and even
to hold their own party together, they had to be able to pose a~
real alternative to KSC policy. The trouble, from their point of
view, was that the US had little interest in helping them. There
therefore seemed to be no practical alternative to the implicit
.
KSC line of incorporation into a Soviet bloc.
There were still lingering hopes of establishing closer
relations with the USA and the US ambassador Steinhardt returned
to Prague just as the crisis broke expressing the continuing hope
that Czechoslovakia would reconsider its decision about the Marshall
2plan. Previously Steinhardt had made the limp offer that, if
questions of compensation for US citizens for property that had
been nationalised and other issues relating to trade between the
two countries could be settled to the satisfaction of the US govern-
ment,then it would "be possible to consider again the Czechoslovak
request for a loan of 20 million dollars for the purchase ..
2~ 21/2/48, p.3.
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of cotton ••
There was some US interest in influencing the political situation
in Czechoslovakia and consideration was being given to a trade
agreement, a gesture on cultural relations and publication of
4documents on the liberation of Prague. Restraint was probably
generated in important places in the US by doubts about the
significance of events in Czechoslovakia: Marshall later argued
that the february events merely confirmed the existing situation
as Czechoslovakia had for three years been a close ally of the
USSR in international affairs5• So suggestions of the usefulness
of a political gesture were linked with exaggerated reports -
quite unrepeatable inside Czechoslovakia - that, if the KSC did
not gain substantially in the elections, BeneS would replace
Gottwald with a non-Communist Prime Minister6•
The US State Oepartment was, however, seemingly unconvinced by
such arguments and made no gesture that could have influenced the
course of the february crisis. This contrasted with the Soviet
position, represented by Oeputy foreign Minister Zorin who arrived
3~ 11/2/48, p.1.
4foreign Relations United states 1948, Vol IV, Washington, 1974,
p.733. The last point was a reference to a fierce debate that
had s~~d in the Czechoslovak press between the KSC, who claimed
that the'US army had failed to liberate Prague thereby showing a
lack of interest in Czechoslovakia's fate, and Peroutka's papers
in which it was claimed that the Soviet Union had prevented the
US army from liberating Prague and therefore could not be
regarded as a completely reliable ally.
5foreign Relations 1948, p.736.
6foreign Relations 1948, p.734.
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in Prague at the same time as Steinhardt. He could offer more
concrete economic assistance with the deal for supplying wheat.
This followed negotiations through the autumn and was given enormous
publicity by the KSe because of its political potential. In fact
there was no gift as the wheat had to be paid for with industrial
7goods and this meant that shortages were simply shifted elsewhere.
Nevertheless, it could be presented as a very good omen for the
future because firm long-term trade agreements with other Slavonic
states were guaranteeing 40% of Czechoslovakia's exports and
8imports •
lorin also made clear that Soviet interest went beyond trade
agreements as he expressed Soviet concern over the allegedly anti-
9Soviet articles appearing in part of the Czechoslovak press •
During the crisis itself the official Soviet position was presented
in the Soviet press and then quoted back inside Czechoslovakia10•
This could further paralyse the National Socialists particularly
when the issue of relations with the USSR was thrust into the centre
of political attention by the founding congress of the Union of
Czechoslovak-Soviet friendship on 22/2/48. All the papers reported
on this fully and highly favourably.
It is also possible that Soviet concern over Czechoslovakia
was so great that Stalin positively wanted the KSC to ask for
7Stru~n9, p.355.
eHospod~r, 18/12/47, p.1.
9BmuOek, Klime~: Dramaticke, p.107.
10~ 23/2/48, p.1.
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Soviet military assistance to establish a full monoply of power.
He was, it has been claimed, well informed of doubts within the
KS~ leadership about the chances of winning an electoral victory11.
In practice Gottwald gave no hint of suggesting that he felt out-
side assistance would be necessary.
VI.38.3. Bene~ tries to find a compromise solution to the
crisis, but ultimately sees no alternative to accepting
the Communists' demands.
Ultimately it was Bene~'s concession to the KS~, acceptance
of the resignations and approval of a new government that ended
the crisis. This has even led to some attempts among later emigre
writers to place some blame on him for the outcome of the february
crisis. This could be related to the concrete question of whether
he knew of and approved the resignations beforehand in which case
he could be accused of selling out.~ It is certainly difficult to
believe that he was not consulted, but he may well have been
ignorant of the risks and uncertainties involved and particularly
of the li~hood of the Social Democrats also resigning from the
12government • There is no reason to doubt that he shared the hopes
givenof the resigning ministers and he may well haveAthem some encourage-
13ment • Nevertheless, a difference soon began to show between
8ene~ and the National Socialist leaders because of the former's
sober and realistic assessment of the actual situation.
11 ~ ~J. ~vec: ~, p.201-202.
12See Ripka: Czechoslovakia, p.219-220. Peroutka claimed that BeneS
indisputably and definitely promised not to accept the resignations;
Peroutka: Byl, p.25.
13Apart from emigre
Central Committee
Praha, p.137.
bysources, this was suggestedAGottwald at the
meeting of 17/11/48, K. Gottwald: Spiay, Vol. XV,
The difference really showed as the KSC steadily mobilised
support. first of. all Bene~ surprised the resigning National
Socialist ministers when he did not demand the resignation of the
14whole government • It would anyway have been a poin~ss gesture
as the constitution .did not allow him such power and if he
abandoned the constitution then the KSC too would be free to do
so. Nevertheless, it indicated Bene~'s acceptance of the implications
of the fact that a solution to the crisis had to be found by
agreement with the KSC.
His position was expressed concisely to a delegation of
workers led by Kozelka, who was chairman of both the CKO-libe~
factory Council and the Prague Trade Union Council, who argued that
he had to yield to the massive demonstrations of support for the
KSC position. Bene! was apparently visibly shaken and snapped
back: "We have not reached the stage yet when the street decides
whether I as President should or should not accept the resignations,,15
He followed this with an insistence that a solution to the crisis
must be reached by compromise. He said that he understood when the
workers' representatives suggested that they were willing to confront
,
civil war rather than retreat, but maintained that he would not allow
anyone to be excluded from the government. "You can rely on me
both now and in the future not to accept anything in any situation
orthat would mean excluding one other group from participation in the
A
t
,,16governmen ••• •
14Ripka: Czechoslovakia, p.236.
15Kozelka: Vzpomlnky, p.183.
16Kozelka: Vzpomlnky, p.184, and ~ 22/2/48, p.1.
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He seems to have hoped that a compromise would still be possible
with Gottwald accepting the renewal of a similar sort of government
at·· least as a temporary expedient17, but this was tantamount to
leaving the initiative in Gottwald's hands. 8y 22/2/48 he was
becoming increasingly aware of the seriousness of the situation and
expressed to tau~man fears that there could be civil war: he was
beginning to conclude that he had to accept the Communists'
18demands •
The point, then, was not just the mobilisation of public
opinion, but the way how the KSC was heightening the crisis into a
struggle for power. This left Senea ultimately with the choice
between conceding or using every means available to fight the KSC.
The latter course seemed hopeless: at the very best, given the
realities of the international situation, it could only hope to
force active Soviet intervention. To 8ene§ that would be a
disaster as he could see no future for Czechoslovakia against the
USSR. Ripka, however, seems to have been quite willing to base
his hopes on yet another war in which he though the USSR would
be defeated. He suggested that he would have succeeded if it
could be shown that a Communist regime could be instituted only
19by violence ,and that if there were Soviet intervention then it ..~
would be clear that external aggression had happened. He could
1780u~ek, Klime~: Dramatick~, p.156, quoting from Smutny's accouht.
1880u~ek, \Klime~: DramaficR~, p.206-207, quoting from smutny's
account.
19Ripka: Czechoslovakia, p.203.
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once more go into emigration and aait a later victory. Sene~
dismissed this as totally unrealistic20• Instead, as the KSC
heightened their campaigning and even began to demonstrate their
ability and willingness to utilise organs of power, he lost interest
in talking to the National Socialist leaders, accepted the resig-
21nations and approved Gottwald!s new government •
VI.38.4. The National Socialists are paralysed by their in-
ability to present a consistent and coherent policy.
Perhaps Sene~ would have resisted the KS~ demands far more
stubbornly if there had been any sign of active mass support for
the National Socialists. They, however, seem to have assumed that
the crisis would remain confined within the government and restricted
to the single issue over which they had offered their resignations.
They therefore made no attempt to mobilise support, although they
apparently planned to hold public meetings on 24,25 and 26/2/48,
when they believed negotiations would be taking place for a new
22government • Sy that time, however, they were split internally,
divided from potential allies, subjected to police repression
and generally in a state of total demoralisation.
This paralysis stemmed in the first instance from the weakenesses
in the National Socialist Party which were brought into the open
by the Congress of factory Councils and by the vigorous activities
20Ripka: Czechoslovakia~ p.257.
21Soueek,
22R• k~p a:
Klime~: Dramaticke, p.297.
Czechoslovakia, p.247.
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of the KS~. The crisis was then posed to the mass of the population
as a far more general one. To mobilise any widespread support the
National Socialists had to be able to formulate convincing and-
realistic aims. This, owing to the international situation and
to the fact that they had to a great extent initiated the crisis
precisely so as to avoid commenting on the issues raised at the
Congress of factory Councils, the National Socialists were unable
to do. Instead, they soon found themselves playing down the
breadth and scope of the crisis.
Behind this lay crippling contradictions in their position.
On the one hand they had refused to come to a National front meeting
and had even resigned from the government: this seemed to suggest
that they saw conflicts as becoming irreconcilable. On the other
hand they could not seriously advocate a government without
Communists - apart from any other considerations that would expose
them without question as disrupters of the National front - and
that meant that they could only advocate a return to the previous
National front. If they called fur immediate elections, and they
had previously advocated this if the constitution could not be
23agreed on ,that still left the same unanswered questions about
their future intentions. Did it mean that they opposed completion
of the government programme? Did it mean that they thought co-
operation between parties would be ended after the elections?
Why, if they did not oppose the workers' demands, could they not
23~ 7/2/48, p.1.
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have continued in the government or, as a minimum gesture, expressed
full support for them? Finally why, if they really feared a
police state, had they chosen to resign from the government? If
they really believed the Communists wanted to seize power it would
be hard to think of any more naive act.
Instead of clarifying their position and answering the questions
that were being raised by their own initiation of the crisis, they
started off by trying to claim that it was completely untrue that
the trouble in the government was caused by the unwillingness of
some parties to allow the passing of the remaining laws. Un-
convincingly they claimed "••• we have it firmly assured that the
only cause of the critical situation in the government is the
question of the security and police services ••• n, adding "We
beg the public not to believe that we want to defend capitalists,
land-owners and reactionaries As they could not prove
this by actively propagating the measures advocated by the Factory
Councils, their whole attitude must have appeared two-faced and
hypocritical particularly to many workers.
In fact, in an attempt to minimise the importance of the crisis,
National Socialists on the Factory Council at Walter-Jinonice
25even voted against calling a meeting of the whole factory •
245S 21/2/48, p.2 and p.1. It was very noticeable that the powerful
;nti-Communist rhetoric of earlier months was suddenly toned
down. Presumably, realising that they could not mobilise active
support of their own, the National Socialists hoped thereby to
discourage the mobilisation of support for the KS~ demands.
251Q 22/2/48, p.2.
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Leading National Socialist trade unionists then failed to present
a coherent position at the Congress of Factory Councils and the
National Socialist Presidium folbwed this with a completely ambiva-
lent attitude towards the one-hour general strike. While not
advocating anything they did not oppose participation "in the
interests of calm in the factories and work places ••• "26. At
the same time, they maintained that the old National Front was
27still in existence so that there was no need for Action ·Committees •
There were some attempts to mobilise support in Prague but the
biggest was a student demonstration which, according to the most
28optimistic account, had a total strength of only 9,000 • It
presented no positive proposals, did not emphasise the original
National Socialist demands concerning the police force and instead
just expressed its loyalty to President BeneS. Two days later a
similar demonstration led to a confrontation with the police and
during this a policeman's machine gun was accidentally fired lightly
wounding a student. Apparently this was the only serious violence
during the whole crisis29•
This suggests that the great majority of National Socialists
could find no counter to the Communists' position. It is therefore
26~ 24/2/48"p.1.
27 .Presidium resolution, ~ 24/2/48, p.1.
28SS 24/2/48, p.2. According to other estimates, there were only
2000 participants; Soueek, KlimeS: Dramatick~, p.250.
29.Boueek, KlimeS: Dramaticke, p.311.
not surprising, although presumably the resigning ministers did not
realise that this was going to happen, that many people who had been
unconvinced a few days before .when the Communists had been arguing
that disagreements were not trivial but represented conflicts
between two fundamentally different conceptions of development,
should suddenly revise their opinions3D• Those Communists who had
for months been fruitlessly seeking firm allies in other parties,
but had been unable even to convince Social Democrats that Zenkl
would betray socialism, suddenly found that their work had been
31done for them by the resignations • Not surprisingly, some
National Socialist leaders began to accept the inevitability of
complying with the KSC desires. One such group was represented
by the trade union leaders Kokt~n and M~tl who followed through
the logic of the whole party's compliance with the general strike
to argue: "In the interests of peace and order in the factories
we recommend that trade unionists of the National Socialist Party
should join the Action Committees and cooperate with members of the
other political parties ••• ,,32. They joined with A. Neumann and
the economist Slechtam £m,O) 24/2/48,an Action Committee inside
33the National Socialist Party : they thereby supported Gottwald's
efforts to create a new government.
3DSoueek: Praha, p.134-135.
31J. Nosek, Cesta k vit~zstvr, p.16-17.
32Eh 25/2/48, p.2.
3380ueek, Klimes: Dramaticke, p.277.
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VI.38.5. The People's Party cannot present a clear and united
position either.
Even though the resignations were coordinated, the two
Czech right-wing parties seemed only to have reached agreement on
a single tactical step. They could not present a united position
throughout the crisis. The People's Party started off just as
vague about their aims and contented themselves with denying that
resignation from the government automatically meant resignation
from the National front. Their solution to the crisis was for the
KSC to accept certain conditions which they vaguely su~marised
as "respect for laws • • There was absolutely no mention of
the issues to be brought before the Congress of factory Councils
and Hala felt free to oppose the one-hour general strike on the
35grounds that everyone should be working •
Finally the party's Executive Committee expressed their aim
in a letter to Bene~ in which they could see "• • .no other way out
of the present crisis apart from an early calling of elections for
which the present government, in a state of resignation, would be
trusted with conducting the normal course of government until after
the elections. That is the road known to our constitution,,36.
Presumably this meant that the government programme was not to be
completed and that Benes, even though he lacked the constitutional
right to do so, should formally dissolve the government.
341£ 21/2/48, p.1.
351£ 22/2/48, p.1.
361£ 24/2/48, p.1.
Alongside the general confusion in the People's Party there
seems also to have been wider differentiation in interpretations of
the likely outcome of the resignations. A number of prominent
figures simply disappeared and reports, which were not denied,
began to appear suggesting that Tigrid had left for West Germany
even before the crisis started. This made it very easy to portray
h' d h' Ii iI' t t f W t i '1' 37~m an ~s po t ca assoc~a es as agen S 0 es ern mper~a ~sm •
It must also have further strengthened feelings of resignation and
defeatism in the People's Party and thereby helped the small left-
wing group that approached Gottwald 20/2/48 to indicate disagreement
ith th 'ti 38w e res~gna ons • By 25/2/48 they, had been able to assume
control of the party's publishing house and propagated the view
that Gottwald's suggestion was the only way out of the crisis39•
VI.38.6. The Social Democrats waver and vacillate while the
Communists build up their campaign. Ultimately the
majority of Social Democrat leaders see no alternative
to accepting Gottwald's demands.
Had the Social Democrats resigned from the government, along
with the other parties, then the course of the crisis might have
been very different. The~ however, were unable to accept the
full implications of resigning. They rejected thoughts either of
40a government of officials orof a majority government and in-
37Mleda fronte 22/2/48~ p.1, and ~ 25/2/48, p.1.
38Bou~ek, K!ime§: Orameticke, p.137.
391Q 25/2/48, p.1.
40The KSC made this offer to them on 19/2/48 suggesting that two
fifths of government posts could go to Social Democrats; Nedv~d:
Cesta, p.61.
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sis ted instead on continuing with the existing government until
th 1 t· 41e e ec ~ons •
The point was that, although even many on the left of the
party viewed with apprehension the aims of the KS~, the Social
Democrats disagreed with the National Socialists on many other
issues. So, instead of joining one side or the other, the Social
Democrats condemned both - the resignations were described as over-
hasty while the Communists' vigorous response was criticised for
making further cooperation more difficult - and set themselves the
task of bringing the two sides together "on the platform of the
hitherto existing National front ••• ,,42.
This was fully consistent with their approach over the preceding
months and was the only basis for overcoming the potentially sharp
differences within the party. Majer, on the extreme right wing,
favoured joining the resignations. On the left were voices for
negotiating with the KSC on the basis of the proposal for a govern-
43ment without the parties that had resigned • At first, however,
the centrist position retained dominance and was also able to keep
the party from completely fragmenting: thus the Prague leadership
could unanimously recommend the expulsion of v. KouSov~-Petr~nkov~
who spoke without the party's knowledge or agreement at the KSC
. 44rally on 21/2/48 •
.... .-
41Resolution of their Presidium meeting of 19/2/48, El 20/2/48,
p.1.
42Resolution of the Presidium meeting of 20/2/48, £h 21/2/48, p.1.
43 'Nedv~d: Cesta, p.61.
44Svobodn~ noviny, 24/2/48, p.2.
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For a time it seemed possible that fear of the KS~ might
lead them towards the National Socialists' position. Lau~man
referred to the preparations for the Congresses of Factory Councils
and of Peasant Commissions as causing "the shaken social and
economic peace" and "bringing the republic hundreds of millions
in losses"45. Even later the joint condemnation of the resig-
nations and of the KSC response was combined with the suggestion
that the only way out of the crisis would be elections46• Such
views must have been pushed into the background by the success of
the Congress of Factory Councils and the mobilisation of opinion -
undoubtedly including many of the Social Democrats', supporters -
around the Communists' demands.
Gradually even the centrist position was made irrelevant by
the initiatives the KSC was taking which made the renewal of co-
operation in the old National front inconceivable. At the party's
Executive Committee meeting on 23/2/48 it was decided not to
actively participate in the Central Action Committee. Nevertheless,
the voting indicated that the left was gaining ground. They
effectively argued that a special agreement had to be reached with
the KSC in view of the dangers from the international situation
and from internal forces which were felt to be threatening the
general direction of Czechoslovakia's post-war development. The
right was increasingly restricted by the failure of the National
45El 22/2/48, p.1.
46J• Wenig, Sv~t prace, 25/2/48, p.1.
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Socialists to present convincing ideas for Czechoslovakia's future.
They therefore ended up with little more than expressions of
47allegiance to the principle of parliamentary democracy • This
could not provide an adequate guide to action particularly in
view of the Communists' probable ability to command the support of
a majority of MPs.
On 24/2/48 the party's Presidium discussed again Gottwald's
proposals and other possible solutions to the crisis. Fierlinger
proved able to win a decisive majority for n~tiating with Gottwald,
but the precise terms were still unclear. Then, as discussion
continued, the Social Democrats' Central Secretariat in Prague was
occupied by left wingers, following a decision reached at a meeting
of factory organisations in Prague and apparently helped by KSC
students. Lau~man called for the police, but they would not help
h' 481m •
Late tbat evening Fierlinger led the majority of the Presidium
out of the meeting and annouced their willingness to accept Gottwald's
terms, which included the removal from the government of Tyme~ and
Majer. The statement read over the radio indicated to some extent
how it had been possible to win over the party's centre as it
suggested that Social Democracy was to be an equal partner with the
49KS~ in creating a new government •
47 .Nedv~d: Casta, p.63.
48Soueak, Klime~: Oramaticke, p.279-280, and BeIda, et al: ~
rozhran!, p.242.
49Soueek, KlimeS: Oramaticke, p.280-281.
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Even if such a hope was highly optimistic, there no longer
seemed to be any ,serious alternative. Gottwald seemed to have
mobilised enough support to ensure that Joining the resignations would
only divide the party without altering the outcome of the crisis.
To the party's centre it probably seemed wiser to follow the
dominant tide of events and thereby try to retain some party unity
and a significant mass base even after the defeat of the two Czech
right-wing parties.
In fact even lauSman, after he had been left in a minority in
the Presidium, outmanuevred 'fierlinger by going to Gottwald
to discuss the composition of the new government in which he
became Deputy Prime Minister.
VI.38.7. Opposition very quickly disintegrates in Slovakia.
The Communist victory in Slovakia proved to be particularly
simple. Divisions within the Democratic Party had already been
shown up before that and the rival groups proved incapable of
organising any serious action when, on 21/2/48, Hus~k effectively
dissolved the existing Board of Commissioners by informing all
its Democratic Party members that their party had resigned from
the National front5D• Two days later replacements were appointed
. d51and the headquarters of the Democratic Party was occup~e • Hus~k
was soon showing one of the consequences of the transfer of power
by signing documents giving ownership rights to those peasants gaining
50·Pravda, 24/2/48, p.2.
51Bou~ek, KlimeS, Dramtick~, p.240.
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52from the land reform • On 27/2/48 the consolidation of power was
made more complete as rerjen~fk resigned, apparently not for
53political reasons, and then Buza too was replaced •
The Democratic Party seemed to collapse more readily than the
Czech parties. They were quickly removed from positions of influence
and an Action Committee was formed on 25/2/48 bringing together the
two distinct internal oppositions led by Kysely and Pol~k. They
54called for a purge and then renewal of the party • By this time
a new government had been created in Prague without the Democratic
Party and Kysely wanted the party to completely change their policies
so as to win back ministerial posts55• This "opposition group from
the former Democratic Party" was given two posts in the new Board
of Commissioners, but the key posts of the Interior, Agriculture
and Supply all went to Communists56•
It was soon announced that all Ukrainian representatives had
57transfered to the KSS while there were reports of massive defections
from the Democratic Party into the KSS58. Outside Bratislava power
52 Klime~: Oramaticke, p.258.Bou~ek,
53 Klime§: Dramaticke, p.321.Bou~ek,
54 Klime~: Oramaticke, p.299.Bou~ek,
55Radio broadcast on 25/2/48, Pravda 27/2/48, p.1.
56pravda 29/2/48, p.1.
other parties and of
57Pravda 2/3/48, p.1.
58pravda 3/3/48, p.1.
There were also representatives of the two
the trade unions.
was transferred remarkably easily with hardly ever any opposition.
In some of the more isolated parts of the country, where the KSS
was particularly weak, there was no scope at all for opposition,
because news of the political crisis was not heard until after it
,59was over. •
VI.38.8. The Communists quickly consolidate the position of
of the new government as potential opposition leaders
capitulate or emigrate.
Even after the new government had been formed it was still
not clear that the KS~ had won undivided power. BeneS remained
as President although he intended to resign at once and was only
dissuaded from doing so by Gottwald. His actions in the remainder
of his life suggest confusion and deep depression as he could
neither approve of the KS~ actions nor could he see any point
in seriously opposing them. So, despite various fluctuations in
his position, he never openly opposed the new government's policies
and finally resigned on 7/6/48. Gottwald was then quickly elected
60President and 8ene~ died shortly afterwards • Although the KS~
may have felt somewhat constrained during those months by BeneS's
continued presence, they were generally very pleased to have so
convincing an indication, for any others likely to oppose them,
that they were working within the constitution during that
uncertain period when power was being consolidated.
59Laluha: Febru§r, p.222.
60Kaplan: Utv~fenr, p.55-60.
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Probably the same applied to J. Masaryk who remained as
foreign Minister in the new government. His death on 10/3/48 was
officially described as suicide. This explanation was widely
accepted by informed sources even if they were aware of the political
capital to be gained from encouraging rumours that there might have
61been "some other" cause • No credible evidence for such a view
has ever come to light and it is hard to see any motive for any-
body associated with the new government wanting to murder him. Had
they wanted to remove him from the government he could have been
sacked as were Majer and Tyme§. Neither did they need to fear
voluntary emigration which for them was a harmless form of protest:
suicide was a very powerful one in the period when they wanted the
appearance of maximum continuity with the previous constitutional
forms.
They were also eager to win approval for the new government and
its programme from parliament which met on 10/3/48. Out of the
300 elected MPs 230 attended and none voted against. The KSC seem
at first to have expected an opposition group to emerge in parlia-
ment but, perhaps fearing that some pretext would be found for their
62 63arrest ,all its possible leaders either fled or capitulated •
This made it very easy for the KSC to discredit them.
615ee Ripka, Czechoslovakia, p.301-302, and Steinhardt's message
to Washington,on 30/4/48, foreign Relations 1948, p.751.
62Such fears would have been justified. A warrant was in fact
issued for lettrich's arrest; ~ 28/2/48, p.1.
63K. Kaplan: "Zakotven! v1sledkB unoroveho v!t~zstvr", ~eskoslovenski
casopia historicki, X, ~2,1962, p.156.
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It is not even obvious what emigres hoped ~ ~hieve in the
West: for some seem just to have always assumed that they would
have to g064. Apparently about 3,000 left by 21/5/4865 and by
mid-1950 there had been 20,450 attempts and successes •. Surprisingly,
the overwhelming majority were not members of any party and neither
were there any leading figures from cultural, economic or scientific
life66• It is only the defeated political leaders that could
influence the domestic situation as they set about starting political
activities in emigration. They were hampered in this because the
67US government, while wanting to encourage their organisation ,
also believed that by emigrating they reduced to zero the chance
of any anti-Communist opposition inside Czech6s1ovakia68• This
meant, particularly as Bene~ refused to denounce the new government,
that there was no point in supporting a full government in exile
which would lead inevitably to a break in diplomatic relations.
US concern, then, was not primarily or immediately with influencing
even~ inside Czechoslovakia but rather with ensuring that the easy
Communist victory there would not help Communists in Western Europe
and,in particular, in the elections that were about to take place
64e.g. Ripka: Czechoslovakia, p.313.
65Vesely, speaking at a press conference, V~stnrk ministerstva
. vnitra ~eskoslovenske republiky, XXX, No.11, 15/6/48, p.2.
66Ma~~k: "K problematice", p.689 and p.699.
67e.g. R.A. Lovett's comments on 25/10/48, foreign Relations 1948,
p.433.
68Steinhardt's message of 30/4/48, foreign Relations 1948,
p.752.
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69in Italy • for this purpose emigres could obviously be a great
help as they could appear as the most convincing support for
propaganda against Communism.
They fitted into the developing cold war atmosphere in the
West and this provided their main field of influence in ensuing
years. They could add authenticity to the extremely strong con-
demnations of the new Czechoslovak government from the press and
official circles in the West where the february events were later
quoted even as a major justification for the establishment of
NATO. The KS~ consistently pointed to the misinformation, exagge-
rations or contradictory claims in the Western press and even tha
absurdity of the same papers that had supported Chamberlain
suddenly appearing to be deeply concerned at the fate of Czecho-
I k d 70 E' ' b th' t . d t bs ova emocracy • m1gres, y e1r ac lons, seeme 0 e
associating themselves with such positions. This 1n turn left
the way open for exaggerated attacks against them. Accusations of
planning an armed putch and civil war became common place71, whila
the fact that they went first of all to Germany was played up to
the full as proof of their anti-state intentions72•
All told then, by emigrating they made tha Communists' task
6ge•g• Marshall's message to the US ambassador in Paris on 24/2/48,
Foreign Relations 1948, p.736.
70 5e.g. M. GaluSka, Sv~tov~ rozhledy, II, No.3, March 1948, p.19 ,
or K. Winter, Tvorba, 1948, No.10, p.187-188.
718are~, Tvorba, 1948, No.9, p.161.
72 /e.g. Gottwald, speech 28/3 48, Spisy, XIV, p.323.·
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of consolidating power a very comfortable one. That, of course,
does not mean that the final outcome would have been different if
a serious attempt had been made to create an opposition inside
Czechoslovakia.
VI.38.9. Summary and discussion.
Communist victory was achieved on 25/2/48 when 8ene~ formally
accepted the resignations and agreed to a new government firmly
dominated by the KSC. This outcome cannot be explained simply
by the mobilisation of opinion. Neither was Communist use of
organs of power in itself an adequate explanation. Rather, those
two aspects of KSC tactics proved successful because of fundamental
weaknesses in the other parties which were crippled by their in-
ability to pose alternatives to KSC policy on foreign relations or
on the general direction of domestic social and economic develop-
mente
8ene~ ultimately gave in because he could see no possible
solution without the agreement of the KSC. He rejected wild, and
probably hopeless, alternatives like trying to use the army against
the Communists because he believed that the most it could have
achieved would have been Soviet intervention.
The National Socialists were unable to mobilise real support,
which might have raised Bene~'s morale, initially because of contra-
dictions in their own political paitian. They had precipitated
the ~risis, but suddenly found themselves unable to present a
solution to it or to challenge the popularity of the Communists'
proposals. Unable to mobilise support, they reversed from their
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aggressive face of the previous weeks to an extremely conciliatory
attitude - presumably in the hope of discouraging the Communists'
mobilisation of support. It was only a short step for some of
their members to join the KSC in forming the new government.
The paralysis and general confusion among the National
Socialists inevitably meant that unity with other parties could
not go beyond agreement on the single act of resigning. In fact,
the People's and Democratic Parties seemed even more demoralised
and the transfer of power in Slovakia proved to be even simpler
than in Prague.
There could also be little scope for unity between the
National Socialists and Social Democrats: this was of great import-
ance in easing the Communists' road to power. Gottwald feared that
if the Social Democrats' ministers resigned, then his whole
government could fall. Instead, the Social Democrats reac~ed
essentially as they had during the crisis over the millionaries'
tax: they dissociated themselves from both sides in the hope of
bringing all the parties together again. This was the only way
to ensure the continued unity of their party but, as the paralysis
of the right and the aggressiveness of the KSC became clearer,
the left won the majority of the party leadership for their policy
of joining Gottwald's new government. The Social Democrats thereby
retained their organisational unity.
One aftermath to the february crisis was the emigration of
many of the defeated politicians. This seemed to confirm their
complete resignation as they had no ·further real chance of in-
fluencing events inside Czechoslovakia. There was, in fact, no
attempt to form an opposition group when parliament next met.
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CHAPTER 39: THE CONSOLIDATION or THE COMMUNIST PARTY'S MONOPOLY
OF POLITICAL POWER.
VI.39.1. Action Committees quickly confirm the extent of the
Communists' victory in february.
Changes in power throughout society were brought about to a
great extent by Action Committees which were presented as the
organs of the new National front. There was soon talk of making
them permanent institutions to be incorporated into the new
constitution1, but the practical details of their size, exact
composition and relationship to other institutions were all left
vague. Only the essential principle was made clear and that left
little doubt that their immediate role was to reflect and consoli-
date the Communist Pa~s newly won power regardless of any normal
democratic procedures. A directive from the Ministry of the
Interior read as follows:
"••• The inititive for the creation of an Action Committee
comes from a Revolutionary Trade Union group or from an
organisation of the Communist Party. If necessary it is
created at the start only by members of the Communist
Party who carefully investigate what reliable people from
other organisations or clubs, or if need be which individuals,
they should draw in"2.
1e•g• Cepieka, answering questions from the Labour MPs Grossman
(Crossman?), and Wigg, B£. 17/3/48, p.1.
2Lidov~ spr~va, 15/3/48, p.81. This makes KSC dominance even clearer
than the figures for different parties' representations which show
68,90% for the KSC, 17,37% Social Democrats, 3,95% National Socialists,
4,53% fro~ the People's Party, 5,25% non-party and 14% representing
trade unions; Pavlieek: Politick~, p.131.
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They were not to be elected organs and control was to be
exercised only from above - even the calling of public meetings was
discouraged. Nevertheless, they were presented as the "authorised"
3spokesmen of the will of the Czechoslovak people and had enormous
powers of discretion: they were assured that decisions, provided
they had been "correct", would be retrospectively approved by law.
In factories they were accepted as only temporary organs while in
localities they were to "direct and control public life for all
the future".
When their immediate tasks were precisely defined, first
priority was given to the implementation of a purge. They were not
to completely replace National Committees, which were to remain as
organs of public administration, but were to.become "organs of
4political leadership and popular control" to be concerned first
5of all with recommending changes in personnel •
It seems that at some levels the purge was often carried out
far more simply with the use of direct administrative measures.
The Communist mayor of Prague simply requested the removal of !!l
representatives of the other three parties from the National
Committee and the Ministry of the Interior quickly approved the
6measure. Changes then went down to lower levels. The official
3Circular from the Ministry of the Interior, 8/3/48, V~stnrk
ministerstva vnitra ~eskoslovensk~ republiky, XXX, No.3-4, 15/3/48,
p.60.
4Lidov~ spr~va, 15/3/48, p.82.
5V~stn!k ministerstva vnitra Ceskoslovensk~ republiky, 15/3/48,
p.60.
6Bertelmann: V9voJ, p.256-257.
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figures suggest that of 9,419 employees in the political admini-
stration, only 526 were removed while out of 5,600 in Regional
7administration a mere 28 were sacked ~ Overall, in all spheres
of life, the immediate post-February purge probably affected only
20,000 30,000, including those demoted or prematurely pensioned
8off. This first purge, then, was not as sweeping as later ones,
but it was thorough enough at the highest levels to completely
change the political power situation.
Apart from public administration, the purge was also concerned
with political parties and mass organisations. This, naturally,
did not affect the KSC, and the trade unions too were felt to be
capable of carrying out necessary internal changes themselves.
Thus Z~potock9 and E. Erbani who had both taken government places,
were replaced while ~plrchalova, A. Vandrovec and F. Dlouhy, who
had voted against the resolution at the Congress of Factory Councils,
9were suspended from their posts •
Actions taken against the political parties that had resigned
from the government prevented them from redeveloping any independent
life. The Presidium of the Central Action Committee called for the
establishment of Action Committees inside these parties to ensure
10that they were purged • As it was made clear that new organs could
7lidova spr~va, 1/5/48, p.138.
8l• Kalinova: "K po~norov1m zm~n~m ve slo~enr f!d!c!ho apar~tu",
Revue d~Jin socialismu, 1969, No.4, p.486.
9URO, 11/3/48, p.2.
10~ 29/2/48,p.2.
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only be formed after the completion of the purge and Action Committees
inside these parties had to be constituted in a way approved by the
relevant local Action Committee11, this effectively gave the KSC the
power to decide on the fate of the three parties that resigned from
the government.
There were,however,unanswered questions concerning the fate of
these other political parties and also of the Social Democrats. It
was not at once clear how the elections would be fought and, above
all, it was not yet clear what difference rebruary made to social
and economic policy.
VI.39.2. The consolidation of Communist power is greatly eased
as the party presents economic and social policFs as
just a continuation of the existing government programme.
In economic life the purge was probably considerably milder
than in the political and public administration spheres. It also
seems to.have been carried out more quickly, particularly in factories
where it was often implemented at public meetings during the one-
12hour general strike • This meant that Action Committees were
generally not necessary in factories wheie rae tory Councils were
firmly Communist dominated. In offices this was often not the
case and directives were given for establishing Action Committees
13without approval "from below" • Even there their existence was to
11Cepi~ka, ~ 3/3/48, p.3.
12Soueek: Praha, p.230.
13~ r '~m dmajer, speech, ~, 4/3/48, p.1-2.
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be temporary and the URO Presidium on 4/3/48 announced that they
would be progressively dissolved14•
Generally in factories the KSC leaders found themselves holding
back their followers who wanted to use political doubts about the
new government as grounds for discrimination against qualified
personnel. This was resisted on the grounds that the KSC still
believed that there was no need to create a "new intelligentsia"
as had been done in the Soviet Union. Kopecky shortly beforehand
had been pointing to this distinction arguing that part of the
intelligentsia was actively supporting the government's policies
while even that part which opposed them could be won at least for
"a loyal attitude to our new regimen15• This sort of argument was
taken up at the height of the february crisis by fejka who insisted
that specialists should not be sacked for their political views
because commitment to their work could still be enough to ensure that
they served nationalised industries16• This was accompanied with
other warnings a~ffit allowing the purge to be dictated by personal
feelings of enmity or dislike and thereby to unnecessarily damage
17production •
Nevertheless, there was no constraint on the speediest possible
14~ 5/3/48, p.3 •.
15Kopecky: Zapas, p.48.
16speaking on 23/2/48, reproduced in frejka: 25 unor, p.53. He
also balanced this with a warning on 8/3/48 that there could be
centres for sabotage left in the nationalised industries, so. that
caution was necessary; Frejka: 25 unor, p.72-73.
17~ 10/3/48, p.2.
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takeover of those firms set by previous KSC policy for nationalisation.
The trade unions argued for the immediate installation of national
administrators wherever it could be said that the "smooth course of
18production" was threatened • There were similar warnings over the
19following weeks so that when, on 6/4/48, the government approved
the further nationalisations, it probably did little more than
confirm the existing situation. By the beginning of May it could
be announced that there were 681% of industrial enterprises and
95% of employees in the public sector20.
Although this obviously was a blow to capitalists, it was not
clear whether or to what extent it was aimed aginst the rest of the
private sector. frejka had earlier stated that:-
"the question in the further road to socialism will be
the gradual limitation and finally complete elimination
of the private-capitalist sector,,21,
while in the same speech it was promised that businesses employing
up to 50 and landholdings of up to SOha would be constitutionally
guaranteed. This, it was claimed, meant that the Hradec programme
22provided "a final solution to the land question" • This was made
equally explicit at the Congress of Peasant Commissions which was
1BRP 25/2/48, p.1.
1ge•g• K. Svec, ~RO 4/3/48, p.2.
20statisticky zpravoda1. XI, No.7-8,July-August 1948, p.282.
21frejka: 25 unor, p.46.
22fakta a cifry, III, No.1-2, 1948, p.34.
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held in Prague on 28/2/48, i.e. after the formation of the new
government. It was stated there that the new constitution would
"refute for once and for all" the stories "about somebody wanting
to establish some sort of kolkhozes,,23.
This indication of KS~ intentions was not as unambiguous as
they claimed. Gottwald, following Stalin, made clear that a
constitution was not a programme for the future but rather "••• a
codification of results so far achieved,,24. It was therefore per-
fectly possible for the KSC to constitutionally guarantee private
property while still believing that it would ultimately disappear.
Nevertheless, there certainly was no rush by the KS~ after february
to alter their general conception of social and economic policies
for the immediate future. Alongside vague references to "faster"
25progress towards socialism there were also expressions of re-
straint. SIAnsky firmly insisted that party education courses
should include "our road to socialism" because "Many people think
that we will now go quickly to socialism, following the Soviet
example to the Soviet system. We must present our, party as a
patriotic force,,26. The laws that were rushed through parliament
in those months seemed to confirm that view. Particularly important
was the passing of the constitution as the KSC had wanted it.
23Zem~d~lsk~ noviny, 29/2/48.
24speaking on 4/2/46, Gottwald: Spisy, XII, p.258.
25See Gottwald's speeches of 28/3/48 and 9/4/48, Gottwald: Spisy,
XIV. p.339 and p.364.
26Speaking on 6/3/48, quoted in Kaplan: Utv~fen!, p.138.
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Undoubtedly the rapid formulation and acceptance of the new social
insurance scheme, including a free health service and adequate
pensions, also had a great political impact, and there were further
new laws affecting many spheres of life. The necessary apparatus
for the revision of the pre-war land reform was created and Peasant
Commissions were established, as the KSC had wanted, from those
27demanding land • There was even a new law extending security of
employment to more in the civil service thereby making nonsense of
28previous claims that the KS~ wanted to abolish their security •
Continuity with previous KSC policy on social and economic
questions could even lead to a generally favourable assessment of
february from those ~ho had vacillated or doubted the KSC before.
This was a further reason for the absence of any active opposition
to the KSC in the immediate aftermath of february. There could
still be doubts about the future development of the political
structure and many could not believe that Zenkl, Ortina and Stransky
were outright traitors. It nevertheless could be accepted that
29"they were not especially progressive people" ,and that sort of
view fitted with the following persuasive argument:
"Everyone can convince themselves • • • that parliament and
government is much more efficient after the february days
27v~stnrk ministerstva vnitra Ceskoslovensk~ re
4 and 10, 15 3 48, p.79 and 31 5 48, p.217.
28L•d, ~1 ova sprdva, 1/4/48, p.102.
29This widespread attitude was commented on in Tvorba, 1948, No.11,
p.201.
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than at any time before when disruptive elements were
undermining the efficiency of government and parlIament.
'Before it needed months or even years to pass important
laws which had great meaning for the working people. Today
the work of government and parliament, which is conducted
in accordance with the resolutions of the all-state Congress
of ractory Councils and of the Congress of Peasant Commissions
and with the programme of the Gottwald government, is pro-
ceding as quickly as the interests of the working people
require ••
It is only a short step from such an argument to the view that
far from being a guarantee of democracy the previous system with
vigorously competing parties had been a purely negative encumbrance.
There was no immediate limitation to discussion in non-party
specialist journals and it could be hoped that February would lead
not to a limitation of discussion in general, but only to the
elimination of negative and destructive criticism that had previously
. 31been damaging to the economy • There were plenty of references to
the need for still more "constructive" criticisms32: this was
clearly expressed in an editorial in the non-party economic journal
30rakta a cifry, III, No.4, 15/4/48, p.6-7.
31e•g• "The elimination of petty party politicking from factories,
offices and workshops and the tightening of the unity of employees
in workplaces is a useful precondition for the fulfillment of all
plans and counter-plans and for raising the quality of products",
V. Slach, URO, 13/5/48, p.1.
32e.g. the editorial in Budovatel narodniho podniku, 1948, No.4,
p.2.
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Hospoda~. It was argued that the government was getting on with the
job that had previously been obstructed by the "superfusion of party
politics". Approval for this naturally led to rejection of Western
claims of "totalitarianism" as the new National front was implementing
measures "which were necessary and which the people had longed for".
After this followed the optimistic claim: "Today party interests and
political affiliations are no longer the decisive agent in our
economy. The revived National front is more than a political
formation, it is a working community which knows what it should do
and wants to do it". Within this there was need for still more
criticism than before, although it had to be intelligent and based on
knowledge: "Masaryk's 'democracy is discussion' applies at all times,,33.
VI.39.3. The Communists immobilise possible opposition by
recruiting high officials and members of other parties
into their own ranks.
While such hopes as those suggested above may have further dis-
oriented potential opposition, similar views seem neither to have
been held nor discussed in the KSC leadership. All attention there
was devoted to confirming the~rty's grip on political power. The
first step towards thi~ although one which still left plenty of
ambiguities about the future political structure, was the encourage-
ment of a massive influx of new members into the party. Having
previously set a target of one and a half million members by 1/5/48,
Gottwald announced that, with membership already over 1400,000 the
33Hospod~r, 11/3/48, p.1.
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t t Id b i d t t 'II' 34arge cou e ra se 0 wo ml lon •
This could appear as a continuation of the previous policy of
winning the maximum number of new members as a basis for the
biggest possible vote. It also acquired new fea~s in the post-
February situation. Analysis of the 856,657 new members gained
by August shows that the biggest influx came in March and Apri135•
A quarter of them were members of other parties, including a total
of over 115,000 former National Socialists. The party grew to
36contain almost 26% of the total Czech population • Simultaneously
there was a change in its social base: the percentage of workers
among members sank from 57% in March 1946 to 49% in late 1947 and then
37below 40% in August 1948 • By contrast, post-February mass recruitment
led to an increase in the representation of office workers from
5,6 to 20,6%38.
There is no reason to doubt that many of the new recruits had
previously been supporters of the KSC. This, however, was improbable
for most former National Socialists, for many office workers and for
the technical intelligentsia. It was the recruitment of these people
that was particularly important in conNrming the new position of
the KSC within the power structure.
34B£ 29/2/48, p.1.
35Kaplan: utv~reni, p.99.
36Kaplan, Utv~fen!, p.100.
37J. Fulka: "R~st ~lensk~ z~kladny KSC a 6nor 1948", Nov~ mysl,
1970, No.3, p~355.
38Kaplan: Utv~fen!, p.99.
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There was, ~fact, considerable resistance within the KS~ to
recruiting former National Socialists. Apparently many of them
had supported the resigning ministers, but then suddenly rushed to
join the KSe so as to save their jobs. The leadership argued in
reply that even those who were not convinc~d Communists should ba
allowed to join as they could be won over and re-educated in time39•
SI~nsk1 dismissed fears that this process threatened a dilution of
the KSC by pointing to the immense "ideological and organisational
40strength" of the party • There ware proposals to start educating
new members as quickly as possible with lectures on the purpose of
the Communist Party and on the meaning of the February events in the
context of Czechoslovakia's road to socialism41•
Even though party leaders did talk of winning genuine conviction
from former National Socialists once they were inside the KSC, the
first and immediate aim was expressed as the destruction of the
influence of the People's Party, of the National Socialists and of
42right-wing Social Democracy • While avoiding direct administrative
measures to dissolve National Socialist organisations, every
encouragement was given to their members to join the KSC. There was
even implicit approval for their local leaderships to dissolve
39Funkcion~t, 6/4/48, p.32-33.
40 Funkcion~f, 10/3/48, p.24.
41 Funkcion~f, 6/4/48, p.1.
42 Sl~nsk9, Funkcionaf, 10/3/48, p.24.
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43organisations and transfer en masse to the KSe • In practical
terms, this was a very simple way of immobilising potential
opposition.
The second important group of new recruits, which probably
contains many of the same people as the first, was made up of those
holding positions of power and influence in the state and economy.
for the KSC subordination of such people to party discipline was a
logical corollary to the great power the party was acquiring. It
could either completely purge all power structures - and in the
process lose valuable specialist abilities - or, as was done,
ensure compliance with some help from the visible threat of a purge
by the Action Committees. Criticisms were, in fact, soon being made
by the KSC leaders of the practice whereby office workers were given
application forms for the party and limited periods in which to fill
44them in • Even if such warnings were heeded, every encouragement
was still given to many of those who wanted to retain high positions
to hastily join the KSC. Warnings against allowing "careerists" into
the party were revealingly balanced by reassurances that they were
no more of a threat than former National Socialists45•
The KSC leadership had equally little hesitation in encouraging
the recruitment of specialists in the economy. Irrespective of the
43This was done in 8eroun; RP 5/3/48, p.3. In Ost! nad Labem the
Action Committees within ths National Socialist Party completely
dissolved all organisations; ~ 11/3/48, p.S.
44S1~nsky, ~ 7/3/48, p.2.
45 .e.g. funkcionaf, 6/4/48, p.33.
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depth of their convictions, they were apparently needed in factory
organisations alongside workers46• In some cases this was evidently
extremely successful: in Vitkovice, for example, not one qualified
engineer was left outside the party47.
VI.39.4. The three other Czech parties are prevented from
challenging Communist dominance.
48The National Socialist Par~y emerged from the February
events with their credibility shattered, many of their former leaders
in ,emigration and no clear conception for the future among those
left. The most visible basis for a continuation of their existence
was the two ministers in the new government. The surviving leader-
ship consisted of ~lechta and Neumann who had had reservations about
the party's policy before, J. David who had never actively opposed
the previous party leadership and a number of trade unionists who
could see no point in the continued existence of an independent
party. At lower levels the idea was still very much alive of a
definitely anti-Communist party49, but this was rejected by the
leadership as unrealistic. It would obviously have been unacceptable
to the KSC. In late February or early March Sl~nsk9 indicated to
46 Sl~nski, Funkcion~f, 10/3/48, p.g.
47Frejka, Tvorba, 1948, No.21, p.404.
488y then it had been renamed the Czechoslovak Socialist Party but,
to avoid unnecessary confusion, they will still be referred to as
the National Socialists.
49Kaplan: utv~ren!, p.76-77.
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Neumann that the party should be very small and be purged of re-
actionary elements~O. Evidently there was a lasting fear that it
could rebuild its public credibility and cause real trouble for
the KSe if left as a genuinely ;independent party.
The People's Party seemed to hold together much better than the
National Socialists and only a few members transferred to the KS~51.
There was also a more clearly defined left which could implement
some sort of purge while retaining the majority of former members52•
This did not prevent later moves to set the People's Party up as a
counterbalance to the KSC53• The party's development was further
complicated by the attitude of the Catholic church which refused to
express loyalty to the state after the February events. In fact
the church even opposed the united candidature54 and tried to for-
bid Plojhar, the party's minister in the government, from standing
f 1· t55or par ~amen •
With both the National Socialist and People's Parties largely
immobilised, the most important potential opposition to the KSC were
the Social Democrats. Their future was not immediately clear as
they had vacillated through the February events and their final
50Pavlieek: Politick~t esp. p.185-186.
51funkcional, 10/3/48, p.2S.
52Pavli~ek: Politicke, p.191-192.
53 l'x . .I( 17 1Pav ~~ek: Politlck~, esp. p.2 -2 9.
54See below Section VI.39.5. for an explanation of the united
candidature.
55Kaplan: utv~renr, p.47-52, and Pavl!~ek: Politicke, p.217.
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commitment to the Gottwald government did not necessarily represent
full subordination to the KSC. The decision had been reached by
a hastily formed coalition between the "centre" o~ "left-opportunist"
trend and fierlinger's left wing, and this still left open the old
question of how far the Social Democrats should differentiate them-
selves from the KSC. This remained even after considerable personnel
changes including the expulsion of a whole number of prominent right-
wingers56 and even after the replacement of Lau~man by fierlinger as
h. 57c a~rman • A new twist was even added to the old problem by an
influx into the party of former National Socialists.
At first the leadership seem to have felt that February gave
the party tremendous prospects. There were references to being
"an equal partner with the Communist Party" and even to becoming
"the leading and decisive agent in our political life". It was
claimed that this would be done on the basis of programmatic clarity
and genuinely socialist policies and there were references to the
58need to maintain the "purity" of the party • Later a three month
probationary period was introduced for new members59•
Hopes for a strong and independent party for those who under-
t d M . "i th'" d b F' I' 60s an arx~sm n e~r own way were expresse even y 1er ~nger
56At the Presidium meeting of 4/3/48, El 5/3/48, p.2.
57At the Presidium meeting of 18/3/48, £h 19/3/48, p.1.
58pL 29/2/48, p.1.
59pL 25/3/48, p.1.
60Eh 4/3/48, p.1, quoting an interview with the Daily Herald.
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who later said that the response at meetings was quite sufficient
61to justify hopes of building a real mass party • There were,
however, a number of real obstacles if the Social Democrats were to
avoid basing their expansion on former National Socialists who were
simply seeking a more respectable base to pursue their former
policies.
The first problem was that there was even less hope of finding
a cD8ffibleinternational orientation. The division of Europe into
two opposing blocs effectively forced them to choose one side or
the other. Other Socialist or Social Democrat parties in Eastern
Europe were merging with Communist Parties on terms that left the new
party as a member of the Informbureau. In Rumania this happened on
21/2/48, Gomulka was predicting it for Poland on 20/3/48 and,
according to R~kosi, the decision was taken in Hungary in early
62March • At the same time, the Czech Social Democrats were forcibly
.divided from their potential allies in the West when the British
Labour Party issued a statement on the february events without even
consulting them. Lau~man and J. Lindauer, the party's new general
secretary, sent a bitter letter protesting at this and indicating
that the Labour Party's criticism was based on a distortion of the
facts and was far sharper "than towards the fascist dictatorships
63in Spain, Portugal or Greece" • An analogy was soon being found
with the failure of the Socialists International after Munich64•
61Speaking on 17/4/48, quoted in Nedv~d: Cesta, p.66.
62Nedv~d: Casta, p.71-72.
63pL 7/3/48, p.1.
64£h 23/3/48, p.1.
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It was also being accepted that the Social Democrats had been
found wanting during the February crisis. This encouraged,
particularly among the left, an inferiority complex towards the
KS~. 65Even laugman admitted that the party had been confused •
and attempts to suggest that this did not indicate any deeper
weakness damaging the party's right to continued existence were not
f 11 . i 66u y conV1nc ng. A more comprehensive self-criticism by V. Erban
pointed to the whole attempt to present an image distinct from the
KSC as having led to the creation of blocs against the KS~ at local
level and a general shift towards the National Socialists. The
remedy he saw in the party purging itself of its right wing and of
reactionaries and in working closely with the KSC6!. It is difficult
to see how this could have led to a mass party with an outward
appearance of full independence.
The natural alternative was a merger with the KSC and many on
the left of Social Democracy saw this as inevitable either at once
68after February or in the near future • During March there may well
have been a shift in the opposite direction. It was certainly un-
clear where the Social Democrats were heading as they remained out-
side the scope of the Action Committees and only participated in
69them in areas where they were weakest • lau~man even claimed to have
65Sv~t pr~ce, 3/3/48, p.1.
66e.g. R. Foustka, Sv~t pr~ce, 10/3/48, p.1.
67£h 16/3/48, p.1 and p.3.
68Kaplan: Utva~enf, p.70.
691n Plze~ only 2% of Action Committee members were Social Democrats;
Nedv~d: Cesta, p.65.
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been starting genuine opposition activity in March70•
Very probably it was the uncertainties about the future course
of Social Democracy and the continued scope for the other parties
to develop into real opposition forces, particularly as the great mass
of the peasants and urban petty bourgeoisie remained outside the
KS~71, that led to a change in KSC policy on the conduct of the
elections and on the overall future party structure.
VI.39.5. The Communists shy away from contested elections.
The results confirm the consolidation of the new
power structure.
Immediately after the february events, the KSC still seem to
have assumed that the elections would be contested between all the
legal parties. The aim was for the most convincing possible
victory~as a confirmation of february. An overall target of 75%
72was set and this was broken down into targets for individual areas •
lower levels in the party responded enthusiastically to this with
reassurances that there would be little difficulty in winning a quite
73enormous vote • There were, however, sobering voices at the
meeting of KSC regional secretaries suggesting that only 55-60% of
the vote would go to the KSC. february, as was pointed out at the
Central Committee meeting on 9/4/48, had been so easy because the
70lau~man: ~, p.228.
71see below Section VI.39.5.
72selda: "Mocensko-politicke", p.236.
73Kaplan: Utv~renr, p.41.
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opposition had been disoriented and immobilised. Its social base
still remained intact. Above all, the middle peasants seemed un-
convinced by february. The Peasant Congress, it was pointed out,
74had by no means expressed the feelings of the whole peasantry •
This led to the fear in the KS~ leadership that, despite the
organisational weaknesses of the other parties, the KSC still might
not win enough votes to justify a monopoly of power75. Moreover,
looking further into the future, "reaction" could re-emerge within
the same parties as before. It could find support among those with
reservations about government policy as it had before february.
This fear was expressed in warnings against complacency. Although
at times it was suggested that no significant opposition could
76develop it was also emphasised that "reactionaries", despite all
appearances, had ~ completely vanished but were just going under-
ground and would in time become even more perfidious77• Prominent
themes were the need to root out reaction completely so that another
february would never be needed78 and the need not to be lulled into
over-confidence, plus the belief that events would not "follow a
74M. Reiman: "dnor a ~eskoslovensk~ cesta k socialismu", K politickym,
p.14.
75Belda: "Mocensko-politick~", p.236.
76e•g• Gottwald, in an interview with A.I. Goldberg of A.P. said:
"A strong opposition cannot develop, because opposition elements
have no hope of gaining the sympathy of the people ••• ", ~
23/3/48, p.1.
77Slansky,
fLPFPD),
For a Pea Ie's Democrac (henceforth
to a KS~ conference in Prague, Gottwald: Spisy,
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smooth asphalt road through beautiful sunny weather directly to
socialism ••• "79.
So, with the expectation that "reaction" would find a social
base and show itself again. within the other parties, it was natural
to try to find a way to bind those parties more closely to the KS~.
An essential part of this was the decision that the elections would
not be contested between parties, but would be fought by a single
united list of candidates. This was later justified for precisely
the reason that it prevented the penetration of "reaction" into
80the other parties •
The change came at the party's Presidium meeting on 5/4/48
when it was decided that all legal parties would stand on the same
81platform • The idea was first publicly mentioned by zapotocky at
the dRO plenum on 7/4/48 and was then, formally speaking, left open
f do ° 82or ~SCUSSlon • Several mass organisations and many factories had
expressed their agreement by the time the KSC Central Committee met
on 9/4/4883•
This was not a decision to ban all opposition outright and in
fact Gottwald even-suggested that there should be a party which
I
"reaction" could join so that it would not need to penetrate the KSC.
79s1ansky, runkciona!, 6/4/48, p.g.
80Gottwald, speaking at the Central Committee meeting of 9/6/48,
Gottwald: Spisy, XIV, p.427.
81Nedv~d: Cesta, p.67.
82~ 8/4/48, p.1.
83B£ 9/4/48, p.1.
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The trouble was that nobody was interested in openly oppositionist
t' it' 84ac ~v ~es • This is hardly surprising as to do so would auto-
matically encourage the epithet "reaction" and mean definitive
exclusion from the developing power structure. This, of course,
was precisely what Gottwald wanted.
There were arguments from both at home and abroad that the
united candidature was undemocratic85• One reply to this was that
the only restriction on opposition candidates was that they would
86need 1,000 signatures before their nominations would be accepted •
The most serious attempt to achieve this was made by V. Bene~, the
87President's brother, but he failed to rally enough support •
Otherwise any opposition preferred not to show itself as, lacking
an organisational basis, it could hardly hope to do well in the
elections.
The elections themselves were held on 30/5/48 and 93,5% of
those eligible voted with 89,3% expressing approval for the single
list of National front candidates. It is always difficult to know
how seriously to take the results of uncontested elections because
there is no opposition to confirm whether they are conducted fairly.
In this case too there were claims that the published figures were
invented and that the true results should show 33% blank votes in
84Gottwald, speaking at the Central Committee meeting of 9/4/48,'
quoted in Nedv~d: Cesta, p.69.
85See Svermov~'s comments on such arguments, B£ 11/4/48, p.1.
86 .B£ 11/4/48, p.1.
87Kaplan: utv~reni, p.44.
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Moravia and 20% - or even as much as 40% - in Slovakia88• No sub-
sequent Czechoslovak source has supported such claims and, in fact,
all seem to have accepted the results as genuine. Such a convincing
victory is not impossible when there was no credible alternative and
therefore little point in voting against. This was particularly
true as it became the general practice to cast one's vote openly in
favour. Anybody voting against could thereby easily be identified
and could fear later discrimination. This obviously contravened the
principle of the secret ballot.
VI.39.6. following the elections, the Communist Party confirms
the impotence of the other parties and completes a
merger with Social Democracy. Communist domination
of political power is complete.
There could be no question that the elections were a great
success for the KSC. They had prevented any big arguments dividing
the nation, there was not the slightest hint of any disorders -
unlike the elections in Italy at the same time - and there was no
decline in production89• Soon afterwards BeneS - depressed,
demoralised and soon to die - resigned and was replaced by Gottwald
who could soon proclaim: "••• we have concentrated all the decisive
levers in this state into reliable hands ••• ,,90. The question of
the continued existence of other parties alongside the KS~ was then
88steinhardt's message to Washington on 31/5/48, foreign Relations
.1.2.!!!, p.756.
89 ' / /Slansk1. for a lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy, 15 6 48,
p.4.
90 /Speaking at the Central Committee meeting of 17/11 48; Gottwald:
Spisy, XV, p.144.
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B purely tactical one.
It had already been decided in early April that Social Democracy
would merge with the KSC. This appeared as a fulfilment of the
belief that the splitting of the workers' movement after World War I
would one day be reversed. It thereby acquired automatic popularity
within both parties. More immediately, it was an important tactical
expedient to prevent the re-emergence of a strong Social Democracy
that could challenge KSC supremacy.
The decision was taken by the KSC leadership at just the time
when fierlinger was talking of the need to ensure the existence of
91an independent party ,but othem on the left willingly seized on
the opportunity. A meeting of the party's representatives on
17/4/48 was meant to discuss how to rebuild the party, but instead,
92it simply discussed and accepted the proposal for a merger • This
93was then announced in the press on the following day •
The terms of the merger were laid down by the KSC. It was
made quite clear that the two parties could not approach each other
94as equals and Gottwald warned against the danger of former Social
95Democrats establishing factions within the united party • It was
even made clear that, despite the mass recruitment of office workers
91 Speaking on 5/4/48, quoted in ~, 15/4/48, p.1S.
92Nedv~d: Cesta, p.68.
93B£ 18/4/48, p.1.
94 Kaplan: Utv~ren!, p.70-71.
95Gottwald, speaking at the Central Committee meeting of 9/6/48,
quoted in Nedv~d: Cesta, p.77.
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and National Socialists, by no me~ns all Social Democrats could be
96accepted into the KSC •
The process of merging took place from the end of June and the
leading left Social Democrats were given good representation in the
KSC leading organs. At lower levels individual KSC branches were
able to choose who they would accept. It is pretty clear that they
excluded any who had spoken against them before. The merger,thereby
effectively eliminated the legal political platform for about half
the Social Democrats97•
The attitude towards the other two parties was different partly
because a merger would not have succeeded in easily absorbing the
majority of their former members into the KSC and partly because
their continued independent existence was advantageous both domesti-
cally, as had been shown in the elections, and internationally as
the appearance of a multi-party system was still maintained9a•
The solution for the future of the National Socialists was
revealed in notes written over the summer by J. Tausigov~. A merger
similar to that with the Social Democrats was ruled out. Liquidation
was also rejected as it implied excessive administrative measures.
leaving the party to develop on its own was felt to be dangerous as
it would give reaction a chance to find a legal base. The chosen
96Gottwald, speaking at the Central Committee meeting of 9/4/48,
quoted in Nedv~d: Cesta, p.74.
97Nedv~d: Cesta, p.76.
9aSes Gottwald's comments to the Central Committee on 9/6/48, quoted
in Kaplan: utv~tenr, p.67, and BeIda: "Mocensko-politick~", p.234.
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course of action was to maintain a nominally independent National
Socialist Party within the National front under KS~ supervision99•
Policy towards the People's Party was probably based on similar
considerations. There were additional complications as it was feared
that 30-40% of Moravian peasants might be completely beyond the
influence of the KSC. There were therefore doubts about allowing the
People's Party to rebuild an apparatus and elected structure, as was
PI Oh ' ° 100OJ ar s a~m •
This stabilisation of the new party structure and the completion
of the post-february purge meant that there was no further work for
the Action Committees. They could have existed as coordinating
committees between the various parties and mass organisations of the
National front, but such a role was made irrelevant by enormous
growth of the KS~, its direct influence over the activities of the
trade unions and the complete irrelevance to serious decision making
of the remnants of the other parties. So, rather than a political
structure in which the Ksf could exercise its influence through a
system of "transmission belts", the KSC felt itself to be big enough
and influential enough to exercise its authority, to an increasing
extent, directly. A logical consequence of this was the degeneration
of Action Committees into what have been described as "administrative
bureaucratic off10es"101. They continued to exist, but made no im-
portant political impact.
99pavlr~ek: Po11tick~, p.203.
100pavl!~ek: Politicks, esp. p.228.
101Pavl!~ek: Politicks, p.200.
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VI.39.7. Summary and discussion.
During the first weeks after the february crisis the KS~
consolidated an effective monopoly of power while maintaining the
appearance of a plurality of parties.
facilitating this was continuity with the old government pro-
gramme, popular aspects of which could very quickly be accepted by
parliament. It therefore seemed to much of the population that the
outcome of february was in their best interests. It could even
appear that meaningful'criticism and discussion would not be restricted.
Meanwhile, the KS~ established firm dominance through the
activities of Action Committees. With a minimum of broad public
involvement, they purged positions of authority' and directed the
development of the formerly right-wing parties in such a way as to
prevent them from becoming real opposition forces.
Complementing the purge was a mass recruitment into the KSC
which brought in, among othe~ large numbers of office workers and
former National Socialists. In effect. this incorporated and there-
by silenced those who could have challenged at any level the KSC
grip on power.
wasThereAa potential base for an anti-Communist party in the large
sections of the population that had remained silent during february.
Although the KS~ could expect to win an absolute majority in the
elections, they would probably have been unable to completely crush
the other parties. They therefore decided against contested elections
and insisted on a single united candidature. The result, not sur-
prisingly, was an overwhelmi~g victory for the single list of
candidates.
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The Social Democrats presented a special problem because they
had not capitulated or split during february and they were not sub-
jected to interventions from Action Committees. This made them
uniquely important as the only party free from direct Communist
control. There were advocates of an immediate merger with the KSe,
but there were also serious hopes of building up a mass party that
could become a genuine partner in the government.
Evidently, the KS~ were frightened by this possibility and
insisted on merging the two parties. This was accomplished 1n a
careful and selective way so as to incorporate the left Social
Democrats while eliminating any legal platform for those who had
ever spoken against the KSC.
This consolidation of Communist power raises an important
unanswered question. Although Gottwald never totally renounced the
notion of a dictatorship of the proletariat as meaning a monopoly
of power for the KSC, he was still referring to the pre-february
National front as the best solution as late as December 1947. He
even still thought after february that the elections could be
genuinely contested. Against the background of this, of KSC
thinking over the preceding months and years, and even of the
surprise from the other parties at how events unfolded, it does
seem surprising that the KSC leadership were so absolutely deter-
mined to convert their political victory into an effectively complete
monopoly of power so quickly.
GottwaldPerhapsAreceived instructions to that effect from Zorine Then,
aware of the existence of doubts about his policies within the KSC
leadership and of Stalin's likely concern should he appear too
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liberal, he took the seemingly safe course. This is all speculation,
b t b t d b· t t' 1 .d 102u can e suppor e y c~rcums an ~a ev~ ence •
In a very real sense, then, the KSe behaved as a "totalitarian"
party, but that term must still be used with caution. The theories
of totalitarianism are incapable of encompassing the reality of
the development of Czechoslovak society. Despite the Communists'
grip on power, they still had to decide how to use their position and
this involved responding to the complex, flexible and changing
realities of Czechoslovak society.
This is to some extent clarified in the next two chapters.
102 .ofSee J. Svec: ~, 201-202.
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CHAPTER 40: THE FIRST PROBLEMS CONFRONTING AND INFLUENCING
THE COMMUNIST PARTY AFTER THE CONSOLIDATION OF
POWER.
VI.40.1.·. The fact of the Communists' consolidation of power
confronts them with the need to reassess much of
their strategy.
On the basis of continuity with the previous social and economic
policies, the KSC had succeeded in winning and consolidating a
position of immense political power. This could at first appear
as "just" a change in power, but it was naturally interpreted by
many within the KSC as having much wider and deeper social impli-
cations. Pleasure at the election results naturally led to growing
self-confidence and to the suggestion that there was little scope
left for any opposition apart from outright reactionaries and
traitors. The conclusion could be: "We are now going •••
unanimously and non-stop by the shortest route to socialismH1•
These direct and optimistic words concealed a number of unans-
wered questions. Previously it had been possible to refer in very
general terms to a road to socialism or to ultimately attaining
socialism. The exact form of socialism in Czechoslovakia was not
defined, but that was not a fundamental obstacle to the formulation
of immediate policies. Instead, they were pragmatically restricted
within a narrow time horizon so as to be broadly acceptable to the
other parties. This set the framework both for the development of
Czechoslovak society and for the development of KSe policy.
february fundamentally altered that framework by rupturing the
1Nosek, radio broadcast, ~ 1/6/48, p.S.
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multi-party structure. Referring back especially to Chapter 17, it
can be seen how many aspects of society evolved, at least to some
extent, under the influence of the existence of a genuine plurality
of parties. After february, the KSC had won a position ~f such
power as to be able to decide alone, and in full consciousness, over
these questions.
This apparent freedom points to perhaps the most important of
all the problems they faced. They had to implicitly redefine the
role end position in society of the party. The restrictions that
had existed before had been manifested largely through the plurality
of parties which had, for example, secured the existence of a
private sector and maintained a degree of independence far mass
organisations. Such issues as the means of representing the diver-
sity of interests within Czechoslovak society, the role of mass
organisations or the relationship between politics and specialist
abilities were all, in appearance at least, up for complete reassess-
ment by the KSC.
Evidently, the problems confronting a party with a monopoly of
power are more demanding and complex than those confronting ~ party
with a predominant share of power. There is still more scope for
direct political intervention to consciously shape social develop-
ment. It would seem that, to be able to find solutions to these
new problems, there ought to be an extension of discussion and
democracy at least within the party.
In some respects the effective elimination of other parties
could make this easier. The need to present a united appearance
against opponents and to incessantly blow one's own trumpet had
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hopefully disappeared. Politics, instead of being concerned to a
large extent with ~alries and manuevres, could centre on serious
discussion of the development of Czechoslovak'society in all its
complexity.
There in fact were signs that many in the KS~ felt that, as
there was no longer any need to restrain themselves in the intereste
of competition with other parties, they could express more publicly
critical and controversial views~ Particularly interesting were
the large number of recommendations on the reorganisation of the
National Committees. Generally they agreed with the KSC pre-February
proposals but many seemed to want more genuine decentralisation of
powers. Amid a whole range of criticisms of the centralisation of
power, one KS~ Area Committee included the interesting comment:
"the competence of National Committees in security is not
properly clarified. While the National Committee members
responsible for the police cooperate very well with the
uniformed branch, there is practically no cooperation with
2the other sections i.e. criminal and state security" •
Hopes for such a democratisation of life were a very partial
and short-lived consequnce of February. The destruction of opposition
could also be seen by party leaders as an end to the need to tole-
rate significant diversity and criticism within the KSC3• Such an
attitude could be seen as following logically from the february
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events, with the role of the Action Committees and the greatly
enhanced power of some Communist activists, but it would also imply
acceptance by the party leadership of a notion of social development.
In short, they would have to believe that the new tasks for a
ruling party remained essentially simple, or largely the.same as
before: under such circumstances a full discussion of how to proceed
would not have been an absolute necessity.
During the latter half of 1948 this attitude gradually won
dominance. This chapter is concerned with the influences that
strengthened it. It will become clear that there was always a
degree of flexibility in KS~ policy. At times there even seemed
to be two lines. One, although never thoroughly worked out or
elaborated, was based on the implicit acceptance of the complexity
of society and hence of the existence of major objective constraints
preventing the KS~ from rapidly and totally transforming society.
This appeared as a continuation of the pra-february notion of a
slower road to socialism which was to avoid rushing or dictatorially
imposing major social changes. By 1948, and particularly after
tha Informbureau's resolution on Yugoslavia discussed in the next
section, there was no possibility of developing positively on the
ideas of the Czechoslovak road to socialism and extending them into
a new conception or model of socialism.
The alternative, although it too was never presented in a
completely unambiguous way, was based essentially on the belief that,
with a secure hold on political power, the KSC could quickly and
totally transform social relationships. The policies of the pre-
ceding three years could then appear essentially as an unpleasant
2 -
but necessary compromise: that meant that there would be no ad-
vantage in trying to maintain continuity.
VI.40.2. The Informbureau's condemnation of the Yugoslav
insistence on Stalin's theories
societ have little
Just as the February events changed internal political
relationships, so too they fundamentally affected Czechoslovakia's
international standing. In effect, they confirmed the completion
of the first stage of the consolidation of the "Soviet bloc".
The first sign that this would have far reaching implications for
Czechoslovakia's internal life was the Informbureau's condemnation
of Yugoslavia at its meeting in June 1948.
The resolution itself centred on the assertion that the
Yugoslav leaders had been pursuing an anti-Soviet policy which was
~said to emanate from bourgeois nationalist elements who were said
to have crept into the leadership of the Yugoslav Communist Party.
This was backed up by some far-fetched accusations including the
claim that the Yugoslav leaders ~ere trying to curry favour with
the imperialists and were arguing that "capitalist states ara a
lesser danger to the independence of Yugoslavia than tha Soviet
Union"4.
Although there were a number of criticisms of aspects of Yugo-
slavia's internal policies, these can hardly have been the root of
the conflict as Stalin would have had more grounds for attacking
4FLPFPD 1/7/48, p.1 and p.2.
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other states - particularly Czechoslovakia. Most likely the issue
at stake was not primarily ideological but rather Stalin's desire
to ensure the maximum consolidation of his bloc with the various
East European states expressing unquestioning loyalty to the USSR.
He must have expected that the Yugoslav leaders would demonstrate
their subservience by accepting the exaggerated criticisms against
them, but instead they refused and relations between the two states
rapidly worsened.
The relevance of the Informbureau's resolution for Czecho-
slovakia was not at first clear. Above all there was no doubting
Czechoslova~s close relationship with the USSR so that criticisms
of "anti-Sovietism" were felt to be irrelevant. Even on internal
policy questions, where the aim of collectivising agriculture had
been mentioned, the resolution seemed to be fairly flexible. It was
pointed out that the Yugoslav party was criticised not for being
too soft in the villages but rather for the opposite error. It
definitely did not advocate sharp measures against the peasants or
immediate collectivisation. So, in summarising the lessons for
Czechoslovakia, it was possible to avoid any mention of collecti-
visation and simply give a vague warning against any sort of over-
confidence with the reminder "that the transition from capitalism
to socialism is not a road of slackening but of sharpening class
5struggle". This did not necessarily indicate the need for any
change in KS~ policy.
Nervousness within the KS~/was, however, gradually increased
5runkcion~r, 7/7/48, p.11-12.
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by changes in other East European parties. The central question was
alwa~'the policy towards the private sector, particularly in agri-
culture, and the most important case from Czechoslovakia's point of
view was Poland. Changes occured there with H. Minc warning that
there could be no socialism as long as petty production remained
dominant in agriculture6• This was followed by W. Gomulka's resig-
nation from the post of first Secretary of the Polish United Workers'
Party. He was accused of a right deviation in peasant poliCY? and
admitted to a number of charges including a nationalist position
characterised as "an underestimation of the real ideological content
in the relations between the new democracies and the Soviet Union,
the failure to understand the leading role of the CPSU(S) in the
international front of struggle against imperialism"8.
Earlier in Bulgaria and later in Hungary there were similar
policy changes. The Yugoslav resolution and the Informbureau in
general were concentrating on condemning an alleged "right deviation".
There were sometimes even references to the dangers from "traitors"
who followed Bukharin's ideas and there was a mounting insistence
that the ideas in Stalin's basic work9 were of supreme importance
for the formulation of policy in the People's Democracies. Above
6fLPFPD 1/8/48, p.2.
7M,~nc, fLPrPD 1/10/48, p.S.
8fLPfPD 15/9/48, p.4.
9This was produced in English as J.V. Stalin: Problems of Leninism,
Moscow, 1953. Similarly important was felt to be History of the
Communist Party of the soviet Union (Bolsheviks), Moscow, 1939.
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all, prominence was given to the conception of socialist transformation
enunciated by Stalin in his struggle with the "right" in the late
1920's. This included the theory that during socialist construction
the class struggle would intensify. This was not a theory that had
been verified by any empirical method nor had it been validly
deduced from other theoretical notions. Essentially it was a bland
assertion that proved capable of giving practical meaning to the
condemnation of the "right deviation" in the late 1920's and of the
notion of "nationally specific" roads to socialism.
Ultimately it led to a conception of social development reduced
entirely to terms of class struggle. All conflicts with the holders
of supreme power were ascribed to the conscious activity of class
enemies. This simplistic view gradually dominated in official
Czechoslovak thinking but, particularly at first, it was balanced
by a more pragmatic view which took greater account of social
realities.
Stalin's theories inevitably had a powerful influence on the
KS~. There had been an apparent theoretical vacuum over the pre-
ceding years, and suddenly party journals were full of ideological
articles which could appear to provide a sounder basis for policies
than had the earlier pragmatism. Nevertheless, their exact impli-
cations for policy measures only became clear against a background
of disappointments and discontent at home combined with the fear of
direct interventions from Stalin himself.
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VI.40.3. The Communist Party is over-optimistic in hoping
for a sudden transformation in the economic
situation as a consequence of February.
The most important disaPPointment for the KSC in their social
and economic policies was the failure of industrial production to
rise dramatically enough to promise earlier increases in workers'
living standards. They had initially been very optimistic as they
took full responsibility for directing the economy. The CPK was
made irrelevant by the transformation of the party structure and
instead enormous power went to a newly formed organ, the 15-member
Economic Council attached to the KSC Pesidium, which made far-
reaching decisions on the post-February reorganisation of the
supreme economic organs10• At the same time the general framework
for economic activity war thought to have been consolidated with the
assurance of secure agreements with other planned economies. Trade
balance figures were expected to improve because of this although
there was still the same persistent deficit with the £ and $ areas11•
General optimism was expressed by frejka who was soon claiming that
the pre-war production level had been passed even with a smaller
population, so that real wages should already have been 40% above
the pre-war level. He foresaw the prospect of making Czechoslovakia
into a "shop window for socialism" claiming: "we have better means
of production than England. We also have an army of technical
12intellectuals and a highly qualified work force" •
1tlSee Frejka's report on its first activities, B£ 30/4/48, p.2.
11R• ~imal!ek, HospodM', 6/5/48, p.S.
12~ 6/4/48, p.1. By England he presumably meant the United Kingdom.
It seems that the February events were expected ta remave
restrictions on the economy and above all to unleash initiative
from the ordinary workers. This seemed to be given some eon-
firmation when the plan in industry was fulfilled by 102,3% in
February and 106,4% in March13• Soon a movement was under way
involving the announcement of "counter-plans" in factories. These
were described as collective commitments worked out and discussed in
factories by workers, engineers and ma~ers with the aim of stepping
up production to reach the Two Year Plan targets by 28/10/48.
Frejka saw in this the start of a fundamental change in "the relation-
ship of members af socie~y to the means af praduction". The
February events, further nationalisations and the thorough purge of
public life were, it was claimed, generating a new fee1iiog that
people were really working for themselves14•
A number of indicatians da suggest that there was a certain
willingness to work and to find ways af increasing production. The
counter-plan movement seems to have started in a few factories in
response to the KSC Central Committee meeting of November 1947.
It then spread rapidly fallowing active encouragement from the
t d
. 15ra e un~ons •
other indicators that could be quoted were the doubling in the
number of'~nnovating ideas" from workers and the doubling in the
13BE. 13"4/48, p.1.
14BE. 1/5/48, p.1.
15J• Provaznlk, F. Vlas~k: Socialistick~ sout~!enr v ~SR, Praha,
1960, p.43-46.
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number of Production Committees: there was also a steady increase
in the number of factories where internal competition was organised16•
These, however, were not the only changes in workers' attitudes.
It seems that this new enthusiasm gripped only a part of the workers
who were willing to put in a great effort, including working extra
shifts, to reach the ambitious new targets. It appears though that
comparatively small voluntary brigades were not enough and the
counter-plans could only have been reached by a far more widespread
17voluntary movement • Instead, imbalances began to appear in may
with particularly serious failures in coal mining. To a great
extent this was blamed on the attitudes of the management but there
were also references to the continuing indiscipline of some workers
as shown in the high figures for absenteeism18•
It soon became clear that workers' attitudes were more diver-
19sified and complex than the KS~ expected • This, however, was not
subjected to a detailed investigation or analysis by the KS~: instead,
the failure to achieve a further upsurge in plan over-fulfillment
was "blamed" on the failure of counter-plans to ~o beyond the work
of a few specialists. This implicit exoneration of the working
class completely contradicted the earlier claims that the counter-
16E• Jukl: "Rozvoj tvoriv~ iniciativy pracuj!c!h na na~ichprGmyslov9ch z~vodech v obdob! poe~tkO socialistick~ v9stavby",
Vznik a vivoj, p.330-331.
17Jukl: "Rozvoj", p.334 and p.33S.
18J• Neuls, Tvorba, 1948, No.25, p.495.
19See below, e.g. p.n2, or Section VI.40.4.
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plan movement had been genuinely broad and came spontaneously from
20the workers • It was. however, backed up with warnings that in
future trade unions and ractory Councils would have to be involved
in formulating counter-plans before workers could be convinced of
th i· t 21e r ~mpor ance • Gradually the blame was placed ever more
clearly on the weakness in party organisations as a reason for the
22disappointing May results • Initiative from the party was seen
as the way to overcome shortcomings and to improve and increase
production23, and the need was emphasised for better organisational
and political preparation for competition24•
Evidently, there was no thorough and consistent analysis of
economic problems and possibilities. Nevertheless, objective
difficulties were being pushed into the background and the success
of the economy was seen increasingly as dependent on the ability of
the KSC to raise workers' morale. The task of party organisations
was therefore to convince workers that benefits would flow from
raising production and productivity and thereby to unleash and direct
their latent initiative which, it was believed, had been stunted
under capitalism when experience had taught that effort to increase
production led only to unemployment for workers or higher profits
20e.g. Tvorba, 1948, No.14, p.261.
21 Z. Valouch, runkcion~f, 14/6/48, p.23.
22Valouch, runkcion~f, 7/7/48, p.34.
23G• Kliment, Tvorba, 1948, No.27, p.521-522.
24J• T~hle, runkcion~f, 7/8/48, p.14.
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for capitalists.
This was an important element in KSC economic thinking before
february but suddenly it became the dominant element with the role
and usefulness of institutions redefined to accord with it. The
plan was to be a means to encourage initiative, party organisations
were to play a bigger role in this in factories and there was a
determined effort to shift members from local into factory organi-
2Ssations • factory Councils were also to help and there seems to
have been little further mention of any other role they could play.
So, although they were extremely powerful during the february days
in deciding global questions of political power, they were given
no specific expanded direct economic role. There were still the
same ambiguities about their powers although demands for representat-
ion at any management talks, even if the law did not give them that
26right, were supported from above • In the following months,
however, this was not clarified in any way to give them a role dis-
tinct or independent from the KSe organisation. Neither were factory
Councils or KSC basic organisations given any~e~er direct say
over economic decisions: the trend was rather for a further centrali-
sation of such powers among a small group of KS~ leaders.
A division of labour was being clarified whereby the supreme
organs formulated a plan with ambitious targets and organisations
at lower levels had only the limited task of persuading the work-
25In March 1945 under 25% of party members were in factory organisat-ions. This fi9ure rose to 40% in early 1949; Kaplan: utva~eni,
p.1S2.
26v~stnrk ministerstva vnitra ~eskoslovensk~ re ublik , XXX, No.10,
31 5 48, p.206.
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force to try to reach or pass those targets. february may well have
created scope for some success in this but it may simultaneously
have strengthened attitudes that made it harder. It was even
suggested at the time that it encouraged false hopes that all
problems would be solved at once and that there was no need for any
27special work effort • Alternatively, in so far as there was an
upsurge in work elan it could not be fully exploited and was only
frustrated because of bottlenecks caused by raw material shortages.
This meant that some important factories were not even expecting to
reach their plan targets by the end of the year28.
VI.40.4. Workers become more militant and demand improvements
in living standards. There are signs of distrust
towards aspects of Communist Party policy.
Very probably a major discouragement to increased voluntary
labour was its failure to yield the expected results in a higher
standard of living. Optimistic talk of reaching and passing the
pre-war level were great exaggerations. It was being claimed that
real wages of manual and white collar workers in August 1947 were
45% and 6% above the March 1939 level29• The calculation was done
in such a way as to ignore the shortages in basic necessities and
the need to pay high black market prices as became even more necessary
after late 1947. A more recent estimate suggested that consumption
for those who had been socially the weakest in the pre-Munich
27 Tetra, 1948, No.9, p.1.
28 Tatra, 1948, No.10, p.1.
29fakta a cifry, III, No.4, 15/4/48, p.4.
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republic was somewhat higher than ever before in 1948 while fat the
better off there was a marked decline30• Even if the average
consumption per head could even have been higher in 1949 than in
1937, there was still no cause for any sort of complacency but
rather deep discontent from workers who were given little more
than promises that bread rations, which had been reduced in November
1947, could soon be raised again thanks to the supplies from the
USSR31. The sort of news they received later was rather that a
government meeting had decided not to reduce rations in basic
foods although late spring was often the period when stocks had
32become depleted • Even later it was decided that, despite the
signs of a good harvest, rations would not be raised as the govern-
ment 'preferred to build up stocks again first33• There was also
a growth in the black market and an acute shortage of textiles
reflecting both the general difficultes in industry and the earlier
need to export as much as possible to pay for the high price of
34wheat on the world market •
The true situation remains unclear but it does seem that after
February, which workers' interpreted as their own victory, shortages
d bl k k t ., d35 1"- t' f th 1 Lan ac mar e pr~ces ~ncrease • u~espec ~ve 0 e conc us ons
30struenj, p.383.
31Jankovcov~, B£ 4/3/48, p.1.
32Hospodaf, 27/5/48, p.3.
33Hospod~f, 23/9/48, p.3.
34J• Nebesaf, Hospodaf, 9/9/48, p.1.
35For the level of black market prices see above Vol.III, p.6~
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that can be drawn from statistics, at least one KSC leader believed
that living standards were dropping to "the lowest possible level"36.
So, instead of responding with an immediate voluntary commitment to
work harder, they began to translate their increased self-confidence
into insistent demands for immediate improvement in their social
conditions. There were some strikes in the late summer of 1948
backing econo~ic demands37,and attaeks on the softness or "libera-
lism" of the party leadership38. The leadership could hardly ignore
this. As Z'potock9 pointed out: ;
"We have for whole decades been teaching workers to put
their demands: you have a right to it and you must press
for your rights, you must raise your living standard. When
these problems are coming up today ,it is not possible to
simply say - walt"39.
Alongside the workers' desire for a social standing commensurate
with their self-assurance was a sceptical attitude towards other
social groups that were less firm in their commitment to the new
government. Above all there was suspicion from Communist workers
towards the "intelligentsia". This term was as vaguely defined as
ever sometimes referring to leaders in the cultural field but very
often to those technically qualified people that workers encountered
36J. frank, at the KSC Presidium meeting of 9/9/48, quoted in
V. Brabec: "Vztah KS~ a vefejnosti k politickym procesam na po~atku
pades~t9ch let", Revue d~jin socialismu, 1969, No.3, p.376.
378rabec: "Vztah~ p.377.
38M. Reiman, Nov~ mysl, 1968, No.8, p.10a1.
39Brabec: "Vztah", p.375-376.
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in their work. The depth of the problem was revealed in a lengthy
discussion in the party's cultural journal Tvorha initiated by a
letter expressing blanket hostility to intellectuals who had allegedly
40all been collaborators • Similar antipathy was expressed in a
number of further letters although some indicated a milder, but
just as real, distrust. One letter pointed out how workers' cynicism
was encouraged as they watched such people suddenly changing to
become KS~ members: "We notice how hard it is for them to get used
to the word comrade, how they dislike greeting in public with our
'honour to labour', how in trains or in public places they keep quiet
when the party or its representatives are attacked, how they do not
wear our badge etc. • • Here is the key to the elimination of
distrust •• This seems to summarise the common theme of
practically all the workers who participated in the discussion as
they suggested ~ that the intelligentisia was acting against or
really damaging the new regime. Instead, they indicated distaste
for those who could enjoy higher incomes or better working conditions
and positions of power and influence while remaining lukewarm or
even, as many workers saw it, hypocritical in their commitment.
It appears from this that, far from leading to a soothing of
tension between social groups, february and the subsequent mass
recruitment further accentuated certain previous divisions. The
40J.Va~ut, Tvorba, 1948, No.16, p.319-320.
41Tvorba, 1948, No.1S, p.360. There was also the converse ,~rgument
that those non- worker new members who ostentatiously displayed
their commitment to the new regime should not be trusted; B. Sylla,
Tvorba, 1948, No.35, p.699.
(
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logic of KSe post-war policy painted to the belief that such social
tensions could be gradually eliminated as they had ultimately been
d bOt 10 42cause y cap~ a ~sm • Nevertheless, the case put by intellectuals
in their own defence did not attempt to deny the reality and even
possible permanence of the social division between the two groups.
Instead there were arguments that the social division of labour
made both essential and also necessitated cooperation between the
two. Against this it was suggested that some ordinary workers
should be put in high positions so as to learn the necessary skills
to replace
43those already there •
The leader~hip was at first perfectly willing to resist such
ideas, just as they had resisted calls for a more thorough purge
in factories during February, but late in 1948 the leadership
suddenly became extremely compliant towards working class attitudes
towards intellectuals and towards the private sector of the economy.
This could appear both as a "class" line that could be hoped to
raise the morale of the working class and as a re-interpretation of
i I 0 i f th I f b ' 1 toy I 0 44the mp ~cat ons 0 e norm ureau s rese u ~on on ugos aVla •
An important further factor indirectly encouraging this change
was the reappearance of an active opposition.
42This was argued by V. Pel!~ek, Tvorba, 1948, No.19, p.378-379.
43e.g. A. Uher, Tvorba, 1948, No.19, p.379.
44 .See below section VI.41.5.
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VI.40.5. The Communists try to ensure continuing working class
loyalty by Dverdramatising the danger of an organised
opposition.
Real opposition first showed itself in public at the Sokol
festival In July, but this was not felt to be a cause for deep
concern. Much more serious was an attempt to use Bene!'s funeral
on 7/9/48 as an opportunity for an anti-government demonstration.
This could have been an expression of concern at post-February
development from the petty bourgeoisie and also an expression of
·t· t th f SkI ff' . 1 45oppos~ ~on 0 e purge rom 0 0 0 ~c~a s • Irrespective of
the source of opposition or of its strength, which is difficult
to estimate, a warning was given by the Central Action Committee
that an attempt was about to be made to hold a major demonstration
against the regime and to reverse the results of february. Meet-
ings in factories were quickly held and resolutions passed warning
46against allowing such a provocation and calling for tough measures •
It was claimed that an attempt was being made "to break our un~ty"
47and to threaten successful economic and political development •
Soon there was evidence of "reaction's" plots in the form of
leaflets. One in Tabor called for the occupation of KS~ offices,
National Committees and police stations wherever strength permitted48•
45Kaplan. "Zamy~lenr", first Part, p.781. following the Sokol
festival the KSC began paying more attention to that organisation.
This involved both a purge and the establishment of Sokol units
in factories; funkcion~f, 7/9/48, p.21-22. Evidently, fears
about potential opposition were leading the KSC to narrow the
scope for comparatively non-political organisations.
46~ 9/9/48,p~1.
47~ 11/9/48, p.1.
48££ 12/9/48, p.1.
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Trials soon followed of the distributors of leaflets showing that
all material had common features. There were, it was claimed,
attacks on the People's Democratic system and on leading representa-
tives of the state and calls for economic sabotage and terrorist
t 49 S nt ft' 50ac s • e ences 0 up 0 seven years were glven •
The crucial question here is not the measures used against the
•opposition but the way how the workers.in factories had previously
51been presented with a dramatised account of the dangers . , so that
strong police measures could be used with their apparent approval
thereby simultaneously overcoming their ambivalence on other issues.
This appears to have been the principal purpose of the factory
meetings as otherwise the police force proved perfectly capable of
handling the situation.
Slansky indicated how important the sudden reappearance of
"reaction" was for overcoming workers' ambivalence with the following
thoughts:
"In the months of July and August over the holiday period
hardly anything apart from the supply difficulties was talked
acut. By our course of action we have succeeded in changing
the mood at once. We have experience that as soon as the
question of the regime is posed so everything else recedes.
49E£ 17/9/48, p.1.
SORP 22/9/48, p.1.
51Looked at objectively, the signs of opposition could have been
disquieting for the future, but hardly amounted to a real threat;
c.f. M. Reiman: HOnor", p.32.
8 -
Also from the telegrams coming from factories it can be
seen that the workers want a vigorous course against
t. "52reac ~on • •• •
This can be corroborated by several more quotes e.g. "We see in
our organisations the fact that when we call them into readiness,
as it was in february or on the occassion of Dr. Bene§'s funeral,
then discontent was forgotten at once ••• and the mood changed in
53three hours" • It was this that gave meaning to the Informbureau's
resolution on Yugoslavia which provided the theory that class
struggle would intensify during socialist construction. Suddenly
this was being repeated in Czechoslovakia on every possible
occassion while before its general correctness had simply been
accepted without any reference to immediate practical implications.
Suddenly there was a willingness to draw sweeping conclusions.
In effect all difficulties were attributed to a class struggle in
the sense of a conscious effort by "reaction" to destroy the regime.
This was accompanied by the beginnings of a self-critical approach
from the KSC leadership amounting to the suggestion that difficulties
had been caused by a complacent view that "reaction" was completely
54defeated • This view had, in fact, never been held: the real
change was not in the evaluation of "reaction's" continued existence
52Speaking at the KSC Presidium meeting of 9/9/48, quoted in Brabec:
"Vztah", p.377.
53 ~Report from Ostrava to the meeting of KS~ Area Secretaries in
September 1948, quoted in Kaplan: utv~feni, p.130
54Gottwald, speaking at the Central Committee meeting of November
1948, quoted in K. Kaplan: "Tfidn! boje po dnoru 1948", Pflsp~vky
k d~jingm KS~, 1963, No.3~p.326.
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but rather in the attribution of economic difficulties to conscious
sabotage by "reaction". Attempts to prove this empirically were
unconvincing55• Instead, Stalin's theory of the inevitable in-
tensification of the class struggle was repeated on every possible
occassion so as to substantiate the point. KSC leaders found a new
and easy explanation for difficulties from the assertion "••• the
more we weaken the positions of the bourgeoisie, the more they will
resist and use all possible means, even criminal ones, to reverse
our development to socialism"56.
Stalin's theory was extremely important in the formulation of
the whole new direction of KSC policy. The first and most direct
point was that vague and diverse discontent or apathy could suddenly
be redirected against a single identifiable enemy. Related to this,
a very simple answer was given to the question of what the general
direction of KSC activity was to be. New theoretical concepts did
not need to be formulated despite the immense changes in society:
instead the central concept was still the old, familiar class
SSAn extraordinary attempt was made to show a relationship between
the number of votes against the National Front in the elections
and the number of litres of milk delivered per cow. There was
a vague correlation which was used as the basis for the sweeping
claim that nonfulfillment of delivery obligations was "primarily
a component of reaction's political struggle against our people's
regime"; Lidov~ sprava, 1/10/48, p.295. This unconvincing
argument seems to have been unique as an attempt to provide some
empirical evidence for the assertion that economic difficulties
could be blamed on political enemies.
56 .G. Kliment, speech, ~ 12/9/48, p.1. This was, of course, a
complete reversal of the argument, which had been presented so
often before and given such prominence within KSC thinking, that
the bourgeoisie was cripplingly weakened by the revolutionary
changes of 1945.
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struggle.
This filled a gap in KSC life too as there had been, over the
summer, a general decline in party activity after the peaks of
february and the election campaign. This decline of activity could
be related to a lack of conception about what party work should
involve and was causing particular concern as signs grew of wide-
57spread discontent or apathy towards the regime • It was feared
that some resolutions sent in by workers had been inspired by
reactionaries58 and that workers discontent could be exploited in
I do to 59severa ~rec ~ons • This seemed to be confirmed when even some
workers were found among those being arrested and sentenced for
anti-state activities60•
Now the solution was found to the linked problems of reacti-
vating the party and rafsing the morale of workers by pointing an
accusing finger at reaction.
VI.40.6. Summary and discussion.
With their monopoly of political power confirmed, the KSC
had to confront new problems and possibilities. Previously, when
constrained by the other parties, they had worked out a policy
involving a degree of cautious pragmatism, compromise and restricted
57There were references to "nervousness and panic" in the party
at the Organisational Secretariat meeting of 20/8/48, quoted
in Kaplan: Utv~renf, p.127.
58Kaplan: "Tlfdn!", p.333.
59snftil, K politick¥m, p.47.
60r k ° 'l<.un C10nal.-, 7/10/48, p.4.
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within a short time horizon. They could conceivably have developed
from this basis even after February. Perhaps the logical next step
in that general direction would have been freer inner-party dis-
cussion of the complex tasks confronting the party.
There were signs of more open discussion developing, and the
leadership at all times showed some caution in face of objective
difficulties. Nevertheless, the course adopted quickly led to
great restrictions on internal discussion and to a sharp change in
social and economic policy.
An important influence was the Informbureau's condemnation of
Yugoslavia and hence of ideas of specificity in roads to socialism.
Fears developed in the KSC leadership that they too would be con-
demned. At the same time, the Informbureau supplied them with a
theoretical basis for policies at just the time when they were
confronting new problems. The basis was Stalin's conception of
class struggle which amounted to a reduction of all social develop-
ment to a struggle between classes such that all difficulties in
achieving socialism could be attributed to the conscious work of
class enemies.
The importance of these ideas was that they could justify
policies adopted by the KSC in the economy and methods being developed
for the exercising and consolidation of political power.
Economic thinking was increasingly divorced from a serious
analysis of possibilities and of the causes of disappointments.
Instead, it was assumed that political commitment from workers would
lead to increased productivity. In fact, alongside some willingness
to work voluntarily, workers were becoming more vocal in expressing
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dis~rust towards the intelligentsia and in demanding an improvement
in living standards.
The method used by the KSC to ensure working class commitment
was bound~wfth their reaction towards signs of a right-wing opposition.
61This was an important precedent for later years •
It appeared~a demonstration was planned to coincide with
BeneS's funeral, but the KSC leadership presented this as a real
threat to the regime. Meetings were held in factories and workers
demanded tough police measures. The crucial point then was that the
KS~ leadership realised that they could ensure working class loyalty
by claiming that the regime itself was threatened: complaints about
living standards were then quickly forgotten.
This manipulative political manuevre rapidly became a central
part both of tha method of governing and of economic and social
policies. This is further elaborated in the next chapter.
Stalin's theories suddenly gained a new relevance within the
KSe. Where empirical evidence was lacking,they could be quoted to
support the assertion that difficulties were due to class enemies.
It is a remarkable thing that, even though their objective
situation was so different, the theoretical basis and even to a
great extent the methods of political work of the KSC were very
similar to when they had been in opposition.
61A direct analogy can be found with the later atmosphere leading
to the arrest and imprisonment of Communist leaders; Brabec:
"Vztah", p.377. Also, sea below p.154.
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CHAPTER 41: THE PROCESS OF PENETRATION OF STALIN'S "CLASS"
LINE INTO COMMUNIST PARTY POLICY AND THE PRO-
GRESSIVE ABANDONMENT OF THE CONCEPT OF A
CZECHOSLOVAK ROAD TO SOCIALISM.
VI.41.1. Gottwald, following consultations with Stalin, takes
a position midway between the two lines emerging
within the Communist Party.
On 11/9/48, as concern and doubts about the correctness of
party policy were growing, Gottwald left Czechoslovakia for con-
sultations with the Soviet leadership. There was little doubt that
questions of internal policy would be discussed and it seemed
likely that the KSC would be criticised. The possible line of such
a critiGism appeared in an article written by the philosopher Kolman
who was himself a Soviet citizen. His criticisms, presented at
party meetings and in an article that was never published were pretty
sweeping pointing to the mild line on religion, describing the
"specific road" as a retreat from Leninism and arguing that an
"all-national" as opposed to a "class" spirit had been allowed to
dominate. All this he interpreted as a consequence of the swamping
of proletarian by petty bourgeois elements as could be seen in the
numerical preponderance of local over factory organisations. He
blamed what he described as the effective leadership of the party -
Slansky, Svermov8 and 8are~ - for preventing development towards a
fully "Marxist - Leninist" party and for restricting the most
mature workers' organisations'.
Although publication of this article was prevented, there was
1M. Reiman, Nova mysl, '968, No.8, p.1082.
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evidently a fear that Koiman might have been speaking with the
authority of the Soviet leadership. SI~nsk9, at a meeting of area
secretaries on 22-23/9/48, spoke of the need to sharpen the course
against reaction "ideologically, politically and administratively",
and emphasised that a "period of sharpening class struggle" was
beginning. He added the self-critical remark that "••• the party
underestimated the danger from reactionary elements after rebruary ••"2,
and even extended it as follows:
"After the return of comrade Gottwald from the Soviet Union
our Central Committee and the Presidium of the party will be
confronted with a whole range of new tactical problems. It
will elaborate anew the policy of the party in a whole range
of sectors so as to correspond to the new conditions of
,,3
•• •sharpening class struggle.
There was also an opposing position that reacted strongly against
the suggestion that party screening should aim to "bolshevise" the
4party. Instead it was argued that nobody should 10s8 his head at
the continuing presence of "reaction" as the Czechoslovak road, it
was repeated, was "••• more complicated, in a certain sense more
difficult,,5. On his return Gottwald stood somewhere between these
two positions. Perhaps Stalin had been persuaded that a full self-
2Be 24/9/48, p.1.
:3Kaplan: Utv~fenr, p.111-112.
4This term was used and explained by ~. Cisar, Tvorba, 1948, No.3S,
p.683-684.
SUO.H.", runkcionar, 23/9/48, p.1 and p.2.
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criticism by the KSC leadership was not necessary as there were no
influential "anti-Soviet" tendencies in Czechoslovakia. Revealingly,
Gottwald presented the strengthening of bonds with the USSR as the
t f 11 1· 6cen re 0 a po 1CY •
Even though policy changes were to be made quietly, they were
still very significant. A Central Com~ittee meeting was therefore
7called for November. In the interim the view that there could be
a road to socialism without a dictatorship of the proletariat was
being vigorously condemned as an attempt at a revision of Marxism -
Leninism. Effectively it was argued that seeking major differences •
from the Soviet road was a "dangerous nationalist deviation" aiming
to separate Czechoslovakia from the Soviet Union8• Instead,
specificity was reduced only to the fact that the Red Army had
liberated Czechoslovakia. The bourgeoisie was still expected to
resist just as stubbornly and this was used as a justification for
employing "all administrative means. thisIn a fight with sort of enemy
strong words will not help, only energetic actions"9.
Gottwald did notrpresent so hard a position. He seemed to want
to retain an element of specificity in the sense of a slower and
more cautious approach albeit within. Stalin's general conception of
6FLPFPD, 1/11/48, p.3. This was, of course different from the
previous emphasis on a Slavonic orientation which had included
great admiration for Tito.
7Kaplan: utv~renr, p.228.
88are~, Tvorba, 1948, No.38, p.741-742.
~. Kdn, runkcion~f, 23/10/48, p.2-3.
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socialist construction. He warned against excessive haste -
particularly in the collectivisation of agriculture - saying that
there should still be no mention of Kolkhozes but just preparations
for their later organisation. Stalin had approved of this10.
Nevertheless, the KSC leadership increasingly returned to a
"pure class" line, in some respects similar to the attitudes of the
1928-1934 period, and this reinforced a number of tendencies that
were making themselves felt after the post-February consolidation
of power.
V1.41.2. Open recruitment to the party gives way to a screening
of members. This is not yet a total capitulation to the
"class" line.
As the KSC held an effective monopoly of power, changes in
the party's internal structure and composition were of immense
\
importance for Czechoslovak society as a whole. As was argued
above, in Section 111.17.8, those issues had been strongly
influenced by the need to compete with other legal parties. After
February that was changed. First there was the mass recruitment,
leading to still greater diversity among members, and then there
were reactions against that from the political core of the party.
It seems to be a perfectly natural corollary of February itself,
(and of the great power party officials and activists had acquired,
that they should see no need to make apparent compromises in favour
of these new recruits when power had been consolidated. Their
attitudes could have much in common with those of manual workers
towards intellectuals.
10Kaplan: utvafeni, p.247.
111
So, following persistent signs of distaste towards the whole
practice, mass recruitment was officially stopped in early August
when the KSC Presidium admitted that serious mistakes had been
11made • Simultaneously, new recruitment principles were announced
with an emphasis on the need to be more selective when recruiting
peasants, small businessmen and intellectuals and to see recruiting
k th· . 12war ers as e pr~mary a~m • This was a significant change as
previously the need to broaden the party's social base had been a
principal aim of the recruitment: middle peasants, workers and office
workers in industry and particularly students, among whom the KSC
was still weak, were seen as the most useful recruits13• There
was also a reappearance of old terminology with references to the
14"Bolshevik principle in accepting new members" •
The official line, however, was that the change was not
intended to be particularly dramatic. The proposals for a screen-
ing of all party members, announced shortly afterwards, appeared to
be essentially in harmony with the stated justification for the
post-february recruitment. for some months there had been ref-
erences to the need for ideological consolidation of the party by
15means of education for the new members ,and the fullest possible
11runkcion~r, 7/8/48, p.1.
12runkcion~~, 7/8/48, p.1.
13H• Lomsk1, runkcion~f, 14/5/48, p.19-20.
14K,un, runkcion~~, 7/8/48, p.6.
15r kc i 'leun clonaL~, 11/5/48, p.30 and p.31.
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internal discussion. Although it was felt that some "alien elements"
16would have to be removed ,the principal aim of the screening
process was to be the education of new members plus some reorgani-
sation and subdivision of local and factory organisations into
it f bl' 17un s 0 managea e S1ze • Shortly before the start, which was
to be on 1/10/48, there were strong warnings against the assumptions
of"many comrades" who "wanted to get,rid of the so-called 'February
and post-february members' which they see as noth~ more than
ballastn18•
It was at this point that mounting nervousness among party
activists and the effects of the Informbureau's resolution on
Yugoslavia began to seriously influence inner-party questions. At
the Presidium meeting of 9/9/48 it was argued, albeit improbably in
view of the realities of the party's organisational structure plus
the nature of opposition the regime was facing, that feelings of
uncertainty and even panic had been able to penetrate more easily
19because of the party's social breadth • It was even suggested that
bourgeois attitudes and petty bourgeois elements were causing the
20trouble, so that many members would have to be expelled •
16Funkcion~f, 14/6/48, p.12-13.
17runkcionaf, 21/8/48, p.1-9.
18funkcion~r, 7/9/48, p.S.
19Kaplan: utv~renr, p.131.
20Kaplan: "Trfdnf", p.339.
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VI.41.3. With a further tightening of the inner-party regime
it seems that Stalin's theories serve to justify
gross limitations on internal democracy.
In early November there were changes announced within the KSC
in line with the "class" approach and responding to demands for
more positive commitment from members. A differentiated approach
was announced with probationary membership, which had been introduced
shortly beforehand, to be of different lengths for manual workers
and others. Conversion of full membership back to probationary
membership, which was allowed for during the screening, was to be
applied only in exceptional cases for workers. For othem there was
to be a very close examination of what motivated them to join the
KSC21• There were general warnings of how many new members from
the intelligentsia, who had previously held no strong political
views, were remarkably reluctant to study socialist theory insisting
22that their work was "non-political, non-party" •
Although it was claimed that the party screening involved a
bigger discussion of party strategy and tactics than ever before23,
there is no sign of the direct involvement of the membership in
formulating that strategy. The discussion took place against a
background of fear that KSC policy was being condemned by Stalin and
fear from part of the membership that they might be expelled by the
21Resolution of the KS~ Presidium meeting of 3/11/48, Funkcion6t,
9/11/48, p.6,1D and p.11.
22B£ 6/11/48, p.1.
23sl~nskf, speaking at the KSC Central Committee meeting of 17/11/48,
reproduced in Slansky: la vrt~zstv!, II, p.234.
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other part. Under these conditions, initiatives and contributions
from lower levels rapidly diminished while the power and field of
t f th t t· d24compe ence 0 e par y appara us ~ncrease • Channels of com-
munication from the ordinary members up to the leadership, which
had been very important for the formulation of policy before
february, seem to have sisappeared.
Perhaps more important than anything else in this deterioration
of inner-party life was the growth of a new phenomenon described
as "dictatorialism". In a sense it was no more than an extension
into inner-party affairs of the methods that were being used
against other parties and against active opponents of the regime.
It was referred to during the autumn of 1948 when a number of party
officials were accused of shunning cooperation with party organi-
25satiens: instead they exercised power alone • The problem came
into the open over the so-called Karlovy Vary case where party
members were expelled or even imprisoned for voicing criticisms26•
There were plenty of similar cases in other areas with officials
consciously restricting internal discussions that could lead to
criticisms of themselves. Perhaps most revealing of the immense
and largely uncontrolled power they had gained after february, they
sometimes used the security organs to silence criticisms from within
27the party •
24Kaplan: Utv~fenr, p.170-171.
25cisaf, Tvorba, 1948, No.35, p.684.
26Kaplan: Utv~ren!, p.177-178. and Tausigova. Tvorba, 1949,
p,458-459.
27 Kaplan: utv~renr. p.183 and p.184.
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The leadership naturally condemned such practices, but did not
see in them a consequence of the new power structure. Instead, in
line with Marxist theory as they understood it, power was seen as
theno more than the expression afAwill of a class. Problems of its
control and regulation and of the role and activities of the ruling
party had not been seriously considered before and were raised only
in a very uncertain, pragmatic and unsystematic way. Gottwald did
at least once indicate that there could be advantages in the legal
existence of another party, but he never pressed the paint28•
Z~potocky felt that trade unions could act as a control, pointing
out that external criticisms had served a purpose in making party
29members aware of the need to defend their policies before the public •
In practice, the trade unions were given a different role within
society so that they could not possibly perform this function.
Zapotocky later pointed to the growth of disagreements and strife
within the party which he attributed to the absence of a visible
30enemy •
Systematisation of this pragmatic observation into a recognition
of the need for a continuing mechanism of control over power was
impossible in the prevailing atmosphere. Advantages of the pre-
February political system were never mentioned and there was never
any suggestion that anything could be learnt from the pre-Munich
28See above p.9D.
29Speaking on 9/4/48, quoted in Kaplan: Utv~reni, p.182.
30 .Speaking on 20/4/49, quoted in Kaplan: Utvafeni, p.1B6.
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republic. Instead, alongside the condemnation of "specificity"
went condemnation of "the remnants of bourgeois liberalism and
31pseudo-democracy" • There was no longer any suggestion that
there had been anything positive in previous democratic forms and
instead only their negative features were emphasised - such as the
undemocratic way of formulating the first constitution and restrict-
ions on freedom of expression particularly for Communists32 - as if
that were sufficient to justify the post-February system.
So the leadership's condemnations of "dictatorialism" could
only imply that the phenomenon was no deeper than the mistakes and
transgressions of a few specific individuals. They, in fact, had
no compunctions about using similar methods. In investigating
the Karlovy Vary case, security organs were used and the leading
party official in the area was condemned as a "class enemy who had
wormed his way into our party to do deliberate harm,,33.
still more serious was the treatment of Kolman. Evidently,.
he was felt to be a real danger and he was expelled from the party,
apparently without his own knowledge, and transported to imprison-
ment in the USSR34• So, paradoxically, it was the man who wanted
the most consistent application of the "class" line who was the
most harshly suppressed. Nevertheless, the scope for more general
31E• Bolg~r, a Hungarian referring to Czechoslovak developments,
quoted in Sv~tov~ rozhledy, II, No.10, October 1948, p.773.
32Fakta a cifry, III, No.8, 10/8/48, p.2-11.
33Tausigova, quoted in Kaplan: Utv~fenf, p.190.
34See the letter frem Kolman in Nov~ mysl, 1968, No.8, p.1079-
1080.
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abuses of power was undoubtedly greatly increased by the spread
of attitudes and ideas that were broadly in line with Kolman's
critique.
The leadership went at least half way towards accepting those
attitudes. They too increasingly saw the problem not as the need
for a democratisatimof political life, but as the need to take a
strong line against alleged enemies within the party. This could
be supported by Stalin's theories and could even appear as a means
to win back solid working class commitment. Moreover, within such
a conception "dictatorialism" appeared just as another reason for
distrusting party members at lower levels.
It was suggested that the introduction of secret ballots in
inner-party elections could be a useful restraint on party officials
thereby restricting these abuses of power. This was strongly
favoured as a principle within the leadership, but it was rejected
as premature owing to the alleged immaturity of members and to the
. 35prevalence of internal conflicts between groups • Control over
the abuses of power was therefore left in the hands of the leader-
ship who, of course, had more scope than anyone else to abuse power.
The importance and practical meaning of the "class" approach was
quickly becoming clear. It was important in justifying an increas-
ingly dictatorial regime within the party. It backed this up with
answers to the questions of the conception of social development and
the content of the work of a party holding a monopoly of power.
~5
W Kaplan: Utv~fenr, p.185.
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Instead of seeing the complexity of the problem, everything was
reduced to a continuing and fierce political struggle. The party
therefore had all the more reason for rigid and disciplined unity
and for paranoia about maintaining the purity of its ranks.
VI.41.4. In an attempt to win firm loyalty from the working
class, an increasingly tough line is taken against
opponents of the regime and against those held
responsible for economic difficulties.
The social and economic policies developed by the KSe in late
1948 were justified in terms of a "class" approach and centred
on the conception of a "sharp course" against reaction. This
was~rtly a response to immediate economic difficulties which
meant that some section of the population had to suffer. It was
also an application of Stalin's theory about the intensifying class
struggle and could appear as an attempt to win back working class
loyalty so as to ensure a firm support for the new regime and to
encourage voluntary efforts to raise production.
This seems to have been all that the working class was expected
to do. There was no reoognition of any advantage in that degree of
independence and differentiation of function that workers' organs
had been given before february. Instead, even at the very lowest
level, trade unions were given exactly the same tasks as party
organisations36 and that did not even include checking the manage-
mente
36Sl~nsky: Za vrt~zstvi, II, p.207. for the tasks assigned to
party organisations, see below p.141.
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The most obvious and immediate practical expression of the
37sharp course was a strengthening of the powers of the police •
There were strong administrative measures against black marketeers
including, for example, the conversion of two terms of life imprison-
t " t d th t b th t" 8 38 d"tmen ~n 0 ea sen ences y e supreme cour ~n rna - an 1
dmappear that this had some influence in reducing the black market.
Reports, however, were often contradictory suggesting that it was
suppressed in some localities but reappearing in others. It seemed
probable that at least the elaborately organised chains were dis-
appearing39: even this would not significantly raise workers'
living standards as it did not solve the fundamental problem of
acute shortages.
A second element of the "sharp course" was the establishment
of labour camps. This was apparently demanded by resolutions sent
in from factory meetings which wanted "loafers and disrupters"
sent there. Sl~nsky approved of this attitude40 and suggested that
there was no need to fear any unpopularity abroad because "it is
already being said that we have concentration camps"41. He linked
it with the sharper measures against small businessmen who were
expressing opposition to the regime and against "Kulaks". The
expectation was that it would raise workers' moral a and this seemed
to be confirmed by the large number of resolutions expressing
42approval • It seemed to be in
37BeIda: "Some Problems", p.142.
38BE 10/10/48, p.1.
39statistickY zpravodaj, XI, no.12, December 1948, p.430.
40BE 14/9/48, p.2.
41Kaplan:"Zamy~leni", Part One, p.781-782.
42Kaplan: "Zamy~lenr", Part One, p.784 •
. '36 T
line with the desire "to finish for ever with the attempts of
t. ,,43reac 10n.
A novelty in the measure was the provision that no court
sentence was needed. Instead, it was felt that adequate objectivity
could be achieved by the Ministry of the Interior while National
Committees might be biased for or against a particular individual.
At times it was implied that the aim was to use repressive measures
against those whose transgressions were so mild that even new
repressive laws could not touch them: this included the mere
spreading of rumours which were claimed to be a conscious part of
reaction's activities44• Others, however, made clear that the
targets were those avoiding work and that the aim was to re-educate
45them • This meant that, despite the ~itial justification, it was
not so obviously linked to the "class" approach and could seem to
be directed largely against indiscipline among workers. A report
in 1950 showed that 86,6% of those in labour camps were workers',
or small businessmen45•
A third element wascthe introduction of "class rationing".
This involved the establishment from 1/1/49 of a dual market whereby
about one fifth of the population (capitalists, small businessmen and
those peasan~ owning over 15ha or not fulfilling their obligations
43B£ 19/9/48, p.2.
44e•g• Sirok~, s~eaking to the KSS Central Committee on 27/9/48,
KSS dok, p.709.
45F. Machula, Lidov~ spr~va, 15/10/48, p.313.
46BeIda: "Some Problems", p.142.
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to the state) were excluded from the ration system for some goods.
In one sense this was just a practical solution to a real economic
problem as the imbalance between supply and demand on the market
could only be corrected at the expense of some or all of the
population. It was felt to be quite impossible to lower workers'
living standards so that the chosen alternative hit very hard only
at much of the private sector. It was hoped that in time market
equilibrium could be re-established and rationing abolished
47completely •
The wider changes in the thinking of the KS~ pushed this prag-
matic conception into the background. Instead, class rationing was
increasingly interpreted as a permanent blow against the private
sector and hence as a firm renunciation of the previous "all-
national" policy. It could be justified by the belief that the
private sector was essentially hostile to the government and that
only among the working class was there solid support. It could
therefore appear as the start to rapid administrative measures
aiming to eliminate quickly the private sector48•
VI.41.5. Following Stalin's advice on the need to create a
"new intelligentsia", a policy is adopted responding.
directly to workers' prejudices.
The most dramatic change was in the attitude towards the
intelligentsia which amounted to a capitulation to the attitudes
-
47Kaplan: Utv~fenr, p.212-213, and stru~ni, p.372-373.
48 Kaplan: Utvafenf, p.213.
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of at least the politically vocal workers. This in turn was linked
up with the rntion that economic success depended on initiative from
the workers and that the purpose of planning was to unleash that
initiative. Gottwald indicated the new attitude on his return from
the USSR when he presented the idea of creating a "new intelligentsia".
This was to provide the new cadre force for the army and police.
There is nothing remarkable in this as it seems quite natural that
any regime would want maximum loyalty from its armed forces. More
surprising was the great emphasis Gottwald gave to the technical
intelligentsia. He argued for a reform of technical schools to
allow for rapid advancement of young workers so that they could
quickly acquire the necessary qualifications to take the highest
positions. His argument was as follows: •
"It is true that a considerable part of the older technical
intelligentsia is faithfully serving the nation, but that
is not enough. The old are dying out • • • We need a new
type of intelligentsia which comes out of the working class
which does not have to overcome earlier prejudices and also
has no cause to renounce the working class because it is
part of it. That applies above all to the technical in-
telligentsia"49.
The case for a new intelligentsia was argued slightly differently
by Kliment, although he too placed all the emphasis on those working
in industry who had previously bean regarded as the most loyal to
the regime. He was full of praise for workers and claimed that
49Speaking on 2/10/48, B£ 3/10/48, p.1.
,
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their enthusiasm had encountered "a lack of sympathy, bordering
somtimes even on sabotage, from part of the technical intelli-
gentsia". No new evidence was presented to support this claim,
but Kliment asserted that Factory Councils and Production Committees
often seemed to be more enthusiastic than the management and con-
cluded from this that the way to utilise workers' initiative was
to give the maximum opportunity for the promotion of talented workers
. t th t .bl .t· 50even 1n 0 e mas responS1 e POS1 10ns •
Although there were voices advocating continued caution51,
these were outweighed by mounting criticisms of the technical
intelligentsia and even arguments that their lukewarm political
attitudes were an obstacle to economic success. This was most
clearly expressed by Sl~nsky at the Central Committee on 17/11/48:
"Take the director of a factory. He is a good organiser or
a technical specialist but politically ha is absolutely
illiterate. Can he today run the factory well? He cannot:
Technical knowledge or simple organisational ability is not
enough for that. If a director today is to fulfill and sur-
pass production plans he can only do it successfully when he
does not suppress socialist competition but when he supports
the development of the initiative and labour elan of the
personnel, when he does not reject the innovating suggestions
50~ 9/10/48, p.1.
51Bare~, at the KS~ Presidium meeting of 8/11/48, argued against
any emergency measures. He saw no need to go beyond making
educational advance easier for the children of workers; J. Ma~~k:
"Soci~lnr aspekty politiky KSC vaei inteJgenci vl~ech 1947-1953",
Revue d~jin socialismu, 1969, No.5, p.691-692.
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of the workers but rather attentively listens to the workers'
voices, consults them and gathers valuable experience from
them. Therefore only he who is a politically educated
Marxist-leninist can be a ga:d director,,:2.
This contrasts strikingly with previous calls to "deepen the
camradely and friendly cooperation of managers, technicians and
workers, of all honest workers irrespective of political affilia-
t. ,,53~on • It is also highly revealing in its presentation of politics
as being the ability to win the confidence and raise the morale
of workers who were naturally distrustful of~nagers. It linked
up closely with the presentation of the tasks of the party's
factory organisations which were as follows: first was the mobili-
sation of the whole labour force to fulfill production plans.
Second was the development of socialist competition and "shock
work". Third was the fight for the full utilisation of machinery
and conservation of raw materials. Fourth was the fight for better
labour discipline. Fifth was the encouragement of piece work and
bonus systems so that each individual could be rewarded for his
own work. Sixth and last was concern for the social conditions
54of the labour force •
52Slansky: Za vftezstvl, II, p.220-221.
53Slansky, speech, B£ 23/11/47, p.2.
54Slanskj: Za vrt~zstvl, II, p.207.
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VI.41.6. The new "class" line leads to a policy of gradually
suppressing the private sector and hence to a con-
ception of economic planning with a maximum of
effective centralisation.
A major element in the Communist Party's pre-February campaign
had been the argument that the Two Year Plan was failing only where
capitalist enterprise predominated. This seemed to be bare out by
the plan's final figures which suggested that national income per
head was 13% higher than in 193755• Heavy industry had done
particularly well and the only real failures were agriculture and
construction "where petty production predominate and where there
were capitalist elemsnts"56 There was a considerable over-
simplification of the causes of failure in these two sectors both
of which were crucial for the standard of living. f.J. Kolar
could see only two obstacles in agriculture - the drought and
57"sabotage by remnants of capitalist elements" • There were also
other obstacles such as the failure of industrial productivity
to rise as planned thereby accentuating the agricultural labour
shortage which could not be counter-balanced by technical progress.
The land reform and settling of frontier areas may also have
adversely effected production so that even the Two Year Plan's
. 58targets were probably unrealistic • Kolar, however, deduced from
his oversimplified position that the precondition for economic
55Stru~nY, p.357.
56~ 24/9/48.
57Tvorba, 1948, No.39, p.767-768.
58stru~n1, p.373-374.
success was "unceasing, untiringand ever intensifying struggle against
the remnants of capitalist elements in our economy and a striving to
replace backward small-scale production with socially higher
59forms" •
This meant a reformulation of the place of the private sector
thewithin the five Year Plan and even ofAaims of the plan itself.
Previously it had been given the very general aim of raising living
standards and a similar relationship to the idea of national unity
as that of the Two Year Plan. It was worked out on the basis of
the original proposal from the KS~ in late 1947 and there is scope
f d bt· h th 11·t· ....1-.. bl 60or au lng weer a 1 s alms were au uava e • In the period
when Gottwald was in the USSR there was a quite sudden change from
61dis~ussions about it in purely economic terms to emphasis on the
need to look at it from the viewpoint of socialist construction,
understood in purely socia-economic terms62• limiting and sup-
pressing the remaining capitalist elements became the "consequence,,63
and increasingly the aim itself of the plan. This was a logical
59Tvorba, 1948, No.40, p.781. Perhaps an encouragement to such
propagandist over-simplification was a feeling expressed by
Gottwald on 20/9/48 (quoted in Kaplan: utv~renr, p.202) that, as
the Two Year Plan had failed to raise living standards, planning
in general was discredited among part of the population. The
presentation of the plan as a political struggle and this
explanation for its shortcomings could make it easier to
mobilise support and even enthusiasm.
60See Kaplan: utv~renf, esp. p.202-204 and p.224.
51Z§potoCky, fLPFPO, 1/8/48, p.4.
52Kaplan: utv~fenf, p.210.
63e•g• Z~potock1, Zaklady prvnf p~tiletky, Praha, 1948, p.13.
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corollary of the view that, because of the intensification of the
class struggle and active resistance from capitalist elements in
th~ form of economic sabotage, complete victory could only be
64acmeved when a socialist economic structure had been created •
At the Central Committee meeting on 17/11/48 Gottwald was more
cautious than to advocate an immediate attempt to eliminate the
private sector. Stalin's writings on the subject had warned against
excessive haste pointing to the need for an adequate industrial
base for a higher technical level before collectivisation of agri-
65culture could be undertaken • Gottwald's caution appeared both
as a response to such warnings and as an element of continuity
with the previous slower road. Nevertheless, there was noticeably
less interest in the private sector than before and, although it
was still given some tasks that it could fulfill within the plan,
there was no suggestion that it was better equipped than the public
sector for even these limited tasks. Moreover, they all involved the
need for the closest integration into the plan and cooperation with
nationalised enterprises66• The ~plication could be that the
private sector was to be absorbed without the use of direct admini-
strativ9 measures and this process was encouraged by the policy of
1 ti' 67c ass ra on1ng •
64f•J• Kolar, fLPfPD, 15/2/49, p.3.
65 In the USSR there had been no really large urban petty bourgeoisie:
problems relating to the priva~e sector had naturally centred on
agriculture.
66e•g• ~ivnostensk~ noviny, 4/12/48, p.1-2.
67Kaplan: Utv~fenr, p.267.
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Towards peasants the immed~ aim was to ensure the fulfillment
of quota obligations. A similar method was used to the encourage-
ment of counter-plans thereby trying to use the peasants'degree
of approval for the outcome of february to incorporate them into
the administratively planned economy68. A new element was intro-
duced with the need for "restricting and suppressing" capitalist
elements: this led to a differentiated approach in setting obli-
gations. Bigger peasants with 30-50ha, who were claimed to be
subtly sabotaging, were to be given hard~ tasks. for smaller peasants
there was to be greater emphasis on solving their social problems69•
There was a prcblem here in defining the boundary between friendly
and hostile peasants. The Russian word kulak, for which there was
no exact Czech equivalent suggesting that it did not refer to an
exact social phenomenon either, was the term applied to the
allegedly hostile peasants but there were differences within the
KSC on what it referred to in terms of size of landholding70•
Problems in identifying and defining class relations in the villages
did not prevent Ouri~ from presenting the struggle against capita-
list elements as the most important aspect of the party's
agricultural policy71. This was the start to an approach which
ignored Gottwald's earlier calls for caution and placed the trans-
68provaznIk, Vlasak: Socialisticke, p.51-54.
69funkcionar, 29/11/48, p.30.
70Kaplan: Utvafeni, p.246.
71Kaplan: Utv~!eni, p.249.
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formation of social relations before the technical development of
agriculture. In other words, collectivisation could be justified
even without the necessary technical preconditions.
Not surprisingly, there was growing suspicion towards the
regimes policies from peasants, who were worried by the reappearance
of talk of collectivisation: even the land they were to have
received after February was generally allocated to newly established
72cooperatives • Small businessmen naturally felt discriminated
against particularl~ by class rationing and there were expressions
of sympathy for their case within the KSC73• The intelligentsia
was also worried: their concern stemmed from the purge, the restric-
tion of opposition and discussion, the changes in the party
74demanding more positive commitment and the "sharp course" •
Talk of the new intelligentsia must have compounded this into real
fear.
All these feelings could find no legal means of expression.
Instead, owing to the nature of the new power structure plus the
atmosphere ~ the KSC their existence could encourage more
repressive measures. Slansky effectively argued that there was no
72K. Jech: "Socialn! pohyb a postaven! ~s. zem~d~lsk~ho obyvatelstva
v Ietech 1948-1955", Revue d~Jin socialismu, 1968, zvla~tnr cislo,
p.1113-1114. In early 1949 there was even an attempt to
establish cooperatives that would be a step towards the full
collectivisation of agriculture. In practice, the attempt
failed and investigations of peasant opinion indicated how deep
their suspicions were; Kaplan: utv~reni, p.259-260.
73Kaplan: utvareni, p.267.
74Ma~ak: "K problematice', p.1017-1018.
longer any point in trying to broaden the party's support: "What
has remained outside our ranks we will probably never win for the
75policy of People's Democracy, they are outright enemy elements" •
This again reveals how far the KSC had moved from the pre-
february implicit conception of social development. At that time
broad national unity had been a conscious aim whereby as much as
possible of the population could be involved in economic construction.
By late 1948, direct'planning, political commitment and the working
class alone were felt to be all that was necessary for Czecho-
slovakia's social and economic development.
VI.41.7. The problem of Slovak nationalism is explained ~way
within a conception of developmpnt reduced entirely
to class struQ91e.
Events in Slovakia during and after february do not appear as .
a major influence on all-Czechoslovak political questions. Instead,
Slovak development became even more firmly subordinated within a
general perspective worked out in Prague.
This, however, led to sharper conflicts among Czechoslovak
Communists than before. ,This did not directly reflect a wider
active opposition in Slovakia than in th~ Czech lands, neither did
it stem from disagreements on the policies adopted to consolidate
power. On that issue there seems to have been implicit unanimity.
The Slovak Communists were happy to carry out the purge of
public administration with the minimum of popular participation.
7SSpeaking on 11/10/48, quoted in Kaplan: "TfidnI", p.343.
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A particular problem arose because it waS usuall¥ felt nece-
ssary to remove over half the elected representatives in
National Committees. Generally this was done by dissolving
the old body and appointing an Administrative Commission from
above with only very occassionally elections at public assem-
blies76• Often these new bodies were formed directly out of
the local Action Committees on the suggestion of the local
K5S . t' 17organ1sa 10n •
There were several specially Slovak factors helping this
transfer of power. One waS the view that the Democratic Party
had been the opposition while the K55 represented support for
the government and even for President Benes. This view could
be reinforced by the trials of the conspirators1B and was
particularly influential in those areas where the government
programme had had an effect. Another important point was the
reassurance given by nuris that land under 50ha was guaran-
teed for private ownership: this was apparently seen by many
former supporters of the Democratic Party as evidence that
. 19they had been deceived by talk of "kolkhozes" •
The election results did suggest slightly more willingness
to vote against the official candidates than in the Czech
lands. There
16Laluha: februar, p.254-255.
71 .Laluha: februar, p.241.
7BObuch, against whom the evidence waS particularly strong,
pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 30 years imprisonment.
Kempny received six years and Bugar one. Urs!ny refused to
admit anything and received a seven year sentence; RP
20/4/4B,p.1, ~ 21/4/48, p.2, ~ 30/4/48, p.1 and RP 16/5/46,
p.1.In 1964 the evidence against Urs!ny was admitted to have
been fabricated; J.JablonickY, M.Kropilak: Slovnik Slovenskeho
narodneho povstania, Bratislava, 1910, p.302.
79Laluha: februar, p.267.
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was, however, no real evidence of an organised opposition. The
impression rather was of a successful consolidation of Communist
power and it was this that led to disagreements between Czech and
Slovak Communists. The point was that, Just as the consolidation
of power allowed some Czech Communists to expect a looser inner-
party regime, so too Slovak Communists could no longer see the
need for the degree of centralisation of authority in Prague. In
discussion of the new constitution they therefore advocated giving
greater powers to the SNR. This point of view was simply not
understood in Prague where Kopecky and to a certain extent also
Gottwald seemed to be losing patience with the KSS~ They seemed
to see the question only in pragmatic terms from their point of
view as the holders of power. They could still see possible
threats to their positions from the other parties and from 8ene~.
Their general distrust towards the political situation in Slovakia
only added to their worries and they could not see any possible
. f d 1· 80ga~ns rom eva v~ng more power •
This was the background to a decision to merge the two Communist
Parties. It was not preceded by genuine broad discussion, but was
reached effectively by the KSC Presidium alone meeting on 26/7/4881•
There was no sign of opposition from Slovak Communist leaders who
in fact seemed to gain from the merger. They ~ere given, by co-
option, full representation in KSC supreme organs thereby apparently
80Kaplan: UtvarenI, p.34-40.
815• Fal£an: Slovenska, p.260 and p.261.
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overcoming the strange subordination they had endured before.
Nevertheless, the merger also ensured the elimination of a
potentially independent Slovak Communist Party and coincided with
further changes in nati~ities policy. The most important of these
th b d t f th 'f II' th H ' , ~t 82was e a an onmen 0 e alm 0 expe lng e ungarlan mlnor~ y •
Instead , it was decided at a KSt Presidium meeting on 8/7/48 that
Hungarians would be allowed certain rights and would be able to
join the KSC (not the KS5)83. Husak pointed explicitly to the
merger of Communist Parties as laying the basis for future
Czechoslovak-Hungarian relations and he emphasised the urgency of
overcoming nationality prejudices in Southern Slovakia84•
Apparently there were voices within the KSS doubting the need
for so big a change in policy towards Hungarians85• There were
even some who, when confronted with anti-Jewish demonstrations,
were prepared to play along with existing prejudices by, for example,
publicising the notion that all the leaders of the Democratic
86Party had been Jews •
So in three respects - in the powers of the SNR, in the
Hungarian question and in the attitude towards anti-semitism -
the problem of Slovak nationalism was being raised in a new way
after February. This led to a particular interpretation of the
82Siroky, speaking to the KS5 Central Committee on 27/9/48, KSS dok,
p.719.
83KSS dok, p.701.
84B£ 29/9/48, p.1-2.
85~, . k' f d t h' t th KSS C tIC ·ttlro y re erre 0 suc Vlews a e en ra omml ee on
28/9/48, KSS dok, p.744.
86~iroky ridiculed this on 28/9/48, KSS dok, p.746.
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Informbureau's resolution on Yugoslavia in such a way as to implicitly
justify the firm subordination of Slovak Communists to Prague's
guidance. ~iroky even claimed that "p,tty bourgeois nationalism"
could be found within certain parts of Slovak society, within the
KS~ d ·th· ·t 1 d' 87~ an W1 1n 1 s ea 1ng organs • He qualified this by pointing
out that, contrary to the suggestions of some other KSS leaders,
the situation was by no means as serious as in Yugoslavia or in
Poland where the party leaders had apparently taken a position of
"anti-Russian nationalismn8S•
It is noteworthy that this condemnation of Slovak nationalism
was partly an expression and consequence of the reversal of poltcies
that had been largely enforced from Prague and that had never been
suitable to Slovak conditions. This reversal, however, did not
lead to a new appreciation of the peculiarities of Slovak develop-
mente Above all, it did not involve a recognition, in political
and constitutional forms, of Slovak nationhood.
The Communists had never argued that Slovakia should retain
complete separation from Czech development. Particularly the Slovak
economy, they believed, could benefit greatly from full integration
into an all-Czechoslovak economy. By the autumn of 1948, however,
this was being taken much furthe~ According to ~iroky, any attempt
to maintain the distinctness of Slovakia was essentially no more
than an attempt to prevent "the acceptance of progressive ideas
87S k'pea 1ng
8SKSS dok,
on 27/9/48, KSS dok, p.710.
p.740.
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from more advanced nations"89.
VI.41.8. Summary and discussion.
Stalin's "class" line penetrated quickly into all aspects of
KS~ policy during the autumn 1948. There were advocates of a
still sharper change who called for a full self-criticism from the
leadership. Gottwald however, following consultations with Stalin,
retained an element of caution. Even if earlier ideas of the
Czechoslovak road to socialism were being quietly dropped, there
was still some continuity in the sense that the Soviet model of
socialist construction was to be adopted with some degree of
respect for Czechoslovak conditions.
Nevertheless, the changes were important enough. Ideas for a
mild screening of the party gave way to demands for more sweeping
changes which stemmed from fears that alien elements had penetrated
the party. This created an atmosphere in which it was practically
impossible to control over party officials who in some cases even
used the security forces to silence their critics. Even the party
leadership started using similar methods.
Stalin's theories gave no framework for understanding the need
for a control on power. They also helped justify increasingly
strong police measures against opponents of the regime. This was
described as a "sharp course" against "reaction" and apparently won
approval from workers, but it involved a dangerous departure from
the existing legal norms.
89Speaking to the KSS Central Committee on 27/9/48, KSS dok, p.710.
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Social and economic policy generally appeared as the consequence
of an application of Stalin's conception of socialist construction
in a situation of increasing economic difficulties. Inevitably,
at least some section of the population had to suffer but, so as
to ensure their political loyalty, workers were ~n preferential
•treatment in the distribution of rations. This became linked with
the view that the petty bourgoisie were politically hostile so
that the private sector should be tolerated no longer. A conception
of economic planning evolved from this in which private enterprise
had no role to play at all. In fact, the aims of the plan were
increasingly set as the creation of socialist socia-economic relations.
There were even attempts at the voluntary collectivisation of
agriculture although there was no technological justification.
Stalin's advice was probably more direct on the need to
create a "new intelligentsia" but, by placing the principal emphasis
on the technical intelligentsia, this idea took a form that fitted
with workers' prejudices and dovetailed with a conception of
economic activity based on loyalty to the KSt.
All this could only narrow the regime~ social base. Under the
prevailing circumstances, this did not lead to a return towards
pre-February social pOlicies. Instead, the KSC leadership relied
ever more on manipulative methods of gaining working class support.
This makes clear the inadequ~ of two simplistic ways of
defining power in post-February Czechoslovakia. It is incomplete
to describe it either as "totalitarian" or, to use the term that
came back into official use in 1949, as a "dictatorship of the
proletariat". Dictatorship was exercised, but neither by nor
~
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against the proletariat.
The development of society depended greatly on the means whereby
the party leadership won consent from their supporters and handled
manifestations of discontent and potential opposition from them.
This was crucially important in the development to the show trials
of the 1950's. They were not simply individual abuses of power,
or reflections of the disruption Of eatlier legal norms. Although
both those set the scene, the point was the conversion of the use
of the security forces into a systematic aspect of the party leader-
ship's method of governing society.
In february 1951 Sling, Svermova and Clementis were arrested
and accused by the Central Committee of treason. BareS commented
as follows: "We are not exaggerating when we say that to a certain
extent the spirit inside the party and the response to the
resolution of the Central Committee ressembles the atmosphere of
february 1948. And this is not accidental ••• because as in
february 1948,~at a different stage of development, we have crushed
the enemy which tried to turn back the wheel of history"90.
So, again, the identification of an alleged enemy diffused develop-
ing discontent and converted it into enthusiastic support.
The question of hawaII this could have been avoided is taken
up again in the next, concluding chapter.
90Brabec: "Vztah", p.379.
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CHAPTER 42: CONCLUDING THOUGHTS.
There is no attempt in this concluding chapter to summarise
the preceding work. The aim is just to bring out and put together
some of the important elements in the argument so as to be able to
confront the wider problems raised by Czechoslovakia's development
in the 1945-1948 period. The basic question can be expressed as
the need to explain why, in the practically unique case of develap-
ment in a definitely socialist direction in an advanced country
with democratic traditions, socialism became associated with the
same dictatorial methods as had developed in the Soviet Union.
This must be linked to a number of further questions. Why
did the Communist Party enjoy such enormous prestige in 1945 and
what role did th~t party play in transforming society? Why,
following a period of evolution apparently towards a specifically
Czechoslovak model of socialism, did Czechoslovakia increasingly
adopt the "Soviet model" of socialism? To ask why something
happened raises the question of whether events followed an in-
evitable course or whether there were genuine alternatives. There
is therefore an attempt in this chapter to indicate how the KSC
could have developed towards, and successfully applied, a different
conception of socialist development more suited to the needs of an
advanced society.
42.1. Explaining the socialist direction of Czechoslovakia's
post-world War II development.
Understanding the general popularity of the Communist Party
and the strength of the general trend of revolutionary changes in
1945 is not the same as understanding in detail the form that
socialism took in Czechoslovakia. The former is best interpreted
against a wider background of Czechoslovak history. This shows
how, and experience elsewhere seems to fully confirm this, socialist
revolution could only take place in an advanced industrialised
society under quite exceptional historical conditions.
Important points are the newness of the Czechoslovak state,
the consequent weakness of a oonservative tradition and the
relative strength of political forces advocating radical social
change. The real obstacles to socialist revolution after World
n War I seemed to be not solid conservatism or political repression,
but the ability of reformist politicians to satisfy part of the
workers' and others' social aspirations and to find solutions to
the specific problems of Czechoslovakia as a new, small, landlocked
state located between powerful neighbours and containing large
national minorities.
A comparison between 1918 and 1945 shows that socialist ideas
were popular on both occassions, but that in 1945 that popularity
was greater and was expressed in a large body of support for the
Communist Party. The experiences from the close of World War I,
from the inter-war period, from the collapse of the Czechoslovak
V state, from the occupation of the Czechiands and from liberation
in 1945 all served to broaden the Communist Party's prestige and
to encourage the view that other political philosophies could not
cope with the problems confronting Czechoslovakia.
Perhaps just as important as this "objective" background was
the subjective ability of the Communist Party to evolve policies
broadly in line with the needs of the situation. This added up to
a unique configuration of circumstances that enabled Czechoslovakia
to set out in a clearly socialist direction after May 1945.
42.2. The general problems of evolving a model of socialism
suitable to an advanced, industrialised society.
A description of the general trend of Czechoslovakia's
development cannot be fully separated from a more detailed analysis
of Czechoslovak society in the 1945-1948 period. Considerable
detail is necessary in this, because the basic argument is that
the Communist Party lacked the theoretical equipment to cope with
the complex tasks of governing and leading an advanced society:
this can only be shown by revealing at least some of society's
complexity.
The likely difference between revolution in an advanced and
backward country was pointed out by Gramsci. In the former case
the process seemed to be more complex because "when the state
1trembled a sturdy structure of civil society was at once revealed" •
In one sense this seemed to be borne out by Czechoslovakia's
experience. It has been pointed out that, looking at post-World
War II Eastern European experience, socialist revolution in the
sense of consolidation of Communist power took place latest in the
most advanced and mature country. Evidently, socialist revolution
had to be viewed as a slower and more complex process and not as
1A• Gramsci: Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci,
London, 1971, p.238.
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a single revolutionary act2•
Despite attempts to use some of Gramsci's ideas as a basis
for throwing further light on Czechoslovak development3, He is
little help beyond indicating the need for a more concrete ana-
lysis of the relationship between political power and other
aspects of the structure of society. References to a "war of
4position" or a "war of maneuvre" , obscure the crucial point.
The national revolution involved the destruction of big capital
in industry and finance plus a whole number of further changes.
Politics thereby became far less a question of "war" and increasingly
a question of conscious and constructive involvement in the shaping
and creation of new institutions and relationships.
A description and analysis of the Czechoslovak Party's role in
society therefore sheds new light on the meaning of a revolutionary
change and of political power in an advanced society. Not only
was society complex, but it was also fairly tightly bound together
into one single entity. Particularly during and as a consequence
of the revolutionary changes politics, in the sense of the activities
of government or of political parties, had a deep, lasting and
direct impact on the lives of most people.
2o. Jane~ek: "Kdy u n~s zaeala socialistick~ revoluce", Ceskoslovensk~
revoluee, esp. p.98.
3See also O. Janeeek:"K ot~zce na~eho ptistupu k socializmu a ktypu na~i revoluce v leteeh 1944-1945", Slovensk~ n~rodn~ povstanie
roku 1944, Bratislava, 1965.
4See Gramsci: Selections, esp. p.237-239.
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There was a discernible gradation and differentiation of
involvement, depending on the effects of revolutionary changes and
the degree of incorporation into the developing model of economic
planning, and this corresponded roughly to the propensity among
different social groupas to join political parties. As an example,
peasants in the Czech interior, and this was even more true in
less advanced Slovak villages, were less closely integrated and
less likely to be actively concerned about politics. This cannot
be expressed rigidly as they clearly were affected by government
decisions and by some of the revolutionary changes. Nevertheless,
there is a definite contrast between their position and that of
many office workers, policemen and employees of the media who
could find their jobs and livelihoods directly dependent on
political allegiances. This, stemming from the generally higher
level of development and hence greater degree of integration of
society, gave the political, social and economic changes in Czecho-
slovakia in and after 1945 a somewhat different character from
those associated with the Russian revolution of 1917.
This is the logical starting point for analysing the Communist
Party's role; and for seeing whether the party was subjectively
capable of handling the objective situation. The Communists could
not, of course, have prepared in advance detailed ideas with which
to confront every eventuality. Ideas were naturally always
evolving, changing and responding to new realities. Nevertheless,
as was argued in Chapter 21, the Communist Party was not fully
r
prepared for the task it was taking on. The party's past history
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had been, in many respects, an inadequate preparation for confronting
the situation of 1945. It left a heritage of serious weaknesses
in the fundamental theoretical basis from which they worked out
their policies.
42.3. The development of Communist Party policy up to 1945.
for almost all the existence of the Communist Party until
the formation of the Ko~ice government, its policies were either
strongly influenced or directly determined by the Comintern.
Particularly from 1924 onwards the Comintern leadership in Moscow
was able to issue directives changing the policies and leadership
of the KSC. Although these directives did not always point policy
consistently in one direction, the net effect was to restrict the
ability of the KSC to work out and develop ideas on the specific
Czechoslovak situation.
A promising start was made in the party's early years when
~meral began working out a strategy based on the recognition of
Czechoslovakia's concrete international standing and advanced society.
He still did not explore the full implications of national state-
hood and neither was their consideration of whether the political
structure, involving mass parties and parliamentary democracy,
could or should be maintained under socialism. Although Smeral
advocated working for a coalition government of socialist parties,
he did not develop from this any ideas on the possible political
structure under socialis~.
Nevertheless, ideas were flexible and changeable and there was
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plenty of discussion of political strategy. Had the Comintern
continued to allow scope for this, then it seems reasonable to
postulate that, even if ~meral's aims might not have been~hieved
at once, the Communist Party would have been much better placed to
lead Czechoslovak society at a later period.
Instead, the Comintern encouraged and ensured the victory of
a negative, sectarian trend which led to increasingly sharp
condemnations of Smeral and a rejection of the need for genuine
internal discussion. Particularly in the 1928-1934 period, ideas
were evolved that were of use only to a party of pure oppo~ition.
Nothing was considered beyond blanket condemnations of capitalism
and consequently, despite some flexibility in ideas, nothing
serious was worked out onrowmfurther advance Czechoslovak society
as a whole. It was in this period that the notion that all
social phenomena could be reduced to class terms really took
root.
The conception of the Papular Front was clearly restricted
by this heritage, but could still provide a basis for ideas for
the new republic developed particularly in Moscow from 1943
onwards. The conceptual advances made then should not be under-
estimated as the KSC proved more capable than any other party
of formulating a programme close to the immediate needs of
Czechoslovak society. It showed that the party leaders implicitly
understood that politics in that perios were not purely concerned
with a struggle for power, nor with regulating strife between parties
or governing within a stable and largely unchanging political and
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cooperation between political parties in laying the basis for a
social structure. Instead, politics after liberation involved
new republic.
42.4. Contradictions and changes in post-war Communist Party
policy.
The development of new ideas could not be complete within the
short space of time from the dissolution of the Comintern until
February 1948. There seemed in fact to be a serious contradiction~
between the party's ability to recognise and respond to the
immediate needs of the situation, and the party's overall way of
looking at social development. Although practice suggested to the
contrary, the party leadership still at first presented the
revolution as primarily a political power struggle, albeit not
between precisely defined socio-economic classes but between
vaguer notions of "reaction" and the "nation".
Even if the leading Communists did not recognise the need to
change some of their basic ideas, it was a fact that the party
was deeply changed in its nature and ~ternal structure by becoming
the leading force in the revolutionary changes and in society
generally. It was no longer just a party of dedicated political
activists, although such people still dominated in its leading
core. It had broadened to include many more sorts of people.
Especially significant were those bringing specialist abilities for
the multifarious tasks of governing an advanced society.
The guiding theoretical conceptions evolved when in opposition
were inadequate for this wider task the party was taking on, but
•
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that did not of itself force immediate modifications. None of
the Communist leaders were great theoreticians and, given the
previous history of the Communist movement, they were understand-
ably reluctant to experiment with new ideas: instead, they waited
for the initiative to come from Stalin. The same sort of attitude
prevailed throughout the KSC as, despite diversity within the
party's ranks, the prestige of the leadership was high: there
was no serious possibility of discussion extending beyond the
limits set from above.
Gradually, however, prominent Communists did develop towards
a.firmer theoretical base for a Czechoslovak road to socialism.
Their ideas were always cautious enough to evade explicit criticisms
of the party's past actions and policies. Nevertheless, it is
possible to conceive of the KSC undertaking major programmatic
revisions on the issues discussed in the following sections. In
each case an important start was made in the party's practice and
often also in explicitly stated ideas.
This avoids the mistake of writing history as if events could
only have followed one possible course, thereby implying that the
only possible model of socialism was and is the one that emerged.
It also avoids the opposite error of indulging in idle speculation
about a totally abstract model of socialism divorced from the
realities of the situation at the time. The aim is rather to see
how Czechoslovak society and the Communist Party could have
developed from the basis laid in and after 1945.
The points below could be referred to as issues of socialist
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democracy, or of a democratic model of socialism. Such terms, and
even use of the word democracy, have been avoided wherever possible
throughout this work as democracy can have so many different mean-
ings to different people. In the following sections no attempt
is made to define or construct a precise model of socialist
democracy. The approach used does not try to portray a conception
of democracy as a distinct issue, but rather as a number of related
issues within a broader conception of society as a whole.
As the Communist Party was trying to actively lead and shape
society, the crucial general introductory points on its conception
of democracy, and on how that could affect Czechoslovakia's
development, are the party's methodology'for interpreting and
understanding society - this centres on the concept of the
dictatorship of the proletariat - and the related issue of its
view of its role within society, which relates to the concept of
the vanguard party.
42.5. The temporary abandonment of references to the dictator-
Ship of the proletariat.
Theconcept of the dictatorship of the proletariat, propounded
by the Comintern in such a way as to mean an effective monopoly of
power for the Communist Party, did not just represent a theory of
political power. It was also a consequnce and expression of an
over-simplified and reductionist method of understanding social
reality. It implied the reduction of everything, especially power,
to terms of class. This, of course, was not the view of Marx and
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5Engels, but change did not begin from a critique or reassessment
of ideas developed in the inter-war period.
The term the dictatorship of the proletariat was dropped in
1941 presumably as a tactical expedient in the interests of good
relations between the Soviet Union and the west. It was not
propagated again by the Czechoslovak Communists until they had
of
safely consolidated a monopolYAPower. Nevertheless, despite the
most superficial appearances, this developed into much more than
just a tactic or trick with which the Communists hoped to dupe
their coalition partners. The realities of Czechoslovakia's
post-war development pointed beyond that and encouraged the
Communists to reassess some of their ideas. This led to the view
that the concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat was un-
necessary and that socialism might be acrneved by a more gradual,
evolutionary process.
This was only a start, but it could conceivably have allowed
for the party to develop towards a new theoretical basis,;more
capable of encompassing the full comple~ity of society. The
Communist Party's leaders were too cautious ruhile theoreticians
were generally too rigid in their ideas to attempt this.
An analogous and related issue was the recognition of a
socialist content to the national revolution. Had this point
been followed through vigorously, it could have had important
political implications. It implied the need for a more flexible
conception of socialism which could not be reduced purely to socio-
economic terms. That interpretation meant that socialism was an
55ee Weselowski's work referred to in Vol. I, p.12,
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essentially simple and easily defined social formation which has
to be achieved, or built, after which problems and difficulties
would cease. Such an intepretation was perhaps natural for a
party of opposition, unable to directly influence immediate policies
and therefore relying to a great extent on a vague vision for the
future. It could hardly be adequate for a party confronting the
realities and contradictions of a socialist development of society.
42.6. The failure to evolve a flexible conception of the
leading role of the Communist Party.
Although there was some discussion within the KSC of the
relevance of the notion of the dictatorship of the proletariat,
there was no clarification of ideas on the role of the Communist
Party itself. Lenin's theory of the vangyard party could be
interpreted as meaning that the party alone can know everything
and can decide the direction of social development purely on the
basis of its own theoretical conceptions.
Such an interpretation fits with the system of political
power that developed after february and also with the Communists'
attitude when in opposition, particularly in the 1928-1934 period,
when all other political movements wers completely oondemned
and rejected. It could be justified historiographically-by an
account of KSC history presented as a succession of successes,
or at least as a steady development towards the ultimate victory.
Propaganda for any party tends to portray its history in as
creditable a way as possible. Slansky's account to the KSC Eighth
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6Congress was an example of this. He argued that the party had
been proved right in the past, that its basic. philosophy had been
proved capable of finding solutions to Czechoslovakia's problems
and that it therefore deserved trust for the future. The only
existing attempt to write a full account of KSC history? points
to a basically similar conclusion.
The evidence assembled in this work points to a different
conclusion. Although sometimes able to contribute decisively to
the general direction of Czechoslovakia's development, the KS~
never had the theoretical equipment, or the means for forming
policies, with which to understand and hence direct society entirely
on its own. At all times, society was too complex to be directed
from one centre or on the basis of one all-embracing conception,
such as class struggle.
It seems that there are broadly two possible conceptions of
the role of a Communist Party, both roughly compatible with the
idea of a vanguard party or of a party exercising a leading role
in changing society. One sees the vanguard as capable of knowing
everything and therefore justified in taking a monopoly of power.
The alternative, more flexible view involves rejecting the claim
that any party can hold a monopoly of truth.
This is still compatible with the view that a vanguard party
has to playa decisive role if a socialist transformation of
6See above Vol.II, p.198-199.
70x.. KS~~J1ny ~.
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society is to take place. It can certainly be argued that the
great strength of the Communist Party was a precondition for
Czechoslovakia developing in a socialist direction, but its
leading role had to be continually reaffirmed in each individual
sphere of social activity on the basis of its ability to develop
and apply its general ideas to specific concrete pro~blems raised
by social development. This naturally involved compromises and
modifications in some of the party's proposals, but the general
trend of development after May 1945 was close enough to the
Communists' immediate aims and dependent enough on their strength
for it to be valid to talk of a leading role for the Communist
Party.
Although this was how the party's role was developing in
practice, and although it was pragmatically recognised that the
party should not try to do everything, it was not justified in
theoretical terms as related to the needs of Czechoslovak society
at the time. This was a very important weakness-greatly restricting
the party's ability to develop answers to more specific issues of
democracy.
42.7. The failure of the Communists to appreciate the benefits
of a genuine plurality of parties.
The Communists did not openly discuss the issue of a one-
party versus a multi-party political system, but the ideas of a
vanguard party as inherited from the days of the Comintern and as
applied in the Soviet Union, plus a very few allusions to that
effect, suggest that they saw a one-party state as the ultimate
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ideal.
A comparison between the pre-February and post-February
political structures does suggest that there were real benefits
in the National Front system. While socialist change was by no
means prevented, there was a powerful control on the Communist
Party leadership's power. Other bodies and organs could not be
tranformed into simple transmission belts, criticisms could not
be totally silenced, the diversity of interests and opinions
could not be ignored and policy measures could not be decidied
on without some discussion in public. To become and remain a
leading force in society, or a vanguard party, the Communist
Party had to be able to present its idea sensibly and convincingly
enough to win in open political debate.
There was, then, an important and very welcome 'mechanism of
control over the supreme positions of power. Even inside the KSC,
and despite the absence of any discussion about inner-party
democracy, relations were affected by the existence of a pluality
of parties in society. It was largely prodding and criticisms
from some of their partners in the National Front that particularly
encouraged Communists to begin publicly modifying their ideas.
The National front, however, was not primarily a mechanism
for preventing the abuses stemming from a monopoly of power.
Initially it was a coalition between political forces holding
~; different conceptions of social development. There was always
the possibility that the balance of strength might change leading
to a reversal of some of the important revolutionary changes, or
to give the Communists sufficient strength to govern alone. This
meant that there was always tension and nervousness between parties.
Moreover, the fact of competition between them encouraged dema-
goguery, the distortion of truth for propaganda aims, and the
restriction of discussions inside parties. Clearly, it was a
most imperfect method of ensuring a degree of control over power.
The further development of Czechoslovak society might have
led to a better system. Even after February 1948 some Communist
activists, and possibly some individuals outside the party too,
did not expect a completely monolithic power structure. It 'might
be possible to develop a model of socialism within which diversity
is represented within one party and through various representative
organs and mass organisations. That would ,require toleration by
the leadership of greater flexibility, discussion and diversity
within the party.
The Communist Party leadership's behaviour in and immediately
after February 1948 suggests that they did no~ recognise the need
for the expression of diverse views and interests up to the highest
point of power in the state. Far from seeking a better way of
doing this from the pre-February coalition, they took measures
going way beyond the method of political debate so as to eliminate
from a share in power the other political parties. The way this
'/ was done points to a conception of social development~as such that
they believed everything could be directed by one centralised
party.
Had they known in advance of the economic and social difficulties
of the next few years and, above all, had they foreseen the
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tragedies about to befall so many of them personally, then leading
figures in the party might have seen the error of this conception.
There was, however, no sign until after 1956 of anybody in the
Communist movement realising the need for a more complete theory
of democracy.
42.8. The failure of the Communists to recognise the need for
Rublic control over potential organs of repression.,
Alongside the general issue of a control over power so as
to ensure representation for diverse views and interests is the
narrower question of public control over the organs that can be
used for direct repression. This became a live political issue
around the situation in the police force. The Communist Party saw
the basic question as the political allegiance of the police.
With considerable justification, they felt that the police in the
pre-Munich republic had been clearly biased towards the right.
Their response from 1945 onwards was to aim for an even firmer
Communist dominance: this was achieved by, and itself involved,
a great restrJction on the deQree of genuine public control over
the police.
There certainly had to be armed forces capable of dealing with
possible concerted opposition especially from some Germans and
from fascist elements in Slovakia. Major changes from the pre-
Munich and Protectorate forces were perfectly justified, as too
was insistence on the need for an anti-fascist political awareness
within the police. This, however, could have been achieved with
an extension rather than a restriction of public control. The
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police and security forces would then have been given the role of
protecting the environment within which the parties of the
National Front could cooperate and compete for popularity. Attempts
to eliminate other political forces from a presence in potentially
repressive organs indicated contempt, or at least distrust, for
coalition partners. It could follow naturally from the erroneous
conception of a vanguard party discussed above in Section 42.6.
Had they appreciated the need for a general control over power, the
Communist leadership might have moved closer to the Social Democrats
ideas on the police.
Communist domination of the police was certainly a source of
tension between parties. It is, however, difficult to assess the
direct political role of the ~police, or of the mOF8 specialised
security and intelligence services, in the 1945-1948 period. They
certainly were not powerful on their own, but they may have been
indirectly influencing major political decisions. Apart from the
known cases where their activities were at the centre of political
controversies, they could conceivably have been reporting to the
KSC leadership on the activities of the other parties in such a
way as to generate and encourage fears. BeneS apparently felt that
Gottwald genuinely believed that there were plans for creating a
government of officialsB•
There is a real lack of empirical evidence on the activities of
the police and security forces and on the Communist leaders' views
BRipka: Czechoslovakia, p.213.
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on how they were to be used. Bare~ hinted that they may have
been playing a larger role than published sources suggest:
"He who takes a stand against the people and against the
republic must be aware that sooner or later he will feel
the weight of the law. It is a definite shortcoming that
many Communists have not yet fully understood the meaning
9of state, legal and administrative power" •
Even without speculation an the role of the police and security
forces, later experience leaves little doubt that potential organs
of repression need to be publicly accountable. In the 1945-1948
period this issue was raised, particularly by the Social Democrats,
but Communists showed no awareness of its importance. Nevertheless,
mechanisms of control did exist owing to the independence from the
Communist Party of the courts and owing to the need for the
Communists to show at least some degree of respect for their coalition
partners who could publicise abuses through their press. These
controls were removed after february 1948.
42.9. Vagueness and ambiguities in the Communist Party's ideas
on the democratisation of local government.
The Communists were the advocates of giving maximum power to
the National Committees in May 1945. This followed partly from a
pragmatic realisation of the difficulties and problems that would
be faced in consolidating the new state and partly from a belief
that grass roots organs of power were necessary to guarantee
98are~: ~, p.2B-29.
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revolutionary changes. This last point could be deduced from an
interpretation of the Russian revolution and from interpretations
of the failure of the revolutionary movement in Czechoslovakia in
1918 and 1938.
This, however, is quite insufficient to define the role of
National Committees after the consolidation of the state. The
Communists evidently hoped that they would develop a lasting role
bringing local administration closer to the people it directly
affected, but to make this a reality they had to have realistic
ideas on what powers and activities could be taken by local organs.
There obviously had to be some limitations to the degree of de-
t
centralisation of power and the main debate between Czech parties
centred on whether to give the National Committees considerable
autonomy in a narrow range of issues, or whether to restrict their
role to that of executive organs of the Ministry of the Inmtior with
a much wider sphere of competence.
The Communists fauoured this latter conception and its weakness
can be seen in the issue of the police force. The issue there,
however, was not simply the ministry's powereover appointments.
Probably of greater importance was the Communist Party's grip on
National Committee posts concerned with the police. That in itself
need not have ruled out a considerable degree of automous decision
making power for National Committees, and hence a genuine decentra-
lisation of power. That would have depended on the situation within
the party and on whether individual party members were likely to
try to act as a control on the activities of a ministry headed by
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a member of their own party. The pressures against doing so -
such as the competition between parties encouraging chauvinism
within each one and the actual power structures within parties as
reflected in their methods of selecting representatives for elective
posts - were considerable.
Although parties could make a major contribution in developing
ideas on the role and powers of National Committees, their domination
over those bodies also in itself hampered the genuine decentralisation
of power. An analogous situation could have applied in a number
of economic organs, as discussed in the next section, and in much
of the press which was directly subordinated to political parties.
Such party domination could be justified by the Communists' view
that ,they could lead society alone and also by the National Socialists'
view that diversity could be fully expressed through competing parties.
After February the Communist Party took responsibility on its
own for the development of society. Despite some hints that a
laxer regime could develop within the party, the trend was for a
far greater restriction on the autonomy of National Committees.
The purge implemented by Action Committees, giving effective power
to party bodies, exemplified this.
42.10. The possibilities for developing a new model of ~anage-
ment for a socialist economy.
Nationalisations, state regulation of the economy and the Two
Year Plan created the basis for the development of a socialist
economy. As was suggested in the introduction to Part V, there
need have been no rush to eliminate all private enterprise although
there could well have been benefits from a gradual extension of
public ownership and a gradual improvement in methods of planning.
This means that the general ownership pattern is only one
side to the question of the structure of a socialist economy.
It is possible to develop different degrees of centralised control
and different methods of detailed management particularly within
the nationalised sector. The situation in Czechoslovakia ruled
out great reliance on market forces or on the price mechanism as
a regulator and organiser of the economy. It would therefore be
quite unrealistic to look for an embryonic model of market socialism.
Czechoslovak experience is, however, of relevance to questions of
centralised planning under a plurality of parties and with attempts
to develop industrial democracy.
Experience in the brief period of economic planning up to
february 1948 does not support the view that political plurality
and centralised economic planning are incompatible. Oespite Ripka's
fears10 the accession of the Communist Party to undivided power did
not follow logically from the nationalisation of, and hence
centralised control over, most of Czechoslovakia's industry. Neither
did the destruction of big capital mean restrictions on workers'
freedoms. On the contrary, it gave enormous scope for an expansion
of industrial democracy particularly through the power of elected
factory Councils.
There~insufficient information to allow for definite conclusions
on the role they could have played within a model of centralised
10See above, Vol.II, p.160.
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planning. It remains impossible to generalise safely on how far
they could behave as completely independent bodies or how far they
were genuinely representing the feelings of workers. The role
played by Communists in their creation and in their later activities
also raises the issue of their autonomy from direct party directives.
Nevertheless, it is possible to conceive of them, and other trade
union bodies, developing from their economic role as a "social
conscience" of the enterprise into a powerful instrument of economic
policy. They could have been permanently involved in winning
workers' commitment for government policies and, as a precondition
for being able to do that, in acting as a partner with or at least
as a control on economic policy makers at all levels thereby prevent-
ing arbitrary acts and voluntaristic decisions.
Only part of this was the Communist Party's conception of
their role, but there clearly was a place for independent repre-
sentatives bodies for workers at all levels in the economy.
Widespread working class doubts about, and disagreements with party
-o..s CNl:-li.~ u~ v-. ao.ylct~a.:=J·_
policy"are evidence enough of that. Together with scope for inde-
pendent, professional economic discussion plus some sort of plurality
in the supreme body of plan formulation, strong Facotry Councils
and trade unions could have prevented the subjectivist planning
errors of the years after 1948.
The greatly expanded role of the Communist Party after February
1948 meant that representative organs were given no specific,
11indiependent role. That does not mean that the party should have
11See above p.
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simply kept out of economic questions. The development of the
pre-February model of economic management suggests that the party
had an important contribution to make on a number of issues that
could not be seen as purely economics. These included the roles
of and relationships between the various economic and representative
organs, the relationships between and relative pay of manual and
technical workers and the general level of labour morale. The
party, however, implicitly accepted that it alone could not
directly manage the economy and that those with different political
affiliations could also make a valid contribution.
It seems, then, that nationalisations and the beginnings of
economic planning greatly expanded the role of politics in the
economy. Politics in this context does rot mean strife between
parties or concentration on a fight for power: it refers rather
to participation and involvement in decision making, representation
of interests, and conscious attempts to go beyond the effects and
operation of purely economic mechanisms. Ripka's point about the
relationship between socialism and democracy in the economy should
therefore be put differently. There need not be any inevitable
tendency, but socialism, with the greatly expanded centralised
governmental power to decide over economic issues, implies a far
greater ~ for democratic forms. Otherwise, real alternatives
cannot be presented and discussed and the best solution to problems
12cannot be found •
After February 1948, when the controlling influence of the
12srus: Socialist, esp. p.193-194 and p.197.
other political parties had been removed, the role of the
Communist Party in the economy increased, but it also underwent a
fundamental change. It seemed set to over-rule the importance
of representative bodies, of specifically economic mechanisms
and to some extent even of specialist abilities13• At the same
time, politics was understood not as involving participation and
control but primarily as a question of hectoring and campaigning
to encourage workers to reach ambitious production targets.
This change can be related to the Communists' oversimplified
interpretation of society as outlined above in Section 42.5 and
42.6.
42.11. The possible irrelevance of speculation on what could
have happened.
The preceding sections have aimed to show that, prior to
february 1948, a Czechoslovak model of socialism was gradually
taking shape. It was still at an early and formative stage and
the leading force in Czechoslovak politics, the Communist Party,
had only begun to recognise the need for major changes in its
thinking. It is, however, possible to conceive of a further
gradual development of society, governed by a genuine coalition,
such that the Communists would have modified their own theoretical
conceptions in such a way as be able to give still more definite
leadership.
A serious possible objection to this is that the division of
13See above p.140-141.
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Europe and the realities of the cold war may really have confronted
the Communists with a choice between total defeat or total victory.
Czechoslovak politics, it could be argued, was bound to divide in
the same way and to the same extent as European politics as a
whole, even if the Czechoslovak Communists did nothing to encourage
the process.
Two points can be made in reply to that suggestion. The
first is that the February events were an important encouragement
to, as well as a consequence of, the division of Europe. They
gave legitimacy to US strategy in Europe and to the setting up
of NATO. The US had seen Czechoslovakia primarily as an ally of
the Soviet Union and had not been seriously concerned about the
14fate of Czechoslovak democracy • The February events then in-
creased the credibility of the claim that the United states aimed
to defend democracy in Europe as it appeared by then that
socialism might be incompatible with expending civil liberties
and a genuine plurality of parties. Czechoslovak experience prior
to 1948 pointed rather to the opposite conclusion.
The second point is that, even if there were disadvantages as
well as advantages to the pre-February political structure, Chapters
40 and 41 show some of the first unpleasant social consequences
of the post-February power structure. Even if the coalition might
have become unworkable without the Communist Party's offensive of
autumn 1947, that cannot mean that there was no alternative to
14See above, esp. p.
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the elimination from a share in power, and then the effective
silencing of all other political opinions. This affected not
only clearly anti-socialist forces, but also those that were
ambivalent or even firmly pro-socialist.
42.12. Unansulered questions on the role of the Soviet Union
in deciding the direction of Czechoslovak politics.
No serious Czechoslovak policy could ever have been based on
total independence in the sense of ignoring the international
situation. from the foundation of the state in 1918 it was
recognised that Czechoslovakia had to be part of some international
arrangement or bloc. After 1945 there were good grounds for a
close alliance between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union: this,
rather than reliance on the West, seemed to be the basis for
Czechoslovakia's security.
The relationship that developed was, however, much tighter
than just a common approach on world questions. A new element
was introduced into Czechoslovak politics as Stalin actively
intervened in Czechoslovak foreign policy in mid-1947. from 1948
onwards this was extended into insistence on such firm incorporation
into a Soviet bloc that Stalin's conception of socialist construction
was adopted by the KSC. This could be seen as a continuation of
the same relationship between the Soviet and Czechoslovak Communist
Parties as had operated within the Comintern. The difference was
that earlier when Czechoslovak Communists had been unable to work
out ideas suitable to their own conditions, they had been condemned
to impotence, but in 1948 they held a monopoly of power. Their
ideas therefore had a very direct impact on the development of
society. Czechoslovakia can be said to have adopted the Soviet
model of socialism. That does not mean that every aspect of Soviet
society was copied and reproduced: that would have been impossible.
The point for Czechoslovakia's internal policy was threefold. In
the first place, Stalin's theories were adopted as a general guide
for policies. Secondly, as a consequence of that, no attempts
were made to evolve new ideas suitable for the new situation.
This meant that differences from Soviet institutions and methods
of organising society appeared as residuals from the past rather
than the consequence of creative attempts to grapple with the
concrete needs of Czechoslovakia's development. Thirdly, there
definitely were times when direct pressures were applied by Stalin
to change KSC policy. It may eventually be revealed that this,
and perhaps some Soviet influence on the Czechoslovak security
forces, was important even before February. Lack of information
on the extent and influence of these undisclosed contacts between
the USSR and Czechoslovak Communists is an important gap, but
need not radically alter any of the conclusions reached in this
work.
Evidently, the Soviet Union had a great influence on Czecho-
slovakia'a internal policy and this could lend support to fejto's
argument that: "the fundamental contradiction of the socialist
system is between the particular kind of hegemonism (both imperial-
ist and ideological) of the USSR,~and the tendency of the Communist
parties and states to try to win or recover their internal and
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15external autonomy" • It is certainly true that a major change
in policy by the Czechoslovak Communist leadership would require
Soviet approval, but Fejto seems to over-generalise the phenomenon.
Apart from implicitly ignoring the extent to which the two states
could have common interests, he obscures the complexity of changes
and tendencies within Czechoslovak society. Some of these
encouraged some of the moves towards adopting the Soviet model
while some could point towards different directio~of development.
The next section therefore suggests the possible principal internal
tendencies in post-February Czechoslovak society and relates them
to the special relationship between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet
Union.
42.13. The contradictions and tendencies of the socialist
society in Czechoslovakia.
The preceding work has shown the steps towards the evolution of
a Czechoslovak model of socialism and how that process was in-
terrupted by the events of February 1948. This raises a difficult
question for some modern Marxist theoreticians. R. Medvedev, for
example, has argued that in the Soviet Union today, owing to the
advanced nature of the society, democratisation is "an objective
necessity,,16. Brus similarly concludes that social advance has
led in Eastern Europe to a "growing complexity of the object and
15F• Fejto: Hjstoire des democraties populaires, Vol.II,
Apr~s Staline 1953-1971, Paris, 1969, p.335.
16R• Medvedeu": On Socialist Democracy, London, 1977, p.311.
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need for democratism He even concludes that economic needs
will ultimately determine "the democratic evolution of the political
system under socialismll19•
Czechoslovak experience in the immediate post-war period gives
some support to the view that democratisation was a "need" of
society, but seems to contradict the argument that evolution will
inevitably lead in that direction. This raises the question of
what conflicts and hence of what tendencies could be expected to
operate in post-February society.
There certainly were a number of sources of conflict in pre-
February Czechoslovakia, but they only really manifested themselves
when expressed in the strife between parties. February eliminated
this strife, but it could not mean a damping of all conflicts: in
fact, some seem to have been intensified as they took on a completely
new importance. Although this work only looks at the first months
after February, later experience would probably support the view
that there were three issues - or spheres of conflict - around which
the future development of Czechoslovak society was largely decided.
These were the issues of inner-party democracy, -of relations between
the party and the working class and of the handling of outright
opposition to the government.
17 Socialist, p.188.Brus:
18 Socialist, p.197.Brus:
19 Socialist, p.207.8rus:
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February brought conflicts within the Communist Party to the
forefront of political attention by encouraging two opposing general
tendencies. One, amounting to an application inside the party of
methods that were used against other political movements, was for
a tightening of discipline and concentration of power. The most
extreme expressions of this in 1948 were the general phenomenon
of "dictatorialism" and the treatment of Kolman. Dictatorialism
in itself could create its own opposition, but there was further
encouragement for an ill-defined opposing trend from the belief
that, as opposition from other parties had been eliminated in
February, there was no longer such need for a tight inner-party
regime. Perhaps there was some tendency for Communist Party activists
to try to incorporate and represent the diverse interests within
society, thereby strengthening the second trend, but that did not
appear as a conscious aim. Instead, there was a general feeling
that social and economic policies should be based on continuity
from the pre-February period plus an embryonic, but clear, tendency
for party activists to criticise excessive centralisation of power.
The conflict between these two tendencies cannot be easily
expressed as a conflict between identifiable sociological categories.
Notions of a clearly defined new class, or even of a bureaucracy,
obscure two important points; first, "dictatorialism" came to
affect all levels of the party and therefore cannot be seen as a
rational expression of a definite interest within society; secondly,
I
the crucial point was the mechanism of decision making and of
exercising political power which was such as to prevent the formu-
lation of policies rationally responding to the needs of Czecho-
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slovak society at the time.
Of these two tendencies, victory in 1948 went generally to
the first one. It was great+y, if not decisively, helped by
Stalin's theories and perhaps also by his direct influence.
Nevertheless, the changes inside the Communist Party were to a
considerable extent dependent on the party leadership's response
to signs of working class discontent.
There had been indications before February that workers often
did not accept economic policies advocated by the Communist Party.
These had never came to the centre of attention because they were
never directly expressed in disagreements between partes. Never-
theless, they probably encouraged the Communists to adopt a more
militant policy and to exaggerate the extent to which private
enterprise caused economic problems.
After February the relationship between the party and the
working class became more important. Workers widely regarded
February as their victory. They were more self-confident than
ever, and less willing to be fobbed off with promises for the
future. Their hcpes and aspirations clashed with the party
leadership's demands for still more effort which, owing to the
realities of the economic situation, could not be accompanied with
real improvements in living standards.
At the same time , February meant a narrowing of the Communist
Party's social base so that loyalty from the working class was all
the more urgently required for the new power structure. Moreover,
bodies able to represent the interests of other social groups at
governmental level, i.e. the other political parties had been
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silenced. There was therefore no mechanism opposing, and plenty
of pressures encouraging, the partial satisfaction of workers'
social demands at the expense of other social groups. This was
very important for the whole direction of social and economic
policy and was encouraged by Stalin's conception of class struggle.
In fact, consolidation of a monopoly of power was legitimated
by social benefits in the very first weeks after February. Workers
certainly gained over the following years compared with the pre-
Munich republic and the model of socialism that developed in
Czechoslovakia could claim credit for overcoming the more extreme
social inequalities and injustices of capitalism. This justifies
f til' 1" t . f .. l' 20 h' h Idre erence 0 a SOC1a concep 10n 0 SOC1a 1sm ,w 1C eou
consolidate a political power structure by its ability to give
benefits to at least a part of the working class, but which could
not satisfy all the other needs of an advanced society.
So, although working class discontent led to a crisis within
the party leadership, it did not thereby encourage any liberalisation
of the regime. Instead, the party leaders believ~d they could
overcome the crisis by establishing still more rigid discipline
within the party and by effectively rejecting the view that the
interests of other social groups should still be respected.
This creates a link between the method used to secure working
class loyalty and the methods adopted against signs of discontent
with government policy. Outright hostility was a new problem as.
20See Kaplan: "Historick~II.
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the coalition had served to incorporate and thereby to some extent
silence social forces with doubts or reservations about the
revolutionary changes. After February there were some signs of
more open opposition to the government. The leadership did not
see this as a legtimate expression of concern at government policies
which could be incorporated by a degree of liberalisation. Instead,
and this related to the desire to secure working class loyalty,
it was exaggerated into a threat to the regime itself and hence to
post-war social gains. This was justified by Stalin's theories
of socialist construction and led to the speediest possible
elimination of all private enterprise, even when it could not be
justified in economic terms.
42.14. The international implications and significance of events
in Czechoslovakia after World War II.
February 1948 is even today quoted as a crucial element in
the chain of events dividing Eastern from Western Europe and
simultaneously dividing Socialists from Communists in Western
Europe. This was the most striking and immediate international
significance of the February events, but this section is concerned
.may
with another issue that~even prove to be of more lasting inter-
national importance: that is, the implications of the whole 1945-
1948 period for the ideas of socialism in advanced societies such
as exist in Western Europe.
Czechoslovakia has been quoted as an example of the feasibility
of a road to socislism based on the winning of a firm majority
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· 1· t21~n par ~amen • Such suggestions, obviously following from
Khrushchev's remarks at the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU,
indicate at least a willingness to see what was new in Czechoslovak
22experience, and that was a definite advance from the early 1950's.
Nevertheless, February was still seen as the decisive change, so
the Czechoslovak specificity was reduced to a question of the road
to Communist power. The revolutionary changes of 1945 therefore
appeared as having no potential beyond being a step along that
road.
There are some similarities, but also some important differences
between the strategies of Western European Communist Parties and
the strategy of the KSC. This can partly be explained by different
circumstances, as no Communist or Socialist party in any advanced
country is likely to find itself in so favourable a situation as .
to be able to incorporate all legal parties into a coalition with-
in which it holds such a definite intitiative. Neither are the
repressive organs of the state likely to be so free from right-
wing influence or domination. This~ans that, if a "historic
compromise" can be said to have been made in Czechoslovakia, then
the Communist Party entered into it from a position,of-great
strength. A positio~;of such strength that developments after
May 1945 cannot be quoted as direct support for "gradualist" ideas
21 For a Czech example see J. Kozak: How Parliament can playa
revo]utionary part in the transition to socialism and the role
of the popular masses, London, 1961, The Czech edition was first
published in 1957.
22see above Section 1.4.
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on the transition from capitalism to socialism.
Nevertheless, there are many specific points and three general
issues that can be presented as important lesso~ from Czechoslovakiats
experience. The first is the great importance of conscious political
leadership if socialism is to become a reality: many of the tasks
and problems involved in the creation of a new social order needed
conscious and systematic solutions: the Communist Party's role
within that process was enormous. The second lesson is that this
need not involve an exclusive position of leadership for one party.
The third lesson, which comes particularly from a comparison between
pre-February and post-February society, is that socialism, perhaps
to an even greater extent than preceding social formations, requires
mechanisms for representing, at the effective levels of power, the
diversity and differences within society. This does not necessarily
mean legal, competing parties: although that does ensure some sort
of control on power, it is by no means a perfect mechanism. Never-
theless, recognition of the necessity for some mechanism is perhaps
the most important lesson for Communists, while other Socialists
might be more surprised by the first two points.
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